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INTRODUCTION
Processes of integration face a continuous dilemma: how can states achieve the provision 
of certain public goods which they alone are not capable of providing, while, at the same 
time, clinging to a jealous defence of the national sovereignty inherent in the very notion 
of statehood. Organisations of regional integration have traditionally provided public 
goods linked to trade in products and, more generally, those linked to economic activity. 
Since the last decade of the last century, regional organisations have also increasingly 
focussed on the provision of another type of highly political goods. These include 
mechanisms to ensure the observance of a certain type of regime. Since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the breaking up of communist regimes, the traditional doctrine of non-
interference and respect for national sovereignty has gradually yielded to the principle 
that regional organisations should also provide mechanisms to guarantee that democratic 
regimes in member states would be maintained. Thus, democracy and integration ended 
up being linked together.
Examples of this global development can be identified in regional organisations of 
every continent with the exception of Asia. In Latin America and the Caribbean, as 
well as in Europe, the earliest expressions of the idea that regional organisations must 
defend democracy in their member states go back to the organisations created in the 
immediate post-war period (the Organisation of American States and the Council of 
Europe) although in practise these were far from being perfect mechanisms. The most 
important development of this type of mechanisms coincided with the last decade of 
the twentieth century. Thomas Franck (1992) drew up the thesis of the emergence of 
a right to democratic governance with the corollary of an assertion of the legitimacy 
of transnational, international and regional organisations acting against destabilising 
tendencies in democratic regimes. The growth in statutory instruments in various 
organisations in this decade seems to confirm the existence of a paradigm shift in 
which, while not questioning the obligation of non-interference and respect for national 
sovereignty, the way has been opened for international and regional scrutiny of possible 
breakdowns or erosions of democratic regimes.
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Beyond these “normative” arguments, there are also more functional reasons for the 
creation of this type of statutory instrument. On the one hand, states facing democratisation 
processes have an interest to ensure that the recently acquired democratic regimes 
are irreversible. To this end, they see in the creation of supranational commitments an 
obligation that national stakeholders will have difficulty altering or ignoring or which will 
at least increase the cost for those who may be contemplating a return to undemocratic 
regimes (Pevehouse 2005). On the other hand, ensuring democracy and the rule of law for 
the member states of regional organisations also serves as an indication and guarantee 
of their commitment to the objectives of the organisation itself. This correlation is even 
stronger if the organisation is also committed to these principles (i.e. democracy and 
the rule of law) as its own objectives. In addition, the more complex the organisation is 
(gauged by the number and sophistication of its objectives), the more likely it is to acquire 
such clauses of democratic conditionality. In fact, Mechanisms for Democracy Protection 
(MDP) are more common in organisations that define themselves as organisations of 
integration (such as the EU, the AU, ECOWAS, MERCOSUR, UNASUR, etc.).
There is a logical link between the democratisation of states and the creation of 
Mechanisms for Democracy Protection at regional level. Tracing the causal relationship 
between these two is not easy (i.e. are the states which are becoming democratic creating 
MDPs, or is it the MDPs which are contributing to democratisation) and the evidence 
points in both directions, thus a wise conclusion might be to accept a circular relationship 
between the two.
This study focuses on analysing MDPs in regional organisations in Latin America, 
the Caribbean and Europe. The study is organised as follows: Chapter 1 presents an 
assessment of the state of democracy in both continents, highlighting the potential factors 
which might pose a threat of breakdown or erosion of democratic regimes. Then, Chapter 
2 gives an exhaustive examination of the legal regulations of the MDPs as contained 
in the various instruments, that is, the Treaties and Protocols. Chapter 3 examines the 
practise of the various organisations, which is then used as the basis for the evaluation 
contained in the conclusions, which in turn leads to proposed recommendations. 
Information related to Chapter 1 comes from the analysis of secondary sources 
(bibliography) while Chapter 2 builds on a critical analysis of the original documents 
(Treaties and Protocols, together with declarations in the case of those institutions which 
do not have formal instruments (for example, CELAC). Chapter 3 compares various cases 
in which there has been a breakdown/threat of breakdown. The empirical evidence comes 
essentially from primary sources, such as texts (declarations, resolutions, and official 
press statements) from the organisations themselves, together with press releases. To 
gain a deeper insight, a significant number of semi-structured interviews were carried out 
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with political figures directly involved in the various incidents (see the list included at the 
end of the study). The fieldwork was done in two periods, in March and July 2015, and 
the interviews were transcribed. The information obtained was collated to shed light on 
the various cases but also, and in particular, to inform the conclusions.
Chapter 4 presents the general conclusions of the study. The general conclusion is that 
regional organisations respond to the dilemma between non-interference and effective 
defence of democracy by striking a balance between the two based on institutional 
devices which grant a wide margin of discretion to the governments of the states that 
are part of any regional organisation, both in their decisions on whether or not there has 
been a breakdown or a threat of breakdown in democracy and the rule of law, and in the 
application of the sanctions laid down. From these conclusions, the study proposes a 
list of recommendations for the improvement of the MDPs – related to their design and 
implementation – on the basis of the empirical evidence collected in both regions.
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1  REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS  
AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN 
AMERICA, THE CARIBBEAN AND 
THE EUROPEAN UNION
1.1. Introduction
This study covers the period 1990-2015, a time which saw a sustained increase in 
the number of democratic regimes together with a parallel decrease in the number of 
authoritarian regimes both in Latin America and in Europe. Indeed, all the countries 
of Latin America – with the sole exception of Cuba - have democratically-elected 
governments which, in addition, have been given authority by another democratically-
elected government. Similarly, all the European governments have been democratically 
elected and, at least since the fall of the Soviet Union and the accession of Central and 
Eastern European countries and some of the Balkan countries to the European Union, 
one could say that democratic order is the only game in town (Whitehead 1986). 
The number of regional organisations which have adopted formal mechanisms for 
the protection of democracy (MDP) including conditionality clauses for accessing and 
remaining in the organisation has grown alongside the sustained increase in democracies 
worldwide. Table 1 summarises the data. 
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No doubt both tendencies – an increase in democracies at national level and an increase 
in MDPs at regional level - are interrelated; nevertheless it is a matter for academic debate 
whether one tendency is the cause or the effect of the other. Is it the greater presence of 
democratic regimes that has driven the emergence of “democratic regional governance”? 
Or, to the contrary, is it the emergence of MDPs that has contributed to democratisation 
and democratic consolidation in various regions? 
Most likely, these two processes have a sort of two-way relationship: regional 
organisations have contributed to the processes of democratisation as shown by the 
example of the countries of Southern and then of Central and Eastern of Europe, those 
of Central America and of the Southern Cone of South America; then the quantitative 
increase in democracies – what some have called the “democratic density” (Pevehouse 
2005) – has favoured the institutionalisation of MDPs by regional organisations. In other 
words, there is a mutually constitutive relationship between the increase in democracies 
at national level and the institutionalization of MDPs at regional level. On this basis, this 
study seeks to answer the following questions: 
· How are MDPs designed in the regional organisations of Latin America and 
Europe? In which institutional aspects do they differ and in which do they 
converge? (Chapter 2)
Table 1: Mechanisms for Democracy Protection: Democratic conditionality and accession clauses
Organisation Original 
membership
Conditionality 
clause and year 
of adoption
New 
members
Membership denied
African Union (formerly OAU) 31 Yes (Ac)/2001 23
CAN 4 Yes (Ac)/2000 1 0
CARICOM 4 No 11 0
Council of Europe 10 Yes (1949) 37 2 (Belarus, 
Kazakhstan)
Commonwealth of Nations 7 Yes (Ac)/1997 47 0
EAC 5 Yes 0 1 (Sudan)
ECOWAS 15 Yes (Ac)/2001 0 0
EU 6 Yes 22 1 (Morocco)
MERCOSUR 4 Yes (Ac)/1996-8 1 0
NATO 12 Yes (Ac)/1992 16 0
GUAM 5 Yes 0 0
OAS 21 Yes 14 0
OIF 21 Yes (Ac)/2000 36 0
SADC 10 Yes (Ac)/2001 5 0
SICA 6 No 1 0
UNASUR 12 Yes (Ac)/2010 1 0
Source: Closa (2013). Note: Ac (acquired; i.e. the formal disposition was added after the creation of the organisation)
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· How have MDPs been implemented in actual cases of democratic breakdown 
and with what effects? (Chapter 3)
· How is it possible to improve the design and implementation of MDPs in the light 
of this comparative experience? (Chapter 4)
In this first chapter we will present a general framework and a common basis of 
definitions and concepts so that we can answer the three questions in greater detail 
in the subsequent chapters. We should first point out that the quantitative increase in 
democracies does not negate the fact that there are great challenges to democratic 
consolidation in the twenty-first century. Indeed, even when authoritarian regimes have 
decreased relative to democracies, hybrid regimes, usually defined as “anocracies”, 
have remained constant. This indicates that a large number of regimes which might be 
considered democratic are, nevertheless, politically unstable and may face authoritarian 
regression. Indeed, in Latin America, during the period of the study, there were over 
sixty incidents that could be described as democratic crises, and sixteen Heads of 
State were removed from office before the end of their mandate (Valenzuela 2008; Heine 
and Weiffen 2014; Marsteintredet et al. 2014). Problems of representation, legitimacy, 
and tendencies towards democratic disaffection are not unknown, nor are demands 
from citizens for greater transparency and accountability and improvements in public 
management. These problems, which are being felt in both regions to a varying degree 
and with different manifestations, should also be included among those challenges to 
democracy, but these are questions which are outside the remit of this study. 
Table 2: Interruptions to democratically-elected presidential mandates in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (1990-2015)
Agent Cause Head of State/Country Year
Congress Impeachment;
political trial
Collor / Brazil
Pérez / Venezuela
Cubas /Paraguay
Lugo / Paraguay
1992
1993
1999
2012
Incapacity or removal from 
office
Bucaram / Ecuador
Gutiérrez / Ecuador
1997
2005
President own 
decision under 
pressure
Resignation De la Rúa / Argentina
Serrano / Guatemala
Fujimori / Peru
Sánchez /Bolivia
Mesa / Bolivia
2001
1993
2000
2003
2005
Resignation and early 
elections
Balaguer / Dominican Republic 1996
Armed Forces Coup d’Etat Aristide / Haiti
Mahuad / Ecuador
Aristide / Haiti
Zelaya / Honduras
1991
2000
2004
2009
Note: The case of the resignation of Eduardo Duhalde in Argentina has not been included, as he was not popularly 
elected. Threats of coups and unsuccessful coups such as those in Paraguay in 1996, Venezuela in 2002, and Ecuador 
in 2010 have not been included. At the time of writing of this study, President Otto Pérez Molina of Guatemala had his 
diplomatic immunity removed and was subsequently detained on charges of corruption.
Own elaboration based on Valenzuela 2008 and Marsteintredet et al. 2014.
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Although incidents of democratic crisis have occurred less frequently, Europe has 
also seen a resurgence of regimes which, although they may have been elected in 
accordance with democratic rules, have led to illiberal or even authoritarian practises 
during the exercise of power (Jenne and Mudde 2012; Scheppele 2013). As will be seen 
in Chapter 4 of this study, in many of these incidents of democratic crisis, the regional 
organisations of both regions have intervened by implementing their formal MDPs and/
or taking actions which varied from making declarations of condemnation to applying 
sanctions. 
This introductory chapter is organised in three sections. The first section presents some 
working definitions which will be used in the rest of the study and examines briefly the 
various theoretical approaches to the study of these mechanisms. The second and 
third section describe, respectively, the challenges to democracy confronting Latin 
America and Europe during the period of the study, emphasising the role of regional 
organisations. The decade of the 1990s in Latin America and in Europe was mainly 
characterised by processes of democratic consolidation after the dissolution of the 
military regimes of South America, the peace agreements of Central America and the 
fall of the Soviet Union in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The role of 
regional organisations and MDPs must, therefore, be set in the context of these major 
processes. 
In the years post-2000, however, the challenges in both regions came rather from the 
emergence of a variety of regimes which, while not being authoritarian, may be considered 
hybrids with features of illiberalism or competitive authoritarianism (Zakaria 2007; Levitsky 
and Way 2010; Philip and Panizza 2011; Sedelmeier 2014; Vachudova 2014). This variety 
of hybrid regimes was typical of the context in which the regional organisations and 
MDPs operated in the last decade. These heterogeneous regimes called into question the 
consensus around the concept of liberal democracy on which the great majority of MDPs 
in the various regional organisations were based. Diversity of views on what democracy 
means opened up a debate on where the area of intervention by these organisations 
began and ended.
1.2. Defining concepts: Mechanisms for Democracy Protection  
 and democratic crisis 
We begin with some basic definitions of what we understand by “Mechanism for 
Democracy Protection” (MDP), “democratic intervention” and “democratic crisis”, as 
these will be concepts used throughout the rest of the study. This study uses operationally 
a liberal and formal conception which describes democracies as those regimes which 
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comply as a minimum with four basic principles (Dahl 1971; Schmitter and Karl 1991; 
Mainwaring 1992; Pevehouse 2005; Levitsky and Way 2010):
· Competitive elections between multiple political parties
· Universal suffrage
· Protection of the rights of minorities and respect for civil liberties
· The absence of unelected supervisory actors (military, monarchies or religious 
bodies). 
Levitsky and Way (2010: 5-6) add a fifth principle; i.e. the existence of a level playing 
field between the ruling party and the opposition. Indeed, some governments may 
severely limit the political opportunities of the opposition by using measures that do not 
necessarily constitute an attack on civil liberties (the third principle), for example by co-
opting the media through informal governance or patronage, as happened in Italy during 
the administration of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. This did not infringe any rights; 
however, it did in fact limit political competition (Van der Vleuten and Ribeiro-Hoffmann 
2010; Scheppele 2013). The formal definition adopted in this study is certainly not the 
only one. There are other definitions including more minimalist definitions of democracy 
which focus exclusively on the electoral aspect (see for example Przeworski et al. 2000), 
and others which are more maximalist imply that democracies have a substantial focus on 
the principle of social justice and the reduction of inequality (see for example Whitehead 
1986; Streeck 2011; on the pros and cons of minimalist and maximalist definitions, see 
Schnably 2000: 165).1 In this study we are limiting ourselves to these four principles we 
have described in order to differentiate between democratic, hybrid and authoritarian 
regimes.
By Mechanisms for Democracy Protection (MDP) we mean formal, semi-formal and 
informal rules and procedures by which regional organisations can intervene in case of 
a potential democratic crisis. MDPs form part of a wider category of mechanisms for 
the promotion of democracy which include, for example, electoral missions or capacity-
building programmes such as those implemented by the European Union and the Council 
of Europe in the candidate countries for membership or in third countries outside of 
Europe (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003; Pace 2011; Heine and Weiffen 2014: 14-15). The 
MDPs codify the democratic consensus of the members of a regional organisation and 
1	 Some	 MDPs	 provide	 definitions	 of	 democracy	 which	 approach	 or	 at	 least	 allow	 for	 a	 substantial	 interpretation	 of	 
	 democracy.	For	example,	in	the	Protocol	of	Washington	which	preceded	the	Democratic	Charter	of	the	OAS,	we	read	that	 
	 the	“elimination	of	extreme	poverty	is	an	essential	part	of	the	promotion	and	consolidation	of	representative	democracy”	 
	 (OAS	 Charter,	 Art.	 3(f);	 Art.2(g),	 33,	 116;	modifications	 of	 the	 Protocol	 of	Washington).	 Similarly	 the	 Inter-American	 
	 Commission	established	in	1992	that	“Popular participation, which is the aim of a representative democracy, guarantees 
 that all sectors of society have an input during the formulation, application, and review of national policies. . . . [T]he 
 implementation [of economic, social, and cultural rights] creates the condition in which the general population is able, 
 i.e. is healthy and educated, to participate actively and productively in the political decision-making process	(Inter- 
	 American	Commission,	quoted	in	Schnably	2000:	165).
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define mechanisms for implementation and for sanctions when a member state deviates 
from this consensus (Schnably 2000, 2005; Closa 2013; Heine and Weiffen 2014). When 
an instrument of international law, such as a protocol or an international treaty formalises 
this consensus, we typically speak of a democratic clause by which the regional 
organisation requires as a condition of membership that the states should be and should 
remain democracies (Genna and Hiroi 2015). As we will see in Chapter 2 of this study, the 
MDPs vary considerably from one organisation to the next in their degree of formalisation 
and completeness, as well as in their assumptions of applicability and of the procedures 
for their application and, when appropriate, of the sanctions which they envisage.
The final basic concept which requires clarification is that of democratic crisis. 
Academically, it is possible to define a democratic crisis as one or several events which, 
occurring within a brief and limited timeframe, directly threaten the political institutions 
of a democratic regime (Linz and Stepan 1978; Heine and Weiffen 2014). According to 
the distinction proposed by Dexter Boniface (2009), it is possible to classify democratic 
crises as to whether the event which caused them was “ambiguous” or “obvious”, and 
whether the agent of the crisis is “endogenous” or “exogenous” to the regime. An incident 
is “obvious” when it has flagrantly violated an existing law, typically constitutional law. 
An incident is “ambiguous” when it does not violate the laws in force, so it can therefore 
be considered legal or partially legal. As for an agent, it is “endogenous” if it is internal 
to the government and “exogenous” if it is an actor or organisation that has not been 
elected, typically a non-state actor or the armed forces. The potential combinations of 
this typology can be seen in Table 3.
However, the formalisation of MDPs does not stick to rigorous academic definitions. 
Defining a “democratic crisis” largely depends on the actors in question, their regulatory and 
ideological positions and, as will be shown in this study, their degree of formalisation and 
legal or regulatory development, or the precedents that may exist. And beyond the formalised 
definition of a specific instrument, the identification of a real “democratic crisis” results 
from the interaction between the institutionalised consensus in the regional organisation 
Table 3: Types of Democratic Crisis
Origin of the Agent
Endogenous Exogenous
Incident Obvious Self-coup
Electoral fraud
Coup d’Etat
Threat of a coup
Attempted coup
Ambiguous Electoral irregularity
Conflict between powers
Constitutional reform
Impeachment / Political 
Trial
Source: Own elaboration based on Boniface (2009) and Heine and Weiffen (2014)
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(perhaps codified in a democratic clause) and, on the other hand, the related deliberations 
of the governments of the member states when faced with a specific case. The more MDPs 
are formalised, the more likely it is that the institutionalised consensus will prevail upon the 
related deliberations. However, as will be shown in Chapter 3, the MDPs envisaged by the 
regional organisations of both regions in the study tend to be incomplete contracts which 
leave plenty of room for the interpretation of what type of situations constitute a democratic 
crisis and of how to intervene (Duxbury 2011; Closa and Palestini 2015). 
As may easily be inferred, faced with an ambiguous incident a regional organisation will 
have greater difficulties determining if the event should be classified as a democratic 
crisis or not and, therefore, whether MDPs should be activated. Ambiguous incidents 
leave more room for deliberation, but also for political calculations based on Realpolitik 
or ideological preferences. Nevertheless, to the extent that regional organisations take 
on a role in Democracy Protection which goes beyond what are flagrant unconstitutional 
changes of government, they must without doubt be open to a better and more detailed 
definition of what are currently considered “ambiguous incidents”.
1.3. Why do MDPs emerge? Why do they matter?
Academic literature on the emergence, institutionalisation and effects of MDPs has 
developed in the last 30 years in response to the emergence of the phenomenon. Indeed, 
although interventions by regional organisations have been recorded in the context of the 
Cold War – for example, the suspension of Cuba by the OAS in 1962, or the indictment of 
Greece in 1969 which led it to leave the Council of Europe –, the formalisation of MDPs 
in democratic clauses gained empirical (and normative) significance from the last decade 
of the twentieth century in parallel with the so-called third wave of democratisation. A 
second reason for the development of literature on MDPs is that the phenomenon sits 
at the crossroads of various sub-disciplines: studies on democratisation, comparative 
politics, comparative regionalism, international institutions, international relations, etc. 
Theories and concepts tend to vary across these different branches of political science, 
making it difficult for a coherent research programme to emerge. 
Nevertheless, during the last decade a series of comparative studies have produced 
a more or less coherent body of knowledge around MDPs and, more importantly, 
identifying causal mechanisms which explain why governments – by definition jealous of 
their national sovereignty and meticulous custodians of the principle of non-interference 
in internal affairs – decide to create such mechanisms, formalise them in clauses and, as 
if that were not enough, to implement them in concrete cases of democratic crisis.
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The first approach is the theory of the diffusion of norms. Back in 1992, Thomas 
Franck argued that there was an idea circulating globally according to which legitimate 
governments were those which were in power with the consent of the governed. In 
Franck’s interpretation, this internationally shared expectation would positively reinforce 
the interest of the governors in gaining legitimacy through the adoption of principles, rules 
and democratic procedures: democracy, in this interpretation, has become a “global 
right” formalised and implemented via multilateral and regional institutions (Franck 1992, 
see also Huntington 1991). Recently Tanja Börzel and Vera van Hüllen (2015) have once 
again supported this argument maintaining that a “global script” is emerging across the 
board in various different regions. They argue that  a policy transfer was taking place 
from certain regional organisations (principally, although not solely, located in Europe) 
towards areas of limited state capacity such as Africa, parts of Asia and Latin America. 
This general perspective which could be called “diffusionist” (Beeson and Stone 2013; 
Risse 2016) tells us little, however, about how such policy transfers come about, why 
their design varies and what their effects are on real democratic crises. What is more, in 
the area of MDPs no empirical research has proved that dissemination exists nor shown 
the channels by which it operates. On the other hand, MDPs were established in Latin 
America at the same time as in Europe.
Other analytical approaches are making more progress in answering these questions. 
Jon Pevehouse (2005) has drawn up an analytical framework centred on the actors, to 
explain the role of these organisations in general and of MDPs in particular, in processes of 
democratic transition and consolidation. According to Pevehouse, regional organisations 
are a fundamental factor, often forgotten by theories of democratisation, in explaining 
why democratic regimes become established and do not suffer authoritarian regressions 
following a process of transition. His general argument is that regional organisations, 
through MDPs, lock in the interests of democratic actors, interests such as respect for the 
rule of law, respect for property and commitment to free trade (on the lock-in mechanism 
see Arthur 1989 and Pierson 2000; as applied to international institutions see Moravcsik 
2000). The actors Pevehouse refers to are not only the political elite but mainly the economic 
elite. MDPs are used for these “democratic actors” to integrate other actors (principally the 
armed forces) and turn their attitudes towards democracy. On the other hand, by accessing 
to regional organisations with MDPs, national democratic actors raise the cost of potential 
disruptive acts thus dissuading other actors who might be motivated to seek power outside 
of democratic rules and procedures (Pevehouse 2005; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006). 
It is not, therefore, the diffusion of standards that would explain the rise of MDPs at regional 
level, but rational calculation by actual actors for whom democracy fulfils a functional 
purpose. We may summarise Pevehouse’s argument in five causal mechanisms through 
which MDPs influence (positively) the transition and consolidation of democratic regimes. 
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The first mechanism is conformity or what we could also call acquiescence: membership 
of a regional organisation provides protection for the interests of key groups, especially 
economic groups. The second, of a regulatory nature, is legitimisation through the 
feeling of belonging to a “club of democrats”. The third mechanism is direct assistance: 
regional organisations can offer assistance through capacity building programmes or 
help with development which, in the words of Pevehouse, acts as a “bribe” towards 
authoritarian actors. The last two mechanisms identified by Pevehouse are related to 
“democratic consolidation”. The first of these is lock-in which, as we have said, consists 
in ensuring a commitment to democracy (and the associated set of principles and 
standards) so that breaches and defaults are prevented. Obviously, the “insurance” is 
greater when MDPs are formalised in a democratic clause. The second mechanism is 
dissuasion: through MDPs and the establishment of sanctions, regional organisations 
dissuade illiberal actors. 
Andrea Ribeiro Hoffman and Anna Van der Vleuten (2007) offer a focus which, while not 
necessarily refuting the mechanisms identified by Pevehouse, complements them with 
new explanatory factors. The authors adhere to a theory of “political realism” to explain 
the intervention and non-intervention of regional organisations in cases of democratic 
crisis. Their intuition is that intervention depends on the interests of global powers and 
regional powers. By studying various cases of intervention and non-intervention by the 
EU, MERCOSUR and SADC, the authors maintain that the main factor explaining the 
intervention by a regional organisation in a democratic crisis is the existence of “external 
pressures” normally from a Western global power (in the cases studied by the authors 
these were the United States and European countries). When there is no external 
pressure, the factor explaining the intervention is the interests of the leader in the region. 
The authors also mention a third factor which, even when there is external pressure, can 
inhibit intervention, namely the “clash of cultural identities”. According to the authors, 
the abstention by SADC when the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe was facing intervention 
and sanction is explained precisely by the clash between the pressure from ex-colonial 
centres (principally through the Commonwealth) and the strong post-colonial identity 
prevalent in South Africa (Ribeiro Hoffman and Van der Vleuten 2007; Van der Vleuten 
and Ribeiro Hoffman 2010; Ribeiro Hoffman 2015). 
Despite some problems of conceptualisation (what is a “democratic intervention”, what 
is a “clash of identities”, etc.) and being based on lower numbers of cases (which can 
lead to a selection bias), the approach proposed by Ribeiro Hoffman and Van der Vleuten 
has the merit of emphasising the dimension of “Realpolitik” which directs the focus of 
the analysis to the interests of the governments of the most powerful states in the region, 
a perspective that is missing in the more normative approach of the diffusionists or the 
more rationalist approach of Pevehouse. 
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Gaspare Genna and Taeko Hiroi (2015) have recently developed a study which combines 
a rationalist and liberal position on international relations with a realistic vision of the 
interests of the powerful states. In a study of 40 regional organisations in Africa, the 
Americas, Europe and Asia, the authors argue that the emergence of MDPs is the result 
of the growing economic inter-dependence at global and regional level. According to 
this argument the economic actors which interact either commercially or financially 
across national borders, require governments to provide political stability and legal 
certainty, so as to ensure the proper functioning of trans-national transactions. From 
this point of view, MDPs are mechanisms which ensure stable politics and respect 
for the rule of law, as the credibility of the democratic commitment of political actors 
in a particular region is increased (Genna and Hiroi 2015: 48-49; see also Moravcsik 
2000). According to Genna and Hiroi the formalisation of MDPs in democratic clauses 
requires not only the existence of a regional consensus, but also the presence of a 
regional leader who will guide the other governments and pay the costs of the process 
of institutionalisation. However, the authors distance themselves from the argument of 
Ribeiro Hoffman and Van der Vleuten, as for them the effects of the democratic clauses 
are “above” and “beyond” the powers and preferences of the most powerful states in a 
region. Once the democratic clause has been formalised, Genna and Hiroi maintain, the 
institutionalisation of conditionality in itself makes it effective. The authors argue that, 
in fact, democratic clauses are particularly necessary and their effects are stronger in 
those regions where the leader state does not present a fully democratic regime (Genna 
and Hiroi 2015: 168). 
The comparative study of Genna and Hiroi presents an optimistic picture of the effects of 
MDPs and in particular of democratic clauses by demonstrating, via econometric analysis, 
that on average regional organisations which have democratic clauses have a lower 
propensity to suffer a coup d’état and democratic regression, than those organisations 
which do not have a democratic clause. In this sense, the authors are producing new 
empirical evidence for the argument that democracy can be promoted “from above”, that 
is, from the regional organisations towards their member states (Pevehouse 2005).
However, qualitative case studies show that democratic clauses have major problems of 
implementation and application when confronting a situation of a situation of democratic 
crisis. As has been said, from the point of view of institutional design the clauses are 
similar to incomplete contracts often with major ambiguities in respect of the definition 
and composition of the fact-finding missions, the term and definition of sanctions, and not 
least the procedures guaranteeing the right to be heard by the parties, as well as that of 
appeal (Schnably 2000; Berry 2005; Duxbury 2011; Closa 2013). The lack of substantive 
definitions (what democracy is, what constitutes a democratic crisis) and procedural 
definitions means that regional organisations apply MDPs in a selective manner, which 
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generally coincides with the interests of governments, especially the most powerful 
governments (Duxbury 2011: 214 and following). Even clauses which define rules and 
procedures more precisely can face problems when they are applied, as seen in the 
case of the clause of ECOWAS and the AU (Schnably 2005). The self-referential logic 
underlying the approaches of Pevehouse, Genna and Hiroi according to which the very 
institutionalisation of the clause would ensure its effectiveness, appears exaggerated in 
the light of the empirical evidence. 
Moreover, as the majority of the regional organisations in Africa, Latin America and 
Asia are strictly inter-governmental, the governments involved in a democratic crisis 
are part of the decision-making processes. Ambiguous definitions and procedures 
coupled with a wide margin of discretion on the part of the governments can mean that 
MDPs run the risk of being used by democratically-elected governments of member 
states to give legitimacy to actions which infringe the third principle of the definition 
of democracy: protection of the civil and political rights of the citizens (Closa and 
Palestini 2015). 
In this sense, clauses may be effective in preventing coups d’état against democratically 
elected governments, but less suitable for protecting civil and political rights from violations 
committed by democratically-elected governments. Various authors have pointed out the 
possibility that regional organisations in general, and MDPs in particular, may in practise 
operate as “supports for illiberal regimes” (regime boosters) (see for example Söderbaum 
2004; Duxbury 2011; Rittberger and Schroeder 2016).
In the fourth chapter we will return to a discussion of these theoretical approaches in the 
light of an analysis of the institutional design of MDPs and of cases of their implementation 
in Latin America and Europe. Following this we will present a brief contextualisation of 
the two regions during the period of the study, emphasising what have been the main 
challenges to democracy to which regional organisations have had to respond.
1.4. Challenges to democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean
In this section we present a succinct contextualisation of the role regional organisations 
have played and the challenges they have faced in promoting and protecting democracy 
in Latin America in the period 1990-2015. It is possible to broadly distinguish two different 
contexts in which democracy promotion and protection have developed via regional 
organisations. The first forms part of the processes of democratisation experienced by 
many of the countries of South and Central America which began in the 1980s, and 
continued up to the last years of the twentieth century. 
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The second context coincides with the emergence of different regimes in the post-
transition period, which vary considerably in the way they understand and practise the 
principles and democratic standards defined in the previous section, and generally covers 
the first fifteen years of the new millennium. It is within this context of a range of varying 
regimes that the distinct democratic crises arose in which the regional organisations of 
Latin America have intervened. 
 1.4.1 Regional Organisations and the process of democratisation 
  (1980-2000)
During the 1960s and 1970s, the countries of Latin America were mostly run by 
authoritarian regimes and dictatorships. Only Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela 
maintained uninterrupted democratic regimes during those two decades. Many of these 
regimes felt committed to a doctrine of national security in the context of the Cold War 
and they were therefore tolerated by the United States under the Mann Doctrine and then 
the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, an approach which was to change dramatically at the end of 
the Cold War, giving rise to a series of initiatives for cooperation based on liberal market 
reforms and the adoption of democratic principles according to a doctrine of democratic 
security (Whitehead 1986; Somavía and Insulza 1990; Feinberg 1997; Domínguez 1998; 
Hurrell 1998; Valenzuela 2008). 
Military intervention forced 104 changes of government between 1930 and 1980 at a 
rate of two per year, which is more than a third of the total changes of government of 
that period. In the period from 1980 to 2015 military intervention forced seven changes 
of government (a rate of one every five years) heralding the period of greater democratic 
stability in the history of Latin American republics. Currently all the countries of the region 
– with the exception of Cuba – have governments elected by democratic processes 
(Valenzuela 2008; Hertz 2012).
In South America, the transition to democracy began with the election of Raúl Alfonsín 
in Argentina followed by the elections in Brazil and Uruguay (1985), Chile (1989) and the 
coup against the dictator Alfredo Stroessner (1989) which began the democratic period in 
Paraguay. A renewed enthusiasm for regional integration and regionalism accompanied 
the transition to democracy in the Southern Cone. In 1980, leaders of the transition, such 
as Raúl Alfonsín in Argentina and Tancredo Neves in Brazil, were aware of the institutional 
weaknesses faced by South American countries in transition to and consolidation of 
democracy. Through regionalism, the democratic elites sought to construct a network 
of democratic security which would protect the countries from potential coups d’état 
(Schnably 2000; Dabène 2004). The Iguazú Declaration (30 November 1985) captured 
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this perception as it also did the Programa de Integración y Cooperación Económica 
(Integration and Economic Cooperation Programme; PICE) between Argentina and Brazil, 
the forerunners of the Asunción Treaty which formalised MERCOSUR.
In the 1990s, the perception that economic integration and democratisation were mutually 
reinforcing processes was to some extent underpinned by a series of initiatives from the 
United States designed to promote free trade, hemispheric integration, and the promotion 
of democracy in Latin America. However, the mechanism was differentiated depending 
on the country in question. In the case of the South American countries the initiative 
promoted by the Clinton administration to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA), encouraged the governments of the time – which shared a neo-liberal ideology – to 
reinforce their commitment to democracy, free trade and the sub-regional processes of 
open regionalism such as CARICOM, CAN and MERCOSUR (Arashiro 2011). In the case of 
Mexico, economic and political liberalisation – the political system being dominated by one 
party – was accomplished by, among other factors, this being an non-formalised condition 
of accession to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Wise 2009).
At the hemisphere level, the OAS began a process of revision and modernisation of its 
commitment to democracy, in order to support domestic processes of democratisation. 
The prevailing doctrines of national security in the external policies of the United States 
influenced the commitment of the OAS to democracy during the Cold War. As a result, 
OAS’ interventions during that period have been questioned as biased and selective, 
as evidenced, on the one hand, by the suspension of Cuba and, on the other hand, by 
the tolerance of authoritarian regimes of national security (Whitehead 1986; Cooper and 
Legler 2001; Duxbury 2011). The Santiago de Chile Commitment to Democracy and 
the Renewal of the Inter-American System (1991) opened a path which continued with 
the adoption of Resolution 1080 and the Washington Protocol (1992) and ended with 
the adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001. The countries of the 
Southern Cone, in particular Argentina, Brazil and Chile, led the search for consensus in 
this process of institutionalisation which did not rely on the approval of major regimes 
of a hybrid nature such as Mexico governed by Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI). These countries were also fundamental in forging links between the process of 
institutionalising MDPs in the OAS area and the sub-regional processes in CAN and 
MERCOSUR (Levitt 2006).
MERCOSUR adopted the antecedent of its MDP in 1996 at the Summit at San Luis, 
Argentina and then formalised it in the Ushuaia Protocol on Democratic Commitment in 
1998 which included Bolivia and Chile as associated countries. As for the Andean Group, 
it had defined its democratic identity in the Riobamba Charter of Conduct (1980) in the 
midst of dictatorships in both the Andean countries and the Southern Cone. The election 
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of Fernando Belaúnde in the same year marked the beginning of the transition of Peru and 
a milestone in the democratisation of the Andean countries. However, the majority of the 
Andean regimes in 1990 barely complied with the first principle of electoral democracy 
as they often failed to protect the civil and political rights of their citizens (Bejarano 
and Pizarro 2005; Tanaka 2005). In 1998, the Heads of State of the renewed Andean 
Community of Nations (CAN) signed the Additional Andean Protocol to the Cartagena 
Agreement on the Commitment to Democracy which stated that the establishment of a 
democratic order and legally constituted states were prerequisites for participation in the 
process of Andean integration and cooperation.
With the exception of Costa Rica, many Central American countries were the scene 
of civil wars during the 1980s (Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador) and 
of interventions by the United States. Severe problems of international security and 
oligarchical political systems conditioned developments in a way that still today explain 
the great weaknesses of purely electoral democracies, with the exception of Costa 
Rica. This also explains the importance of regional security governance in the process 
of Central American integration. Indeed, in 1995 the member countries of the Central 
American Integration System (SICA) adopted a Framework Treaty of Democratic Security 
in Central America, replacing previous agreements on security and defence agreed in the 
Charter of the Organization of Central American States (ODECA), inspired by doctrines 
of national security (Sanahuja 1998). This Framework Treaty placed particular emphasis 
on aspects of security and governability. Its Article 8, for example, states the parties’ 
obligation to “abstain from giving political, military, financial or any other type of support 
to individuals, groups, unregulated forces or armed groups, who threaten the unity and 
order of the state or advocate the overthrow or destabilization of the democratically 
elected government of any other of The Parties” (Framework Treaty 1995, Article 8). On 
the basis of the Treaty, the Council of the Heads of State of SICA has condemned various 
acts which have occurred in member States such as the political crisis faced by President 
Bolaños of Nicaragua (September 2005), as well as the terrorist attacks in El Salvador 
(July 2006).
 1.4.2 Regional organisations and types of regime in Latin America  
 and the Caribbean (2000-2015)
The gradual consolidation of democratic regimes in Latin America changed the context 
of the actions of regional organisations and their MDPs. Indeed, during the first fifteen 
years of the twenty-first century, MDPs went from being indicators of the commitment to 
democracy in countries undergoing transition, to acting as instruments for the defence 
of democracy in crisis situations. Some of these crises corresponded to typical cases 
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of coups d’état or attempted coups d’état (Haiti 2004; Paraguay 1996; Venezuela 2002, 
Honduras 2009 and Ecuador 2010), but many other events were of a more ambiguous 
nature, involving conflicts between state powers (Nicaragua 2004; Bolivia 2005; Ecuador 
1997 and 2005; Paraguay 2012), between the opposition and the government (Venezuela 
2013), or between local and central government (Bolivia 2008). We should add to this list 
the recurrent incidences of violations of human rights and situations of impunity, which in 
many cases occurred within the context of violence of various kinds, such as the cases 
of “false positives” and sexual violence in Colombia and/or the murders of journalists 
and the disappearance of people which occurred throughout the past years in Mexico 
and which involved sectors of the state system. These are situations which, based on the 
definition of democracy we adhere to in this study, might also be the subject of attention 
from regional organisations and their MDPs, without prejudice to the powers invested in 
the inter-American system of human rights. The fact that these situations do not feature 
in this study is due in the first instance to the fact that the regional organisations have not 
addressed them. 
The emergence of these incidents of political crisis coincides with a period of great 
variety in the political regimes of the region in which the relative ideological consensus 
around economic liberalism and liberal democracy, which came to the fore in the 1990s, 
became increasingly blurred. Hugo Chávez arrival to power in Venezuela in 1998 opened 
the way to a period of “turn to the left” with the election of left-wing candidates in 
Argentina (2002), Brazil (2003), Uruguay (2004), Bolivia (2005), Ecuador (2006), Nicaragua 
(2007), and Paraguay (2008). The origin of this change in the political spectrum of these 
countries of the region had its roots partly in the increased social inequality throughout 
the 1990s, that is, during the implementation of market reforms, which paved the way for 
non-aligned policy options in the so-called Washington Consensus (Couso 2013). The 
democratic consolidation itself in the region also explains the assumption of power by 
left-wing political parties, as argued by Levitsky and Roberts (2011). In fact, the process 
of democratisation allowed a great majority of political parties and organisations of the 
left - until then marginalised or persecuted - to legitimately participate in competitive 
elections, gaining thereby not only political experience but also electoral victories first at 
local level and then at parliamentary and presidential level. 
The processes of democratisation of the 1980s and 1990s succeeded in reinstating the 
institutions and practise of democratic elections both in South America and in Central 
America and Mexico. However, these processes were not sufficiently deep-rooted or 
extensive to transform the historic structures of Latin American societies characterised by 
profound social inequalities and a high concentration of economic power. The first fifteen 
years of the millennium show clearly a series of cases in which policies and reforms, 
which in some way affected these power structures, unleashed a defensive dynamic 
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against the elected governments (Levitsky and Roberts 2011). Democratic institutions 
channelled some of these reactions. Others, however, were channelled elsewhere, 
harking back to the coups d’état of previous decades. A third group of reactions which, 
while not manifesting themselves as a coup d’état, used political institutions as a means 
of dismissing elected governments (Marsteintredet et al. 2013). 
On the other hand, some governments have also tended to make respect for the rule of 
law dependent on the implementation of their economic and social reforms. According to 
some left-wing political views, what liberal political thought calls “rule of law” may be seen 
as the normalisation and protection of dominant structures in economic, political and 
social spheres (for a classic expression of this position see Viciano and Martínez 2010). 
The adoption of legislation via enabling decrees, the use of these decrees to strengthen 
executive power over other state powers, constitutional reforms aimed at favouring re-
election, and the restriction of the media and of the freedom of political adversaries, are 
examples of measures violating the rule of law and which are normally justified as an 
attempt to achieve reformist or even revolutionary goals (Kornblith 2005; Couso 2013; 
Corrales 2015). 
These two tendencies – social sectors which react by undemocratic means against 
elected governments, and elected governments which violate the rule of law for political 
purposes – made up the complex political arena of the region over the last fifteen years 
of this century, and they posed an enormous challenge to the regional organisations 
which have made commitments to protect democracy. What seems to prevail in the 
region is an interpretation according to which regional organisations and their MDPs 
are primarily instruments to protect the elected governments from opposition groups of 
a reactionary nature who oppose the economic and social reforms. Thus, for example, 
President Hugo Chávez stated in the UNASUR support framework for the government 
of President Correa at the time of the attempted coup of 2010: “This is a clear message 
for those who participated in the coup (…) because destabilising movements are still 
a threat to the region, especially in countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia or Venezuela”.2 
At the same time, the Argentinian chancellor, Héctor Timmerman, claimed that the 
“background” to the attempted coup d’état was “to attack the progressive Governments 
of Latin America”.3 
The history of coups d’état in Latin America lends empirical support to this interpretation. 
However, it is also true that violations to the rule of law and to the rights of sectors of 
society may be committed in the name of reforms. The new millennium leaves open, 
2		 http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2010/11/26/presidentes-de-unasur-se-unen-contra-intentos-de-golpe-de-estado-	
	 en-la-region/#.VzH6zkWlOWg	(accessed	1	June	2015).
3	 http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2010/10/01/cancilleres-llegan-a-quito-para-expresar-respaldo-de-la-unasur-a- 
	 correa/#.VYkuIPmqpBc	(accessed	1	June	2015).
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therefore, the question of whether regional organisations and their MDPs are capable of 
going beyond the protection of governments, to also protect the civil and political rights 
of citizens who may be the victims of acts by democratically elected governments (Closa 
and Palestini 2015). This is a difficult question to answer as it relates to the very definition 
of democracy and the role that political and social actors are prepared to grant to regional 
organisations in the framework of this definition. 
1.5. Challenges to democracy in Europe
 1.5.1 The European Union and the democratisation of post-socialist  
  countries (1990-2004)
In Europe, as well, the process of regional integration and, in particular, the process of 
creating the single European market, has gone hand in hand with the democratisation 
and consolidation of democracy in the peripheral countries. The principle of respect 
for democracy and human rights became a central element in the enlargement of the 
European Community with the accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain, three countries 
which were emerging from authoritarian regimes. In this way the European Community 
and – from 1993 – the European Union (EU) exercised a direct influence on the transition 
to democracy of the Southern European countries – in the eighties – and of the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe – in the nineties and the new millennium – through 
mechanisms of conditionality which require candidate countries to have established 
democratic regimes before acceding to the Union (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003; Vachudova 
2005; for a critical view of the mechanisms of conditionality in Europe, see Kochenov 
2008). 
The involvement of Community institutions in the process of democratic transition in 
the post-socialist countries, in turn, contributed to the development and formulation of 
regulations for the protection of democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms as 
part of the “New Europe” in regional organisations such as the EU and the OSCE (Sneek 
1994; Merlingen et al. 2001).
The fall of the Soviet Union and of single-party regimes in the Central and Eastern 
Europe Countries (CEECs) implied both a huge challenge and an opportunity to advance 
European integration. Not surprisingly, the EU devoted a large amount of organisational 
and financial resources – greater than those used for the accession of Greece, Spain 
and Portugal - to enable the CEECs to accede to the Union. The concern towards the 
Union’s Eastern enlargement in major sectors of the European political elite resided in 
the institutional fragility of the CEECs, which could eventually rebound as authoritarian 
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regression. For this reason, the new ruling elites of the post-socialist countries stressed 
their commitment to democratisation as a means of inspiring trust and ensuring potential 
membership.
The accession process therefore consisted of a contract between Community institutions 
and domestic political elites in which on the one hand, the EU would provide the road map 
for obtaining membership (including the resources necessary to generate institutional 
change and the necessary market reforms), and, on the other hand, the domestic elites 
would make a commitment to implement stable democratic regimes (Pevehouse 2005; 
Schimmelfennig 2005, 2007). 
In 1993, the European Council summit in Copenhagen drew up a series of conditions (known 
as the “Copenhagen Criteria”) which candidate countries must fulfil in order to implement 
both a functioning market economy and stable democratic institutions guaranteeing the 
rule of law, the protection of human rights and the rights of minorities, both prerequisites 
for the adoption of the acquis communautaire (Duxbury 2000; Bruszt and Vukov 2014). 
Fulfilment of these criteria required demonstrating, among other things, strong state 
capacity, judicial independence, anti-corruption measures and detailed regulations 
associated with the protection of human rights and of those of minorities (Vachudova 
2005). In 1997, the European Commission the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovenia suitable for proceeding with accession negotiations whereas Bulgaria, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Romania were deemed deficient in respect of market reforms. The 
Commission considered that Slovakia could not for the moment proceed with negotiations 
because of the weakness of its democratic institutions under the government of Vladimir 
Meciar. The specific case of Slovakia provoked the inclusion of an explicit statement in 
the Treaty of Amsterdam that the Union was “founded on principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law” (TEU Preamble). 
Along with establishing conditionality criteria, the Council of Europa (CoE) and the EU 
drew up a series of special programmes and plans to assist candidate countries to reach 
the goals set by the Copenhagen criteria. Already in 1990, the CoE had created the 
Demosthenes programme with the aim of providing the necessary technical assistance so 
that CEECs could develop participatory democracy. Through this programme, the CEECs 
undertook reforms of the judicial system, especially of the criminal codes, bringing them 
in line with the European Convention on Human Rights (Kritz 1993). But perhaps the most 
important programme was PHARE (Programme of Community Aid to the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe). Commitment to market reforms and to democratisation were 
requirements for applying for the assistance of PHARE, focussed on the implementation of 
community regulations, the re-engineering of national budgets, infrastructure projects and 
the reform of administrative capacity (Pevehouse 2005; Vachudova 2005; Schimmelfennig 
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2007). The EU penalised those countries with high levels of corruption giving them fewer 
resources, as was the case with Bulgaria and Romania, countries which received below 
average funds during the period 2007-2013 (see Chapter 3).
But not only the EU and the CoE have played a fundamental role in the process of 
democratisation of the CEECs. Regional security organisations, such as the OSCE, via the 
Charter of Paris, have also contributed to this process through a different mechanism from 
that of conditionality. In 1992, the OSCE (at that time called the “Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe”, CSCE) suspended the membership rights of Yugoslavia for 
violations to the human rights of ethnic minorities by the Yugoslav army. OSCE readmitted 
Yugoslavia once again in 2000 in the light of positive evidence of democratic commitment 
(see Chapter 3). However, the OSCE also contributed indirectly to the processes of 
democratisation. According to Jon Pevehouse, the interaction of the military leaders of 
countries like Hungary with Western military leaders within NATO and the OSCE helped 
re-orientate the role of the armed forces in accordance with the standards of a democratic 
society, taking them out of the political sphere (Pevehouse 2005: 119; see also Herring 
1994). It is possible to find a similar argument in the case of Latin America, where regional 
cooperation on security and defence, within the framework of the new doctrines on 
democratic security of the 90s, contributed to a strict separation of the civil and military 
spheres, which was essential for the consolidation of democratic regimes (Agüero 1995).
Becoming full members of organisations such as the CoE, the EU or the OSCE granted the 
political elites of the CEECs great legitimacy with voters and public opinion in general for 
whom belonging to Europe not only carried a strong identity-giving component, but also 
held out the promise of economic and social development. For their part, the European 
regional organisations not only provided the financial and organisational resources to 
generate political regime change, but also the instruments for monitoring and ensuring 
that there was no regression to authoritarianism. 
 1.5.2 The emergence of illiberal tendencies in Europe (2000-2015) 
The accession process to the EU for the new member States took place in two rounds 
of accession in 2004 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania). In 2013, Croatia 
also acceded as a full member of the EU. Today, Europe and the EU institutions are 
reinforced and also constituted by an increasingly diverse demoi in terms of language 
and historical, religious and cultural heritage. Nevertheless, in some European countries 
populist regimes and illiberal practises have re-emerged and this has provoked reactions 
from European regional organisations. The rise in populist governments is a process not 
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unconnected from the rapid and profound transformation undergone by the economies 
and societies of former socialist countries, now converted into capitalist market societies. 
Political parties such as “Law and Justice” in Poland, or “Fidesz” in Hungary proclaim 
proposals for change which supposedly aim at fulfilling the promises that were not met 
by the elites who led transitions in the 90s. These are therefore populist parties which are 
both anti-communist and critical of the elites who headed the transition to democracy 
and the change to free market economies (Rupnik 2007; Jenne and Cas Mudde 2012; 
Iusmen 2014).
Jacques Rupnik has argued along these lines, indicating that the transformation of the 
ex-socialist economies took place on the basis of a consensus between the European 
elites with two main components. The first of these consists in the primacy of liberal 
constitutionalism (with the emphasis on the separation of powers and the independence 
of “neutral” institutions, such as the constitutional courts and central banks) above citizen 
participation. The second component consists in economic liberalisation based on both 
the large scale privatisation of the economy and the economic integration of the European 
economic space (Rupnik 2007; see also Rosamond 2012). Both components are related, 
as the radical transformation of economies concentrated on free market economies 
was achieved on the basis of a weak civil society and low political participation (see 
Schmidt 2006). The reforms were carried out without an adequate legal framework and 
with recurrent examples of corruption which gave rise to standard-bearing populist 
movements with an anti-elite and anti-corruption message.
At a more theoretical level, the progress of populist movements in the CEECs might 
seem to indicate that the effects of “Europeanisation” on democratic consolidation tend 
to weaken once the candidate countries are accepted as members. Conditionality resulted 
extraordinarily effective in creating incentives for democratic commitment, but once they were 
inside, the incentives to undertake new reforms – which enable the move from an electoral 
democracy to a substantive democracy – were reduced: “The whole EU-accession process 
was able to promote democracy because of the accepted asymmetry it entailed. It worked 
best, of course, with those who already shared the assumptions of the European project, 
but it was also effective in a different way with the illiberal elites, who soon discovered that 
the costs of nonmembership to them and their respective countries would be prohibitive. 
Once a country has joined the EU, however, this logic no longer seems to hold, at least not 
in the short term” (Rupnik 2007: 23; see also Mungio-Pippidi 2007; Jenne and Mudde 2012; 
for an opposing argument, see Falkner and Treib 2008). While the political elites of the 90s 
shared a strong commitment to the “historic task” of achieving membership, the new elites 
of the CEECs, which were already full members of the EU, embraced “Euroscepticism”. 
Through criticism of the EU, the new populist elites supported programmes based on 
national identity and “economic nationalism” (Jenne and Mudde 2012). 
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However, the phenomenon of populism is not limited to the new member states. In fact, 
we can trace a “third wave of right-wing extremism” right back to the beginning of the 
1980s when it still had modest electoral success (Beyme 1988; Merlinger et al. 2001). Many 
of these political parties became established in the 1990s, and parties with populist and 
Eurosceptic programmes mark the current political scene in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Italy and the Netherlands (Mungio-Pippidi 2007; Jenne and Mude 2012). The participation 
of the Freedom Party (FPÖ) – led by the extreme right leader Jörg Haider – in the coalition 
government in 1999 in Austria was the first event that set alarm bells ringing in Brussels 
and which, at the same time, demonstrated the limited capacity of the EU to prevent the 
rise of illiberal movements and parties to power. In fact, the EU had to retract the sanctions 
applied to Austria when a “committee of experts” concluded that the Austrian government 
was respecting democratic rules (see Chapter 3). Similarly, the EU and the CoE had to 
content themselves with a role as critical observer – through the Venice Commission – of 
the constitutional reform undertaken by the government of Viktor Orbán, which, although it 
was approved by two thirds of the parliament, was never put to a referendum of the people. 
The government of Fidesz has implemented a press law seriously limiting freedom of 
expression and the capacity for dissent in the public sphere, which was widely criticised 
by the OSCE and the European Commission (Müller 2013). However, the practise of 
controlling the mass communication media by a process of acquisition and market 
concentration was not only a recurrent practise in the CEECs, but also in countries such 
as Italy especially during the government of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi (Mungio-
Pippidi 2007; Van den Vleuten and Ribeiro-Hoffmann 2010). EU action in this field has 
focused on sanctioning strictly economic and legal aspects, while leaving the scrutiny 
of respect for civil and political rights in the hands of the governments of its member 
states. Indeed, supranational powers and the EU’s mandate remain closely linked to the 
functioning of the single market. The EU is much less active in problems with the internal 
functioning of the democracies of member states such as the violation of freedom of 
press, corruption in public administration, and the concentration of power in the hands of 
the ruling party (Jenne and Mudde 2012; Closa et al. 2015). 
When the European Commission attempted to challenge some of the policies put forward 
by Fidesz, Orbán responded challenging the democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions. 
In fact, owing to the level and range of responsibility acquired by its institutions – the 
Commission, the European Court of Justice, and especially since the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
Parliament – the EU is, amongst all existing regional organisations in the world, the one 
which has reached the most sophisticated level of political and institutional development. 
For the same reason, it has also fostered the widest debate about its own democratic 
legitimacy. The EU is not a state, but it certainly operates in the sphere of public governance 
which is precisely the sphere of democracy (Closa et al. 2015: 25 and following).
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According to the argument of Philipp Schmitter (2000) there are two good reasons which 
justify a serious debate on the democratisation of the EU and its institutions, beyond the 
democracy of its member states. The first is that many of the rules and practises of the 
EU are increasingly being challenged by European citizens. The second reason is that 
the people feel that the majority of the community norms which affect their daily lives 
are drawn up in remote, secret places through processes that are difficult to understand 
and over which the citizen has no control. At the time of writing his book, Schmitter was 
already in possession of a large amount of evidence to justify this argument. Certainly, 
with the beginning of the financial crisis, which became a sovereign debt crisis in 2009, 
the dissatisfaction of the people of the countries of Southern Europe reached worrying 
levels, swelling the numbers of those voting for the “Eurosceptic” parties which are now 
part of the European Parliament (Aguilera de Prat 2013).
1.6. Conclusions
This first chapter provides a general framework for the subject of this study. We have 
offered a wide definition of mechanisms for Democracy Protection (MDP) which 
encompasses not only formal instruments (democratic conditionality clauses), but also 
informal measures and actions which regional organisations may adopt in cases of 
democratic crisis. At the same time, we have been cautious in the moment of defining 
democracy and democratic crisis. Although the chapter offers minimal definitions of 
these concepts that have multiple meanings, we have noted that the political actors are 
who ultimately supply and alter their content and significance. The following chapters 
are therefore methodologically careful not to impose a definition of democracy and 
democratic crisis, but to analyse the uses and meanings that political actors lend them 
when drawing up their MDPs and implementing them in specific cases.
We have also given a brief review of the academic literature on the emergence 
and institutional variation of MDPs. Diffusion approaches stress the processes of 
transmission of norms from one region to another, turning democracy into a global 
script. These approaches normally assume a one-directional view of transmission from 
the North (Europe and the United States), towards the other regions. The external policy 
initiatives of North America towards Latin America of the 90s, based on democratisation 
and liberalisation, as well as the Europeanisation of the CEECs in the European context, 
may be viewed as processes of diffusion based on both material resources and on 
socialisation. However, diffusion approaches need to be complemented by approaches 
centred on the actors to explain why MDPs are adopted and formalised and, even more 
importantly, why they vary from one organisation to another. Thus some approaches 
emphasise the economic interests of domestic actors who see in the adoption of 
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democratic regulations a mechanism for ensuring their own preferences. Other 
approaches highlight the leadership of the powerful states of each region in formalising 
and implementing MDPs in cases of democratic breakdown.
Finally, we have presented a contextualisation of the period analysed in both regions. 
We thereby aimed to highlight the challenges faced by regional organisations in the past 
and today whilst making a commitment to protect democracy. It is tempting to focus on 
certain parallels between both regions. In the 1990s the adoption and formalisation of 
MDPs was, in Latin America as in Europe, tied to the processes of democratisation in 
the context of the end of the Cold War. From 2000 onwards, regional organisations have 
faced a new context with other complexities. The variety of political regimes tends to be 
the common theme in both regions. In both, newly elected governments carry out reforms 
to the limit of what, from a constitutional point of view, might be considered as the rule 
of law. In Latin America in particular, reactionary sectors respond to these reforms by 
using and abusing democratic institutions, using legal and legislative powers against 
the executive, or resorting to political trials and impeachment. Do the MDPs of regional 
organisations have the capacity to act in the face of these crises? What roles are played 
by interests and power when such mechanisms are implemented? 
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2  MECHANISMS FOR DEMOCRACY 
PROTECTION IN ORGANISATIONS 
OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN 
EUROPE AND IN LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE CARIBBEAN:  A LEGAL 
EXEGESIS
2.1. Introduction
In recent decades processes of regional integration have proliferated in various geopolitical 
spheres and, alongside these, a phenomenon of radical importance has occurred: the 
linking of these regional integration projects to the promotion of democracy, expressed 
through democratic mechanisms, clauses and commitments. The academic literature 
has reflected this phenomenon particularly in regard to Europe (see inter alia Grabbe 
2001; Schimmelfennig 2007; Youngs 2009), although also, increasingly, in regard to other 
regional spheres (see inter alia Cooper and Legler 2001; Legler and Tieku 2010; Cánepa 
2015; Genna and Hiroi 2015; Heine and Weiffen 2015). 
The debate around MDPs in organisations of regional integration has in reality a dual 
dimension: the external, focussed on the rules of democratic conditionality for accession, 
and the internal, focussed on the rules requiring states which are already members to 
respect democratic standards (Closa 2013). Democratic conditionality for accession is 
defined as the requirement for third states to adopt democratic practises and norms as 
a condition of receiving rewards such as financial assistance, any type of institutional 
association and, in the final instance, membership of the organisation (Schimmelfenining 
and Scholtz 2008: 191). In the field of association agreements, the European Union has 
been a particularly well studied case (inter alia Youngs 2002; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 
2011). Although not the subject of study of these pages, in recent years this type of 
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mechanism had begun to be also incorporated into other types of agreement, such as 
free trade agreements. In general, the benefits of accession offer a strong incentive for 
the candidate states interested in joining the organisation to comply with the established 
requirements, even when these requirements conflict with other priorities (Grabbe 2001: 
1015). This democratic conditionality for accession may however be complemented by 
requirements related to the democratic commitment of member states while they remain 
in the organisation, which allows sanctions to be imposed on states which cease to 
meet democratic standards after accession or in those where there is a breakdown of 
democratic institutionality (Wobig 2014: 2).
In this chapter we will provide a legal exegesis of these MDPs in organisations of regional 
integration in Europe (EU, CoE and OSCE) and Latin America and the Caribbean (OAS, 
CAN, CARICOM, CELAC, UNASUR, MERCOSUR and SICA). In this sense, this chapter 
complements recent exegetical efforts such as that of Cánepa (2015), focussed on 
Latin America. Table 4 shows all the relevant norms in the constituent treaties and the 
secondary legislation of all the organisations analysed, as well as the date when these 
were agreed in brackets. All these MDPs will be evaluated in detail later. The purpose 
of this analysis is two-fold: Firstly, it offers readers a precise description of MDPs from 
a legal perspective, which helps understanding with greater clarity the analyses of a 
more political science nature which are presented in the rest of this work. Secondly, 
this chapter has an interpretative and taxonomic objective, as we propose classifying 
Table 4: Mechanisms for Democracy Protection in organisations of regional integration in 
Europe and in Latin America and the Caribbean
Organisation 
(date of creation)
Mechanism for Democracy Protection (year of creation)
OAS (1948) Cartagena Convention (1985), Resolution 1080 (1991), Washington 
Protocol (1992), Inter-American Democratic Charter (2001)
Council of Europe (1949) Arts. 3 and 8 Statute of the Council (1949)
European Union
(Treaty of Paris 1951, Treaty of 
Rome 1957)
Copenhagen Criteria (1993), Arts. 2 and 7 TEU, Art. 354 TFEU (current 
versions of the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007, although there are explicit 
references to the democratic nature of the members from the Single 
European Act of 1986 if not earlier)
SICA (ODECA Charter in 1951, 
SICA constitution in 1993)
Arts. 3 and 4 Tegucigalpa Protocol (1991), Framework Treaty on 
Democratic Security in Central America (1995)
CAN (1969) Additional Protocol to the Cartagena Agreement (1998)
CARICOM (1973) Charter of Civil Society (1997)
OSCE (1975) Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990)
MERCOSUR (1991) Presidential Declaration on Democratic Commitment (1996), Ushuaia 
Protocol (1998), Montevideo Protocol (2011)
UNASUR (2008) Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty (2010)
CELAC (2010) Special Declaration about the Defence of Democracy and 
Constitutional Order in CELAC (2011)
Source: treaties and legal regulations. Own elaboration
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MDPs according to their various features and, in so doing, to highlight and clarify the 
obscurities in interpretation from which they suffer. To this end, this chapter is structured 
as follows: Following this introduction (2.1.) we will describe the context of the creation 
and systematic placing of MDPs in the regulatory framework of the respective regional 
organisations (2.2.). Then the definitions of democracy provided by each organisation will 
be presented, as these definitions are of vital importance to understand the scope of the 
MDPs, as well as their precision or, on the contrary, their interpretative ambiguity (2.3.). 
In the second section, we will examine the external dimension of MDPs, when these 
are configured as a requirement for accession to the organisation (2.4.); afterwards their 
internal dimension will be analysed, outlining the sanctions which operate when a state 
that is already a member ceases to respect democratic standards (2.5.) and the possible 
sanctions which these cases can incur (2.6.). The chapter ends with a general reference 
to other aspects of the commitments to democracy by organisations (2.7.) and some final 
conclusions (2.8.). 
2.2. Origin and systematic place of MDPs in the legal context of   
 integration treaties
The process of creating MDPs, and sometimes of placing them systematically in the 
regulatory framework of the organisation, may be very revealing of the status of these 
types of regulations and commitments on the political agenda during the genesis of 
the respective regional organisations. Some organisations introduced MDPs in the very 
moment of their constitution. This demonstrates that their commitment to the promotion 
of democracy was part of their raisons d’être. In other cases, the MDPs were added in a 
later moment, complementing thereby the original aims and values of the organisation. 
Finally, in a few cases, no MDPs as such existed, but they were developed along with 
the operation of the organisation. In these cases, still without an explicit commitment to 
democracy, actual political events led to assume that such a requirement was implicit in 
the norms of the organisation.
The Council of Europe (CoE) provides a clear example of an international organisation 
which considered its commitment to democracy as part of its constitutive document 
right from its foundation. The CoE included this commitment in the original draft of its 
Statute in 1949. The paradox is, however, that the MDP in the Statute of the CoE does not 
explicitly mention democracy itself, except for a brief reference in the preamble, where 
it is defined as constituted by individual freedom, political freedom and the rule of law. 
Instead of a reference to democracy, the provisions of the Statute refer to elements which 
presuppose it, “human rights and fundamental freedoms”. This reference, enshrined in 
article 3 of the Charter, together with the sanction mechanism in article 8, constitutes the 
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most basic structure of the commitment to democracy in the organisation. Originating in 
the post-war impulse towards democratisation, and against the background of the terrible 
human rights violations which had occurred in the previous years, it is not surprising that 
the Council made a commitment of this type at such an early stage. It may perhaps 
be precisely the early nature of the democratic commitment by the organisation which 
explains its sparse formulation, to which we will refer in greater detail later.
Simultaneously, Rich (2001: 21) mentions the OAS Charter of 1948 as one of the 
first constituent instruments of international organisations that contained the idea of 
democracy. However, Levitt (2006: 94) minimises the real value of the initial norms on 
democracy of this organisation, stating that they were at best a waste of paper, and at 
worst a cynical form of “Realpolitik”. The evolution of the OAS in respect of the protection 
of democracy was, however, relatively powerful. According to Alda Mejías (2008: 2), the 
end of the military regimes of the 80s and of the Cold War were the catalysing events 
that deepened the democratic commitment of the organisation, enabling it “to defend 
representative democracy in a coherent manner” as one of its central pillars. Thus, the 
Cartagena Protocol of 1985 incorporated within the Charter of the OAS the obligation to 
promote and consolidate representative democracy. From the 90s onwards (Levitt 2006: 
94) this progression became considerably more intensive: in 1991 Resolution 1080 was 
approved; it established the convening of a meeting of the Permanent Council if democracy 
was suspended in one of the member states. In 1997 the Washington Protocol which 
had been signed five years earlier, came into force; it authorised the General Assembly 
to suspend the rights of a member state whose democratically elected government had 
been overthrown. Finally, in 2001 the Inter-American Democratic Charter was approved, 
which currently constitutes the most complete mechanism within that organisation for the 
protection of democracy (for a more detailed analysis of these milestones, see Cooper and 
Legler 2001).
Several organisations did not recognise MDPs in their respective constitutive treaties and 
they constructed or at least refined them through reforms or complementary instruments. 
In the case of the European Union, assistance and the creation of institutional linkages 
were from the start conditional upon respect for democratic standards and human rights, 
although this democratic conditionality was initially informal (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003: 
497). In 1963, the then European Communities refused to negotiate the status of an 
associated state for Spain because of the authoritarian character of its regime (Closa 
and Heywood 2004). Since then, and for a period of time, compliance with democracy 
emerged as an obvious but non-formalised criterion. In 1993 a fundamental step was 
taken in the institutionalisation of democratic conditionality in the EU with the drawing 
up of the so-called “Copenhagen criteria”, which establish respect for democratic 
institutions as a condition for full membership of the European Community, together 
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with acceptance of the acquis communautaire. And finally, the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
anticipating the incorporation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with past 
experiences of totalitarian regimes, formalised “democratic conditionality” (Sadurski 
2009-2010: 388). Today the primary legislation of the Union enshrines the requirement 
for respect for the democratic institutions by the member states in a pre-eminent place, 
through the combination of articles 2 and 7 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) 
and article 354 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The systematic 
placing of some of these precepts, in particular articles 2 and 7 TEU, in the initial part of 
the main regulations of the Union, seems to indicate an emphasis on these principles.
In a large number of regional integration organisations, MDPs – beyond any rhetorical 
mention – were not included in their constitutive documents, but were added later 
in additional protocols or similar documents. In the case of MERCOSUR, the Treaty of 
Asunción did not refer to democracy, perhaps because of its marked economic and 
commercial nature. However, democratic conditionality was included via the Presidential 
Declaration on Democratic Commitment of 1996 and, above all, via the Ushuaia Protocol 
of 1998. In 2011, the democratic mechanism was refined in the Montevideo Protocol, also 
known as “Ushuaia II”, which laid down the sanctioning procedure and extended the range 
of sanctions.4 The evolution of MERCOSUR in this sense constitutes an interesting example 
of the gradual institutionalisation, improvement and deepening of the content of the MDP. 
CARICOM makes no express mention of the idea of democracy, either in its treaty of 
origin (the Treaty of Chaguaramas) or in the current reformed version. In the opinion 
of León (2000: 163), this facilitated the approaching towards CARICOM by the Cuban 
government, as it could enjoy the institutional diversity of the region and the existence of 
organisations without an MDP. However, it would not be accurate to say that CARICOM 
would not have taken any kind of position in respect to democracy, considering that 
its Charter of Civil Society of 1997 includes a commitment to democracy and makes 
reference to a wide range of rights; this commitment could be considered an informal 
MDP which is more programmatic than binding in nature (Berry 2014: 94-95).5
The evolution of the CSCE-OSCE is equally interesting and largely reflects the geopolitical 
changes which occurred on the European continent. The Helsinki Declaration of 1975, 
4	 We	 must	 remember	 that	 the	 situation	 of	 this	 treaty	 today	 is	 “pending”	 according	 to	 MERCOSUR	 itself	 (see	 point	 
	 129,	referring	to	the	Treaty	of	Montevideo	on	democratic	commitment,	at	http://www.mre.gov.py/tratados/public_web/ 
	 ConsultaMercosur.aspx,	 accessed	 19	 August	 2015).	 To	 date,	 the	 Congress	 of	 Paraguay	 has	 refused	 to	 ratify	 the	 
	 Protocol.	Despite	 this,	 in	 this	 chapter,	when	we	 analyse	 the	MERCOSUR	 regulations,	we	will	 take	 account	 of	what	 
	 was	added	by	Ushuaia	II,	although	we	will	also	refer	to	the	previous	regulations	to	clarify	the	differences	between	the	 
	 two	regimes.
5 “However the status of the Charter, despite the strong mandatory language seen in many of its provisions, remains 
	 non-binding,	 and	 this	 impairs	 its	 overall	 effectiveness.	 The	 non-binding	 nature	 of	 the	 Charter	 is	 evident	 from	 
 its status as a declaration of the Conference (rather than being, for example, a treaty), and also from its weak 
 implementing provision” (Berry	 2014:	 94-95).	 Despite	 of	 this,	 and	 bearing	 in	 mind	 this	 important	 particularity,	 
	 CARICOM’s	Charter	of	Civil	Society	will	be	analysed	here	jointly	with	the	MDPs	of	the	other	organisations.
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institutionalising the CSCE (renamed in OSCE in 1995), contains references to human 
rights, although not to democracy as such. However, coinciding with the end of the 
Cold War, in 1990 the member states signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 
according to which representative democracy was accepted as binding for all of them 
(Jawad 2008: 612). In the case of the Andean Community, the MDP was effectively 
created in 1998, with the Additional Protocol to the Cartagena Agreement as the 
constitutive treaty of the organisation; in its original version, the document only referred 
incidentally to democracy in its preamble. The case of UNASUR was similar, as the MDP 
was not included in its Constitutive Treaty, which only contained superficial references 
to democracy; however, the MDP was developed in an Additional Protocol in 2010. 
UNASUR’s MDP must, moreover, be read in relation to the operation of the organisation, 
as the Georgetown Declaration (Guyana) of 2010 is also highly relevant in this respect. 
CELAC did not include an MDP as such in the first document of the then embryonic 
organisation, the Latin American and Caribbean Unity Summit Declaration of 2010, 
although in this document various references were made to democracy as the basis for 
integration or as a shared value of the region. The real MDP was to appear one year later, 
with the Special Declaration about the Defense of Democracy and Constitutional Order 
in the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States signed in Caracas (Sanahuja 
2015). We should, however, note the unusual character of CELAC, which does not have 
a constitutive treaty of hard law in the strict sense, and whose MDP therefore does not 
have the status of a norm of international law, so that, strictly speaking, it cannot be 
called a democratic clause.
One final and very peculiar case is that of SICA. The Tegucigalpa Protocol (which in reality 
is the constitutive agreement of SICA) does make reference to the idea of democracy: 
article 3 considers democratic consolidation as a purpose of the organisation, and 
respect for it is one of its fundamental principles according to article 4, among other 
references. Indeed, the Governments of States that are part of the organisation signed 
a Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America, which contains many 
commitments relating to the respect and promotion of democratic values. However, 
neither the Tegucigalpa Protocol nor this Framework Treaty on Democratic Security 
incorporated a process of sanctions to punish breakdowns in constitutional order, nor is 
it even clear that membership of the organisation is prohibited to undemocratic countries, 
although in fact all its members are democracies (see Chapter 3). In reality, this situation 
is not exclusive to this organisation, and it seems to be also present in other regional 
spheres (Closa 2013), although it is difficult to explain this institutional design, which 
appears a priori counter-intuitive.
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2.3. The definition of democracy and democratic conditionality 
One of the most relevant questions in the application of MDPs is the very definition of 
democracy. Beyond its theoretical and programmatic connotations, this question is 
relevant because of an obvious practical issue: the application of MDPs, including the 
sanction mechanisms envisaged by many of them, will depend on what is understood by 
democracy and how it is defined. The range of situations which could eventually give rise 
to a violation of basic democratic principles is potentially unlimited, so that regulating all of 
them becomes impossible. However, in line with what Cánepa suggests (2015), the total lack 
of precision of the MDPs may lead to situations of legal uncertainty and make controversies 
around interpretation more likely. In theory, greater levels of regulatory precision would 
lead to higher levels of certainty and fewer political disputes over the meaning of the 
regulations and the legitimacy of their application to actual cases. As we will see later, the 
various integration processes in Europe and in Latin America and the Caribbean show a 
huge variation in content, breadth and level of specificity in their definitions of democracy, 
although one frequent feature is a link to the idea of the rule of law.
One of the instruments which makes most effort to define democracy is the Inter-
American Democratic Charter of the OAS, which in its article 3 lists what it considers to 
be its essential elements: “Essential elements of representative democracy include, inter 
alia, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, access to and the exercise of 
power in accordance with the rule of law, the holding of periodic, free and fair elections 
based on secret balloting and as an expression of the sovereignty of the people; the 
pluralistic system of political parties and organisations; and the separation of powers and 
independence of the branches of government”. Furthermore, in its article 4 it mentions 
as “essential components of the exercise of democracy” transparency in government 
activities, probity, responsible public administration on the part of governments, respect 
for social rights and freedom of expression and of the press, as well as the subordination 
of state institutions to civilian authority and respect for the rule of law. In addition, articles 
7 to 10 make a conceptual link between democracy and human rights, including the 
principles of non-discrimination and respect for workers’ rights. Finally, articles 11 to 16 
recognise the relationship between democracy and social and economic development, 
including social rights and the fight against poverty, and article 28 links the political 
participation of women to the promotion and exercise of democratic culture. According 
to Legler and Tieku (2010: 466) the Democratic Charter of the OAS – together with the 
African Charter on Democracy – provides definitions of democracy with unprecedented 
detail. However, it should be recognised that CARICOM’s Charter of Civil Society is 
even more exhaustive in its definition of democracy. In this Charter, democracy appears 
closely linked to a series of rights which are an institutional requirement or expression, 
such as political rights in general and the right to free elections in particular, rights to hold 
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meetings and demonstrations, or even the right to good governance, among other things. 
In this sense, the level of detail of the substantive content of the CARICOM MDP contrasts 
with the great lack of precision in the application mechanism, as will be explained later.
In the Copenhagen criteria for accession to the EU in 1993 “the stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy” is the first in a list of political conditions which also include 
“the rule of law, human rights and respect and protection of minorities”. The Copenhagen 
criteria are therefore relatively ambitious in this respect, and they seem to underline a 
conceptual link between all the elements listed. Something of the same is evident in the 
even more exhaustive article 2 TEU which lists the values of the EU, including democracy 
along with human dignity, freedom, equality, the rule of law, respect for human rights, the 
protection of minorities, pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between men and women. Bear in mind that this article acts as a basis for article 
7, which provides for the imposition of sanctions on member states which violate any of 
the values listed in it.
In the OSCE, Appendix I to the Charter of Paris is particularly relevant. In point 7, the 
commitment to democracy of member states is made explicit, listing the staging of free 
elections at reasonable intervals, the elected character of at least one of the legislative 
chambers, universal and equal suffrage to adult citizens, free voting by secret ballot, etc. 
These stipulations are particularly valuable, as they add a high level of detail to many 
procedural and institutional elements of what is understood by “democracy”, beyond 
rhetorical declarations about it.
Other international instruments are comparatively sparse. The Additional Protocol to the 
Cartagena Agreement “Commitment of the Andean Community to Democracy” does not 
define the concept of democracy nor its essential traits, nor, as Cánepa (2015) claims, 
the concept of the breakdown of democratic order, which would give the states “a large 
margin of discretion to determine which cases produced a situation that merited the 
application of this Treaty and which cases did not” Cánepa (2015: n.p.). However, we 
must recognise article 1 of this Protocol refers to democratic “institutions” – without 
specifying what these institutions are – and they are linked to the “rule of law”, with both 
aspects being considered essential conditions for political cooperation and integration 
within the framework of the Andean Integration System. This article therefore recognises 
that democracy is based, beyond general principles, on concrete institutions and on a 
judicial system in which public powers are subject to the law. 
Similarly, this reference to democratic “institutions” is the closest we find to a definition 
in the Ushuaia Protocol of MERCOSUR (article 1), and Ushuaia II did not add much 
to this definition, except for the references to human rights, fundamental freedoms 
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and the rule of law in its preamble. Particularly in documents such as Ushuaia II or the 
Georgetown Declaration drawn up by UNASUR in 2010, there are some references 
to the “constitutional order” with major practical consequences, as will be seen in 
Chapter 3.
The Riviera Maya Declaration of 2010, a constituent part of CELAC, makes abundant 
references to democracy. In its preamble, as we said earlier, democracy is cited as the 
basis for integration and as an ideal of the region. Giving the concept a somewhat more 
tangible dimension, there is also mention of promoting the “establishment of democratic 
institutions”. At times this is mentioned alongside the rule of law or human rights. Article 
2 identifies it as a principle common value to be consolidated. In the Caracas Declaration 
of 20116, which establishes a real mechanism of democratic conditionality for member 
states, a higher degree of precision can be found. Democracy is mentioned alongside 
other values such as the rule of law, human rights and respect for legitimately constituted 
authorities, as an expression of the will of the people, but also, very significantly, alongside 
others such as “non-interference in internal affairs”. This last reference reflects a certain 
tension between democratic commitment at supranational level and the principle of 
sovereignty which is particularly present in CELAC. The model of institutionalisation of 
the conditionality mechanism that converts the affected state into the protagonist at the 
expense of more ambitious regulations and peer evaluations reflects the same tension and 
it resolution in favour of sovereignty. Note also, as we mentioned above, that the CELAC 
agreements have the character of political declarations and not of international treaties.
The constitutive Treaty of UNASUR mentions democracy succinctly in articles 2 and 
14 although its Preamble pays more detailed attention. Here, it appears as one of the 
principal premises of South American integration, together with sovereignty, pluralism 
and human rights, among other things. Moreover, the conclusion of the preamble gives 
democracy an institutional dimension by attributing to “the democratic institutions and 
unrestricted respect for human rights” the role of an essential condition for peace, 
economic and social prosperity and the development of integration. Very significantly, 
this same declaration opens the preamble to the Additional Protocol of the organisation 
on Commitment to Democracy which later affirms its commitment to democracy as well 
as to the rule of law and its institutions, and to human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
in particular freedom of expression and opinion. 
There are two organisations which link the MDP to a broader conception of security and 
relations between states. In the case of the OSCE, this link is quite obvious, as the Charter 
of Paris establishes the so-called “Human Dimension” in a document which also tackles 
 
6 Entitled “Special Declaration on the Defense of Democracy” adopted at the Caracas Summit in 2011.
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the question of security between the states parties and lays down the functions of the 
Conflict Prevention Centre (Supplementary document, part I), focussing mainly on military 
matters. A particular aspect of the SICA Framework Treaty on Democratic Security, in 
turn, resides in the reference to the “subordination of the armed forces, the police and 
the public security forces to constitutionally established civil authorities chosen in free, 
honest and pluralist elections”. Article 2 contains this consideration and includes it among 
the main principles of the Central American Democratic Security Model, together with the 
rule of law and the ongoing strengthening of democratic institutions. Indeed, this norm is 
an expression of a more general trait, characteristic of SICA’s approach to the question of 
the promotion of democracy in the sub-region: the connection made between democracy 
and the issues of security and defence in the Framework Protocol is directly linked to the 
historic origins and founding objectives of the organisation (Cánepa 2015).
Finally, the most striking regulation may be that of the CoE, which does not in fact mention 
democracy as such in its MDP. The preamble of the Statute mentions briefly democracy, 
but it is not cited again as such in the articles themselves. On the other hand, article 3 of 
the Statute requires each member State to accept the principles of the rule of law, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and to collaborate in the realisation of the aim of the 
organisation set out in its chapter 1: the attainment of greater unity between its members 
for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which constitute 
their common heritage and facilitate their economic and social progress. It is through this 
article 3, which does not explicitly mention the concept of democracy, that the MDP is 
constructed in article 8, in the case of a serious violation of article 3, with the imposition 
of the corresponding sanctions. 
2.4. Democracy as a condition of accession
The MDPs of regional integration organisations have a dual dimension: the external one, 
concerned with democratic conditionality for accession, and the internal one, concerned 
with the internal dimension (i.e. remaining a member of the organisation on condition 
of continuing to be democratic). Analysed together, these two dimensions, lead to a 
classification with four basic types.
Table 5: Types of Mechanisms of Democracy Protection (explicit)
Democratic conditionality during 
membership 
No democratic conditionality 
during membership
Democratic conditionality for 
accession
CoE, EU MERCOSUR, CARICOM SICA
No democratic conditionality 
for accession
OSCE, OAS, CAN, UNASUR,
CELAC
-
 Source: Own elaboration based on treaties and legal regulations. 
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According to Table 5, the only organisations that are committed to both aspects of 
democratic conditionality are the European Union, the CoE, MERCOSUR (according to 
the regime of Ushuaia II) and CARICOM (with important clarifications we will make below). 
Interestingly, the most frequent type consists of organisations which do not envisage 
democratic conditionality for accession, yet do establish mechanisms to avoid the 
decline of democracy in states which are already members (OSCE, OAS, CAN, UNASUR, 
CELAC). These organisations may be called “preventive” rather than “promotional”, as 
they seek above all to prevent a decline in the democratic institutions rather than trying 
to extend them to states which are not democratic. Finally, the opposite type is that of 
organisations which seem to link accession to the fulfilment of democratic requirements, 
but which do not set out mechanisms of sanction for member states which cease to fulfil 
them: one such case is SICA. There is no organisation which does not envisage any type 
of MDP, however informal it may be.
We should caution, however, that given the open nature and frequent ambiguity 
of regulatory texts, and the developments to which their interpretation may lead, the 
classification outlined in Table 5 is not set in stone nor is it exempt from potential variations 
over time. A good example of this regulatory ambiguity and difficulty with classification 
is CARICOM. CARICOM’s Charter of Civil Society (1997) establishes a series of explicit 
commitments to democracy and human rights. This Charter, however, does not explicitly 
state that it will deny accession to states which do not fulfil the requirements – although 
this would seem to be a plausible interpretation – and it does not delineate possible 
sanctions for the breakdown of democratic order, although the Charter does in fact 
appear open to this. The case of CARICOM may be the most difficult to classify, therefore 
its location in Table 5 is purely indicative, and we are better advised to refer to concrete 
regulations which will be dealt with further below. There are, however, similar ambiguities 
in the case of other organisations. 
The behaviour of organisations during their operation adds another problem on top of 
the ambiguity of provisions when interpreting MDPs. The case of Cuba exemplifies this, 
as its membership (as a founding member) of CELAC, an organisation which included 
a commitment to democracy, raises major doubts of interpretation. From one point of 
view, one might think that CELAC allows the participation of undemocratic states, and 
that its MDP – as suggested in Table 5 – is limited to requiring that those which are 
already democratic should remain so once they become members of the organisation. 
A second interpretation might state that, given that the MDP was created after the 
accession of Cuba, it cannot be applied retrospectively, although it could be used to veto 
undemocratic states which present their candidacy after the MDP came into force. A third 
interpretation would be that the MDP also implicitly applies to states which are already 
members, and that the organisation attributes the character of democracy to this country. 
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This last interpretation, however, would be in open contradiction to the position of a 
large number of human rights organisations, a majority of the International Community 
and the OAS itself. One final interpretation is that CELAC has simply disregarded formal 
interpretation in favour of strategic criteria; among them, for example, the idea that the 
involvement of the state affected, rather than its exclusion, is the most effective way of 
promoting democracy. The reality is probably that each actor in the organisation has 
opted for different interpretations and political motivations when it came to dealing with 
the case of Cuba, although the result has doubtlessly been that the MDP was subjected 
to great tension in its interpretation because of the ambiguity in the way it was applied 
in this case. Similar issues have come to the fore in European organisations, as well, 
particularly in those situations where democratic standards have been seriously eroded 
or are not met in states which, nevertheless, continue to be members of the organisation. 
Russia, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan – to cite just a few examples – continue to be part of 
organisations such as the CoE or the OSCE, despite them being considered authoritarian 
regimes according to various indices of political freedoms.7
This section focuses on the first of the dimensions outlined: democratic conditionality for 
accession, leaving the internal dimension of preserving democracy during membership 
of the organisation to the following section. The study of democratic conditionality for 
accession is linked to the ambiguity of the MDPs themselves. This problem occurs 
because the majority of the organisations make rhetorical commitments to democracy, 
sometimes in great detail. However, the same organisations do not always state explicitly 
and unambiguously that the accession of undemocratic states will be vetoed. In this 
context, member states are given a wide margin for interpretative manoeuvring, even 
discretion, in how they apply the organisational norms to actual cases. Moreover, 
this regulatory ambiguity does not exclude the veto referred to for the accession of 
undemocratic states; it simply does not guarantee it. 
In only a few organisations does this veto appears in a clear and unambiguous form 
in their basic regulations: the EU and the CoE. Article 4 of the CoE Statute states 
that Committee of Ministers will invite to join the CoE to any European state which is 
considered as having the capacity and will to fulfil the provisions of article 3 – previously 
referred to. Very soon, the Committee of Ministers approved Resolution of May 1951 that 
required to consult the Consultative Assembly of the CoE, later called the “Parliamentary 
Assembly”, on any invitation to a new state – and thus the suspension of any member 
for violating the principles of article 3. In the view of Closa (2013: 6) the constitution of 
this procedure enabled limiting, via the political pluralism of the Assembly, the capacity 
of the governments to ignore the requirement for democratic conditionality. Since 1992, 
 
7 For example, Freedom in the World 2015, from Freedom House; Democracy Index, by the Economist Intelligence Unit.
51
the Venice Commission has advised the Parliamentary Assembly on the candidate states’ 
respect for the democratic standards and human rights of the organisation (Closa 2013: 
6). In the case of the EU, we have already mentioned the principal norms in respect of 
democratic conditionality, which include it as a criterion for access to the organisation. It 
is worth remembering once again that the Copenhagen criteria require, for the accession 
of a new state, stability in the institutions which guarantee democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and the protection of minorities.
Democratic conditionality for accession to the organisation is obvious in the case 
of the organisations previously mentioned. This same issue results, however, much 
more ambiguous in respect of other organisations. One example is SICA, which in its 
Framework Protocol on Democratic Security incorporated a large number of commitments 
to democracy. Neither this Protocol nor the Constitutive Treaty of the organisation 
contain any clause expressly and incontrovertibly expressing a requirement for respect 
for democracy on the part of candidate states, although the reiterated proclamations 
about democracy as the basis of the organisation and its guiding principle, as well as 
the commitments to its strengthening, lead one to think that in practise accession to 
the organisation by undemocratic states would be vetoed. Something similar occurs in 
the case of MERCOSUR. Through the Protocols of Ushuaia I and II the organisation 
establishes clear regulations for the case of a breakdown of the democratic order in states 
which are already members. Historically, regulations for democratic conditionality for 
accession were less clear. The new formulation included in the preamble of the Protocol 
of Ushuaia II of 2011 according to which a commitment to democracy, the rule of law and 
human rights is regarded as essential condition for becoming part of MERCOSUR seems 
to dispel doubts on interpretation.
2.5. Conditionality for members: sanctioning rupture  
 of the democratic order
In addition to conditionality for accession, the regional integration organisations may 
fulfil a complementary function in the protection of democracy through the creation 
of sanctions for member states which cease to fulfil democratic standards. Empirical 
evidence found in literature on the effectiveness of these mechanisms in the survival 
of democratic regimes is inconsistent. While Ulfeder (2008) did not find any evidence 
suggesting that the member states of this type of organisation are more likely to remain 
democratic, Wobig (2014) argues that the threat of sanctions by the organisation may 
be effective in democracies with a moderate level of wealth (see also Pevehouse and 
Mansfield 2006; Genna and Hiroi 2015).
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Table 6 summarises the sanction mechanisms of the regional integration organisations 
studied in respect of the internal dimension of democratic conditionality. SICA does not 
appear in the table, because it does not have norms that are sufficiently explicit in this 
respect. The first aspect of the analysis shows which actors take the lead in adopting 
mechanisms of sanction. Although there is a certain margin of regulatory ambiguity, a 
group of organisations rely on leadership mainly (although not solely) from the other states 
in the organisation, with the sanction mechanism being one of monitoring by peers in 
which each state guarantees fulfilment of democratic standards by the others. The three 
European organisations (CoE, EU and OSCE) notably belong to this type (although the 
EU Commission plays an important role aside from member states). In addition, CAN also 
follows this model. CELAC represents the opposite type. In this model, the state affected 
by the potential or actual decline in democracy actually activates the sanction mechanism. 
As will be explained later in greater detail, and contrary to the previous model, this 
second model appears to envision the danger to democracy originating not as much from 
established governments abusing their power and damaging the quality of democracy, 
but from external threats to the established power which could subvert democracy in the 
affected state. Finally, a third model seems to integrate both the leadership of the affected 
state and that of the other states in the organisation, opting for a mechanism that can 
be activated upon the request of a high number of actors. Very few of the organisations 
studied, and none of the European ones, have incorporated this model, which however 
would seem a priori to offer the best guarantee. Finally, Table 6 also shows a second 
dimension: the type of sanctions that may be imposed, which in the majority of cases 
refers to the restriction of rights derived from membership of the organisation (CoE, EU, 
OSCE, CELAC, OAS), although in a few cases they also seem to touch on sanctions 
external to the organisation (UNASUR, CAN, MERCOSUR). CARICOM is a special case, 
as its Charter of Civil Society hardly even outlines any sanction mechanism, not does it 
provide for any explicit range of sanctions. However, we will analyse this second aspect, 
referring to types of sanction, in the following section. 
Table 6: Sanction mechanisms in the internal dimension of democratic conditionality
Prominence of other states Prominence of the affected 
state
Both
With no explicit range 
of sanctions
- CARICOM -
Only diplomatic 
sanctions and the 
suspension of rights
CoE, EU, OSCE CELAC OAS
In addition, economic 
sanctions and the 
opportunity for others 
to be drawn up
CAN - UNASUR, 
MERCOSUR
Source: Own elaboration based on treaties and legal regulations. 
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 2.5.1 Procedures led by other member states
We previously mentioned the fact that the three European organisations studied, as well 
as CAN, seem to share similar characteristics in their sanction mechanism: leadership is 
given to the other states, which seems to produce a system of peer evaluation. This does 
not imply that the affected state may not also in fact take some initiative in managing the 
situation affecting it, but only that the regulatory framework appears to focus primarily 
on the other states in the organisation. In this sense, organisations such as CELAC, 
OAS, MERCOSUR or UNASUR contain somewhat clearer mechanisms that allow for the 
activation of sanctions by affected states themselves. Once again, however, regulatory 
ambiguity appears as a problem in the drawing up of clear taxonomies, as some 
regulations are particularly concise. The Statute of the CoE, for example, only mentions 
in its article 8 that any state which violates article 3 – which as we saw listed principles 
such as the rule of law and fundamental rights, although not democracy as such – could 
have its rights of representation suspended; according to this precept, the Committee of 
Ministers could ask such a state to withdraw voluntarily from the organisation, and if it 
did not comply with this request, the Committee could decide that the state would cease 
to be a member of the Council. 
In the case of the EU, article 7 TEU details the procedure for sanctions and article 354 
TFEU, which establishes the procedures and majorities which have to be attained in 
these cases in institutions such as the European Parliament, the European Council 
or the Council supplements it. Article 7 TEU, which outlines the basic structure of the 
sanction mechanism, establishes a procedure to determine the existence of a risk of 
violation of any of the values in article 2 TEU (including democracy), a second procedure 
to determine any actual violation of these, and a sanction procedure in response to the 
latter. In order to determine the existence of a risk, there should be a reasoned proposal 
by one third of the member states, the European Parliament or the Commission; the 
Council will examine this proposal and will decide on whether such a risk exists, by a 
majority of four fifths of its members and with the consent of the Parliament, - having 
listened to the state concerned, and being able to make recommendations to this state 
in accordance with the same procedure. In the opinion of Sadurski (2009-2010: 397) and 
Shaw (2001: 200), this mechanism for assessing risks which have not yet become reality 
was added specifically as a consequence of the experience of the sanctions imposed 
on Austria in 2000. The procedure for determining that the violation has in fact occurred 
is more demanding, therefore requiring the unanimity of the European Council and the 
consent of the European Parliament on a proposal from one third of member states or the 
Commission, after having invited the state concerned to submit its observations. Finally, 
when this procedure determines that one of the values of article 2 TEU has been violated, 
the Council may impose sanctions acting by qualified majority and taking account of 
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the consequences of such sanctions on the rights and obligations of individual persons 
or legal entities. The Council may decide by the same majority to revoke or modify the 
sanction in response to changes in the country’s situation. In 2014, the Commission 
proposed a new Framework that created a preliminary procedure previous to the 
activation of article 7 (Closa et al. 2014). The Commission activated this Framework for 
the first time on the Polish government in January 2016.
The OSCE is as usual a special case. In principle, the organisation functions by consensus, 
and although it has a mandate to promote democracy laid down in the Charter of Paris, 
no clear procedures exist to be applied in cases of violation of democracy by a member 
state. The only similar precedent – that of the suspension of the former Yugoslavia in 1992 - 
may, however, offer some information by inductive reasoning. In this case, the Permanent 
Council of the organisation took the decision to invoke the idea of “consensus-minus-
one” which had been created in their meeting in Prague in 1992, and which enabled it 
to undertake actions when a state was violating the norms of the Helsinki Declaration or 
other later decisions of the organisation (Galbreath 2007: 86). In the case of Yugoslavia, 
this idea of “consensus-minus-one” made it possible to avoid using the veto against the 
affected country. It must be borne in mind, however, that the trigger for these sanctions 
was not so much a violation of democratic norms by the affected country as the violence 
unleashed by it, which in the view of the OSCE presupposed the violation of the norms 
of the organisation.
Finally, one of the American organisations, CAN, also seems to have opted for systems in 
which monitoring by peers is at the forefront of the imposition of sanctions. The Additional 
Protocol to the Cartagena Agreement of CAN is relatively detailed. Article 2 claims that 
the Protocol will be applied when there is a disruption of the democratic order of any of 
the member states, without specifying what is considered a “breakdown”, just as it was 
not specified in any detail what was understood by “democratic order” (Cánepa 2015). 
Faced with this situation, consultations shall be set up with other member states and, 
where possible, with the affected country to examine the nature of this breakdown (article 
3). After these consultations, the Council of Foreign Ministers may be convened to make a 
definitive judgment on the disruption of the democratic order, in which case “appropriate 
measures shall be adopted for its prompt reestablishment” (article 4). According to 
article 5, the Andean Council of Foreign Ministers will adopt the measures considered 
adequate by means of a decision without the participation of the affected country, which 
will be notified of these measures. The Protocol envisages the parallel development of 
diplomatic measures by member states aimed at re-establishing the democratic order 
(article 6), as well as a cessation of sanctions decided upon by the Andean Council of 
Foreign Ministers once such order has been re-established (article 7). 
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 2.5.2 Procedures led by the affected state
Two organisations leave the leadership to the affected state: CELAC and CARICOM. 
CELAC’s procedure contains a series of peculiarities. The preamble of the Declaration 
about the Defence of Democracy and Constitutional Order of 2011 lays special emphasis 
on the principle of non-interference and links it to the democratic principle, when in other 
contexts both principles have been in a very tense relationship. Moreover, in the latter 
part of the preamble the member states express their “rejection and condemnation of any 
attempt to alter or subvert the constitutional order and normal functioning of institutions 
of any Member State”. The sanction procedure is consequently focused above all on the 
government of each state which must notify the Pro Tempore Presidency of the existence 
of a threat of disruption or alteration of the democratic order which substantially affects 
it. That is to say, the mechanism is devised as a type of self-defense for governments 
which are already constituted, with less attention than other organisations to evaluation 
by peers and the activation of the MDP by third states where a government has violated 
democratic standards in internal order. When a government reports a threat of disruption 
in the democratic order, the Pro Tempore Presidency, with the assistance of the Troika, 
will inform the member states so that they can take joint actions. When the breakdown 
does in fact take place, an Extraordinary Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Relations of 
member states shall be convened in order to adopt measures decided by consensus. The 
CELAC model also differs from that of other organisations in this respect as it provides for 
offering assistance at this meeting to the legitimate government affected. The measures 
will come to an end when it is determined on the basis of periodic evaluations that the 
reasons giving rise to them have ceased. It is also worth mentioning the consultation 
procedure approved in the Statute of Procedure approved at the Caracas Summit in 2011, 
which attempts to give the organisation flexibility and efficiency by urgent consultation 
and tacit approval. This procedure enables a plan for a declaration or resolution to be 
raised with the Troika, which will then be passed to member states and approved quickly 
if there are no objections raised within a short frame of time.
For its part, CARICOM constitutes a case sui generis. Its Charter of Civil Society establishes 
that states are obliged to report periodically on their progress towards democratic 
objectives and human rights, but it does not prevent the Commission of the organisation 
from asking for special reports at any time. Simultaneously, it establishes that a National 
Committee or evaluation body must be created for each state to assess how the Charter 
is being fulfilled and report on this to the Secretary General of the organisation; this 
National Committee will be made up of representatives of the state, civil society (“social 
partners”) and people of high moral authority. From this point, the Charter restricts itself 
to stating that the Secretary General will inform the states of the organisation about this 
matter, issuing recommendations whenever necessary.
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 2.5.3 Twofold procedures
Finally, three organisations seem to have opted for comprehensive mechanisms, in which 
the system of peer evaluation and that of an alert from the affected state itself both play 
a role: OAS, UNASUR and MERCOSUR. The UNASUR procedure is halfway between the 
CELAC mechanism and that of other organisations such as the CoE. According to article 
1 it will be applied “in the event of a breach or threat of breach against the democratic 
order, a violation of the constitutional order of any situation that jeopardises the legitimate 
exercising of power and the application of the values and principles of democracy”. In 
these cases, according to articles 2 and 3, the Council of Heads of State and Government 
or alternatively the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs will meet, either at the request 
of the affected state, or at the request of another UNASUR member state, to determine 
jointly the nature and scope of the measures to be applied. This twofold route to convene 
a meeting thus enables the mechanism of peer evaluation to be combined with the 
possibility of the MDP being invoked as a means of self-defense by a government under 
threat. Moreover, article 6 enables a constitutional government which considers there to 
be a threat to the democratic order in their country to turn to the organisation to report 
about the situation and to request the adoption of measures. Article 7 makes provision 
for the measures to cease once the democratic order is restored.
The dual route has also been adopted in the case of the OAS. The procedure is established 
in article 9 of the Charter of the Organisation, which is in turn detailed in the Democratic 
Charter of 2001. According to article 17 of its Democratic Charter, a member state which 
considers its democratic political process to be in risk may turn to the Secretary General 
or Permanent Council to seek assistance. However, according to article 20, when there is 
an alteration in the constitutional regime that seriously impairs its democratic order then 
“any member state or the Secretary General” may request that the Permanent Council be 
convened to adopt diplomatic measures. Equally, if these measures prove unsuccessful 
or the urgency of the case so warrants, the Permanent Council may convene a special 
session of the General Assembly which may adopt sanctions by a vote of two thirds of 
the member states. According to article 22, when the situation which gave rise to the 
sanctions has been overcome, these may be lifted by a vote of two thirds of the member 
states at the request of any of them or of the Secretary General.
Lastly, in the case of MERCOSUR, the Ushuaia I protocol stipulated that in the case of 
a disruption of the democratic order in a state which had signed the Protocol, the other 
states parties would hold consultations between themselves and with the affected state 
(article 4). In this case, although the affected state was mentioned, leadership seemed 
to stem from the other member states. It would seem, however, that things could be 
different under the Ushuaia II Protocol, whose article 2 refers to the convening of a 
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meeting of Ministers of Foreign Relations at the request of the party affected or any other 
party when there is a disruption of the democratic order. Moreover, article 4 of Ushuaia II 
stipulates that when the constitutional government of a party considers that a disruption 
of democratic order is occurring within its jurisdiction, it can request cooperation to 
preserve the democracy of the other member states. According to Cánepa (2015), 
leadership by the affected state under this new regime is one of its principal innovations.
2.6. Sanctions in the case of disruption of democratic order for  
 members of an organisation
In the previous section we analysed the mechanisms which the organisations can activate 
to determine that there has been a disruption of normal democratic life of a member state. 
However, the question of the sanctions to be imposed in such circumstances is equally 
important. Generally speaking, the literature has classified these types of sanctions as 
diplomatic, economic and military sanctions as well as those of suspension (Youngs 
2012; Heine and Weiffen 2015). Table 6 summarises these types and demonstrates that 
the majority of the organisations only envisage diplomatic sanctions and the suspension 
of the rights derived from belonging to the organisation. This does not prevent some 
organisations from imposing sanctions of an economic nature or others that may be 
determined.
 2.6.1 Organisations without explicit sanction mechanisms:  
  the case of CARICOM
CARICOM constitutes a special case in terms of democratic commitment but also in 
respect of the sanction mechanism. The Charter of Civil Society establishes only the 
need to inform the Secretary General of the violation of any of the principles and rights 
contained within it, or of its incapacity to achieve its objectives. The role of the Secretary 
General, according to article XXV, is limited to informing the member states and formulat-
ing recommendations. In this respect CARICOM’s MDP is one of the most ambiguous 
of all those analysed. No explicit range of sanctions is foreseen, although this does not 
prevent the Secretary General from considering sanctions in his recommendations. And 
while it is established that allegations of violations or of failure to comply with the Charter 
do not impose on the state any obligation to abstain from applying the decisions of its 
courts or authorities8, just below, in article XXVI, the commitment of the states to observe 
the provisions of the Charter is established. Leadership from the affected state and trust 
 
8 “Allegations of violations or non-compliance shall not impose any obligations on a State to refrain from carrying out 
 any decision of its Courts or other authorities pending consideration under this Article”.
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in its voluntarism rather than external coercion defines the CARICOM mechanism. At 
the same time, its ambiguity could potentially allow different interpretations from those 
contained a priori in its text.
 2.6.2 Sanction mechanisms restricted to diplomatic measures and  
  the suspension of rights in the organisation
In many cases organisations envisage the suspension of rights derived from the 
organisation itself as a sanction mechanism. In this sense, the sparse nature of provisions 
for sanctions is striking in at least two of the European organisations: the CoE and the EU. 
The concise text of the Statute of the CoE lays down, in its article 8, suspension of the 
rights of representation for the state concerned as a possible sanction, together with its 
withdrawal from the organisation. In the case of the European Union, article 7 TEU is also 
relatively concise in its description of the range of applicable sanctions; this article refers 
only to the suspension of certain rights derived from the application of the Treaty to the 
state in question, including suspension of voting rights for representatives of the state on 
the Council. Article 7 TEU clarifies that the obligations to the Treaties of the sanctioned 
state will remain in force, but even so, the clause in article 7 is relatively open, since the 
Treaties recognise a wide range of rights of member states which can be suspended. 
The Treaty of the European Union in this sense diverges from other much more precise 
models, such as the abovementioned Additional Protocol to the Cartagena Agreement. 
In the case of the third European organisation, the OSCE, the paucity of hard law makes 
it necessary to resort to actual precedents in order to understand how the sanction 
mechanisms work. The OSCE lacks any regulations that are sufficiently explicit and 
detailed in this respect. In the case of Yugoslavia the sanctions, which were adopted ad 
hoc, consisted in the decision that the country would cease to attend summit meetings. 
According to Galbreath (2007: 87), this meant that the OSCE could manoeuvre around 
the crisis in Yugoslavia avoiding vetoing the country, although it also implied losing a 
direct line to Belgrade and therefore having less ability to influence events on the ground. 
Two organisations in the American arena also use the suspension of rights within the 
organisation as a sanction: these are the OAS and CELAC, although in these cases the 
wording of the MDPs is slightly more detailed than those of its European counterparts. 
In the OAS, the Democratic Charter lays down in its article 19 that an interruption of 
the democratic order of a member state constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to 
this government’s participation in the sessions of the General Assembly, the Meeting 
of Consultation, the Councils of the organisation and the specialised conferences, 
commissions, working groups and other bodies of the organisation, thereby reflecting 
article 9 of the Charter of the organisation. In the same sense, article 20 of the Democratic 
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Charter lays down that faced with an “alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously 
impairs the democratic order” the Permanent Council may initiate the necessary diplomatic 
initiatives. When these prove unsuccessful or if the urgency of the situation so warrants, 
the General Assembly may be convened, and according to article 21 of the Democratic 
Charter it may suspend the member state from participation in the OAS, although this 
will release the state from its obligations towards the organisation “in particular its 
human rights obligations”. According to Levitt (2006: 96), article 21 of the Democratic 
Charter implies a codification of the provisions of the Washington Protocol and gives the 
impression of compelling – rather than authorising – the OAS to punish disruptions of 
democracy. In the case of CELAC, the Declaration on the Defence of Democracy of 2011 
envisages a parallel implementation of diplomatic measures towards the affected state, 
the suspension of this state from the right to participate in the bodies and courts of the 
organisation, and from rights deriving from membership of the organisation. Measures 
adopted in this respect must respect International Law and the internal legislation of the 
affected state, referring in this latter case to the legislation which was in force before the 
subversion of the constitutional order. 
 2.6.3 Sanction mechanisms extended outside of the organisation
In other cases the sanction mechanisms are slightly more imaginative, and it was intended 
to add a range of sanctions that go beyond diplomatic actions and suspension of the 
rights derived from belonging to the organisation. This is the case for three Latin American 
organisations: CAN, UNASUR and MERCOSUR. In fact, the similarities between some 
of these organisations are obvious, as for example those between the assumptions of 
application and the sanction mechanisms of the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR and of 
the Ushuaia II Protocol (Cánepa 2015), which may indicate dynamics of observation and 
training between organisations in the region.
Article 4 of the Additional Protocol to the Cartagena Agreement of CAN establishes 
a detailed list of measures which may be adopted in the case of a breakdown in the 
democratic order which will be applied “in accordance with the seriousness and the 
evolution of political developments in the country in question” and which include: 
suspension of the affected country from any of the bodies of the Andean Integration 
System, or from the cooperation projects carried out by the member states, extension 
of the suspension to other bodies of the Andean System (including disqualification from 
access to facilities or loans of Andean financial institutions), suspension of rights to which 
it is entitled under the Cartagena Agreement and the right to coordinate external action in 
other spheres and, finally, “other measures and actions that are deemed pertinent under 
International Law”. Article 4, therefore, lists various measures and concludes with an 
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open clause. This latter offers a wide margin of manoeuvre for member states to adopt 
sanctions they consider relevant, including those which are not expressly laid down in the 
non-exhaustive list of the aforementioned precept.
Article 4 of the Additional Protocol to the Treaty of UNASUR is relatively extensive in the 
sanctions envisaged and includes some not specified by other organisations. Of course, 
they include the usual clause on the suspension of rights derived from being a member 
state and of participation in the bodies of UNASUR. But in addition, other, relatively more 
ambitious sanctions are included. These envisage the entire or partial closure of territorial 
borders, including the limiting or suspension of trade, air and sea transport, communications, 
the provision of energy, services or supplies. There is the possibility of encouraging the 
suspension of the affected state from other regional and international organisations, or of 
its rights derived from cooperation agreements with other organisations or third states. 
Finally, there is a clause of openness to other sanctions in which is simply laid down the 
“adoption of additional political and diplomatic sanctions”. Moreover, according to article 
5, all of this does not prevent the implementation of parallel diplomatic actions.
Finally, in the case of MERCOSUR, the Presidential Declaration on Democratic 
Commitment of 1996 only envisaged the suspension of rights derived from membership 
of the organisation. This sparse wording was replicated almost identically in the Ushuaia 
Protocol of 1998, which in its article 5 only referred to measures which range from 
suspension of the right to participate in the various bodies of the respective processes 
of integration, to suspension of the rights and obligations arising from these processes. 
However, the Montevideo Protocol (Ushuaia II) has now established in its article 6 a 
much more ambitious range of sanctions, which include, to mention only a few, and 
besides the organisational ones, the closure of land borders, the suspension or limitation 
of trade, communications, the provision of energy, services or supplies, encouraging 
the suspension of rights by third party or in other organisations, collaboration with 
international or regional efforts to establish a peaceful and democratic solution, and a 
generic clause of openness to other sanctions. The widening of this range of sanctions is 
precisely the commonly provided reason why Paraguay has refused to ratify the Protocol.
2.7. Other aspects of MDPs
There are other aspects of MDPs which deserve a brief review before we finish with this 
chapter, as they enable us to understand how they not only provide mechanisms of 
conditionality of access or of sanctions for states facing a disruption of the democratic 
order, but also how these extend to other and equally relevant considerations. In some 
cases, for example, the provisions on democratic conditionality have the objective of 
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being reproduced in other international instruments ratified by the organisation. This is 
the case in the EU with its association agreements.9 It is also the case with CAN, which 
in article 8 of its Additional Protocol to the Cartagena Agreement stipulates that “The 
Andean Community shall seek to incorporate a democratic clause in the agreements it 
signs with third parties, in accordance with the criteria set out in this Protocol”. Point 5 of 
the Declaration on Democratic Commitment in MERCOSUR makes a similar commitment. 
Another interesting example is that of the regional organisations which envisage 
support for the democratic processes of their member states. This is the case with the 
OAS, which in articles 23 to 25 of its Democratic Charter envisages sending electoral 
observation missions at the request of an interested member state. Moreover, in its article 
26, the Charter commits the OAS to activities and programmes to promote a culture of 
democracy. The OSCE, in turn, provides for the presence of observers from other states 
in the organisation of its electoral processes (point 8 of Appendix I to the Charter of Paris). 
MDPs, therefore, are complemented by arrangements of this type, which envision the 
supervision of the appropriate functioning of democracy by multilateral as well as distinct 
forms of democracy promotion and conditionality outside of the organisation.
2.8. Conclusions
Although regional organisations share a common tendency towards the increasing 
inclusion of MDPs in the regulations of their functioning, their concrete design displays a 
high diversity. In this chapter we have analysed some of the fundamental aspects of this 
variation, and these are summarised in Table 7.
As may be seen in Table 7, far from all following the same wording, MDPs seem to follow 
differentiated guidelines: peer revision mechanisms versus mechanisms which leave 
leadership to the affected state; organisational sanctions versus extra-organisational 
sanctions; concise definitions of democracy versus others that are more detailed. In 
reality, the differences between the institutional design of the MDPs are so large that it is 
possible that they could lead to completely different consequences. MDPs present great 
differences between regions, but also within the same region. The European organisations 
are generally characterised by an explicit democratic conditionality at least during their 
membership (and for access in the case of the EU and the CoE), with leadership taken 
by peer monitoring and sanction mechanisms consisting, above all, in the restriction of 
organisational rights. The OSCE, however, presents major peculiarities, as it appears not 
to include any explicit democratic conditionality for accession and is characterised by a 
certain lack of precision in its democratic mechanism, which has often been constructed by 
9	 See	the	communications	of	the	Commission	of	2001:	http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ 
	 TXT/?uri=CELEX:51995DC0216	and	2005	http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52001DC0252 
	 (accessed	1	June	2015).
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decisions applied to concrete cases. In Latin America and the Caribbean there is even greater 
heterogeneity, although this is probably correlated with the greater number of organisations. 
In this region, we find organisations that range from very ambitious ones (CAN, UNASUR, 
MERCOSUR), to others which have hardly any explicit procedure to make their regulations 
effective (CARICOM). At the same time, it is possible to observe organisations whose MDP 
seems to emphasise access (SICA) alongside others which seem to focus mainly on respect 
for democratic institutions for member states (CELAC).
Table 7. Summary of MDPs (explicit norms) in Latin America, the Caribbean and Europe
Organisation Formalisation 
of the MDP 
Access 
conditionality
Membership 
conditionality
Agency in 
the sanction 
procedure
Range of sanctions
OSCE Formal No Yes Other states Diplomatic and 
organisational 
CoE Formal Yes Yes  Other states Diplomatic and 
organisational
EU Formal Yes Yes Other states Diplomatic and 
organisational
SICA Formal Yes No No procedure No categories
CAN Formal No Yes Other states Diplomatic, 
organisational, 
economic or other
CARICOM Informal(*) Yes Yes Affected state No categories
OAS Formal No Yes Affected state 
and other 
states
Diplomatic and 
organisational
MERCOSUR Formal Yes Yes Affected state 
and other 
states
Diplomatic, 
organisational, 
economic or other
UNASUR Formal No Yes Affected state 
and other 
states
Diplomatic, 
organisational, 
economic or other
CELAC Informal No Yes Affected state Diplomatic and 
organisational
Source: Own elaboration based on treaties and legal regulations. (*)Not binding.
Although the objective of this chapter is not to offer a causal explanation of these differences, 
it is worth mentioning that these variations undoubtedly follow deliberate decisions taken 
by the leading actors when they created the MDPs. Beneath these differences, there may 
therefore lie differing preferences and motivational backgrounds, processes of imitating 
other organisations or learning from their mistakes, as well as different political contexts and 
institutional constraints. In this sense, the evolution of regional integration organisations, 
which are experiencing a moment of great success, shall show which models will prevail and, 
above all, which institutional designs are most successful when it comes to guaranteeing 
the ultimate objective of all these norms: to ensure the preservation and promotion of 
democratic regimes in the regional context within which the organisation operates.
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3  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
MECHANISMS FOR DEMOCRACY 
PROTECTION IN LATIN AMERICA, 
THE CARIBBEAN AND THE EURO-
PEAN UNION 
3.1. Introduction
After the analysis of the institutional design of MDPs of the ten organisations covered 
by this study, this chapter concentrates on their implementation in concrete cases of 
democratic crisis in member countries. Institutional design and implementation are, of 
course, interconnected. The design of a democratic clause establishes the regulatory 
and procedural framework within which a particular intervention must fit in cases of 
democratic crisis. To be sure, different institutional designs lead, in theory, to different 
types of intervention: designs that are more precise and detailed in their procedural 
definitions reduce “legal uncertainty” providing political actors with better road maps 
when they face a concrete case of democratic crisis (see Chapter 2). However, this does 
not imply an automatic relationship between design and implementation. A fundamental 
assumption of this chapter is that, between “design” and “implementation”, there is a 
space for the articulation of interests and preferences at play in any particular situation. 
These interests influence the way the actors interpret both the concrete situation they are 
facing, and the texts that lay out the legal basis for their actions.
The chapter analyses 25 cases of democratic crisis in the period 1990-2015, in which 
regional organisations have intervened, either by implementing their formal mechanisms or 
by adopting measures from without these mechanisms (Table 8). Due to the considerable 
number of cases and organisations involved, we will prioritise the identification of patterns 
and common tendencies over the particular detail of each case. Table 8 also shows that 
the events that trigger the intervention by the organisations were very varied in nature, 
including “coups d’état, “self-coups”, “political violence”, “removals from office”, and 
“electoral questioning” among others.
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Table 8: Cases of Intervention by Regional Organisations at times of political crisis
 (1990-2015)
Case Year Type of crisis Regional 
Organisation
Invoking of formal MPDs
LATIN AMERICA
Haiti 1991 Coup d’état OAS Yes (Resolution 1080)
Peru 1992 Self-coup OAS Yes (Resolution 1080)
Venezuela 1992 Attempted coup OAS No
Guatemala 1993 Self-coup OAS Yes (Resolution 1080)
Dominican 
Republic
1994 Questioning of electoral 
outcome 
OAS No
Paraguay 1996 Attempted coup OAS 
MERCOSUR
No
No 
Ecuador 1997 Removal of the executive OAS No
Paraguay 1999 Assassination and 
destabilisation
OAS
MERCOSUR
No
No
Paraguay 2000 Attempted coup OAS
MERCOSUR
No
No
Peru 2000 Questioning of electoral 
outcome
OAS No
Ecuador 2000 Coup OAS No
Venezuela 2002 Coup d’état OAS No
Haiti 2000-2004 Electoral challenge - Coup 
d’état
OAS
CARICOM
Yes (Democratic Charter)
Yes (Charter  of Civil 
Society)(*)
Nicaragua 2004-2005 Attempted removal OAS
SICA
Yes (Democratic Charter)
No
Bolivia 2005 Removal of the executive OAS
CAN
No
No
Ecuador 2005 Removal of the executive OAS
CAN
Yes (Democratic Charter)
No
Bolivia 2008 Destabilization and political 
violence
UNASUR
OAS
CAN
No
No
No
Honduras 2009 Coup d’état OAS
SICA
Yes (Democratic Charter)
No
Ecuador 2010 Attempted coup UNASUR
OAS
No
No
Paraguay 2012 Removal of the executive MERCOSUR
UNASUR
OAS
CELAC
Yes (Ushuaia Protocol)
No
No
No(**)
Venezuela 2013-2015 Questioning of electoral 
outcome and political 
violence
UNASUR No
EUROPE
Yugoslavia 1992 Political violence and 
violation of human rights
EC
OSCE
No
Yes (Prague Document)
Austria 2000 Challenge to the political 
platform of the elected 
government
EU-14 (Council 
of the EU)
No
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As may be appreciated from Table 8, in various cases – particularly in Latin America – 
more than one regional organisation tackled the same crisis. In order to make the analysis 
intelligible, we will group the organisations into four geographical groups: the OAS as a 
hemispheric organisation (3.2.); CAN, MERCOSUR and UNASUR, as South American 
organisations (3.3.); CARICOM and SICA, as organisations of Central America and the 
Caribbean (3.4.); and EU, CoE and OSCE as European organisations (3.3.). 
Each group of organisations will be analysed according to three dimensions of 
implementation:
Activation
As we have seen in Chapter 2, the organisations have formalised more or less explicit 
activation procedures. We are therefore interested in investigating whether these decision-
making procedures have been respected, identifying which actors call upon the regional 
organisation and which invoke, if applicable, the democratic clauses. Similarly, we are 
interested in investigating the “justifications” for the invocation, that is, what reasons the 
actors give for activating the MDPs. This is an important dimension for analysis since, as 
it can be seen in Table 8, most interventions were carried out without invoking the formal 
MDPs, hence the actors had to call upon some kind of reasoning to give them legitimacy.
Verification	and	evaluation
Once the MDPs are activated, the regional organisations must first verify the facts 
supposedly leading to a breakdown of democracy and, second, evaluate progress or 
regression in the political process of the affected state. Several different mechanisms 
serve to verify and to evaluate facts although missions on the ground have become the 
Table 8: Cases of Intervention by Regional Organisations at times of political crisis
 (1990-2015)
Case Year Type of crisis Regional 
Organisation
Invoking of formal MPDs
Hungary 2011-2014 Challenge to constitutional 
reforms
EU (European 
Parliament, 
Commission) – 
CoE
No
Romania 2012 Adoption of anti-
constitutional measures, 
and attempt to depose the 
President
EU (Commission 
and Parliament)
No
Poland 
(***)
2015-2016 Questioning of laws and 
constitutional reform.
EU (Commission) Yes (Rule of Law 
Mechanism, preliminary 
instrument)
Notes: (*) Is not of a binding nature.
(**) The organisation does not have a constitutive treaty, therefore the MDP is of an informal nature.
(***) This case happened while this study was already completed, thus has not been included in the analysis below.
Source: Compiled by author. 
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most common one. These missions can be organised in an intergovernmental way through 
diplomatic representatives of the member states, or by assigning to the Secretary General/
Commission a leading role, by which the governments implicitly delegate a greater level 
of authority to the regional organisation vis-à-vis the member states. The missions may 
also be composed of members of civil society, such as an NGO or representatives of the 
academic world, which confers upon the verification and evaluation a greater degree of 
independence. We are also interested in identifying the objectives of the missions. They 
may derive from the democratic clauses – in case the organisations contain such clauses 
– or they may be determined ad hoc in each case of intervention. The missions may be 
limited to objectives of verification and evaluation as in the case of fact-finding missions, 
they may have objectives of mediation, or they may have both objectives – investigative 
and of mediation – at the same time, which could, in theory, overburden the mission and 
jeopardise its success. 
Sanctions
As we argued in Chapter 2, the organisations stipulate sanctions in their clauses that 
these may be of varied nature including suspension of the rights of membership, as 
well as political, diplomatic or economic sanctions. There is abundant literature on 
sanctions in international organisations (see inter alia Wallensteen and Staibano 2005; 
Gottemoeller 2007; Hubfauer 2007; Hellqvist 2010). In this chapter we are interested in 
analysing precisely how sanctions are decided upon, identifying whether they conform 
to what is stipulated in the clause or whether they are determined ad hoc depending on 
the incidence in question. Other aspects of interest are determining the duration of the 
sanctions and whether they include a procedure of appeal.
Primary sources, such as declarations, resolutions and official press statements provided 
the ground material for the analysis of these three dimensions. Where this was possible, 
semi-structured interviews with political actors who took part in both the negotiation 
and adoption of the MDPs provided confirmation for the information, as in the cases of 
implementation analysed here. The textual sources used and the actors interviewed are 
listed in the Appendices of this study.
3.2. The Organization of American States (OAS)
The OAS is the hemispheric organisation that includes all the countries of the Americas. 
In January 1962 the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member countries decided to 
suspend the government of Cuba from the organisation, even though the OAS Charter 
did not at that time envisage formal MDPs or sanction measures. The meeting of the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs resolved that a Marxist-Leninist government was incompatible 
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with the Inter-American system, an action which must be interpreted in the context of the 
Cold War (see inter alia Magliveras 1999 and Duxbury 2011). Despite the suspension 
being adopted against the “current” government of Cuba and not against the Cuban 
people, in practise the representatives of the Caribbean country were excluded from all 
bodies of the organisation for almost five decades. With the approval of Resolution AG/
RES. 2438 in June 2009, OAS cancelled Resolution VI (by which OAS suspended Cuba 
from its rights of membership) and this paved the way for Cuba’s reincorporation. 
Because of its vast membership of 35 states, the OAS has participated in practically 
all events of political crisis in Latin America we analyse in this chapter. Moreover, the 
period analysed – 1990-2015 – coincides with a process of formalising and improving the 
MDPs which already existed in the OAS; a milestone in this regard was the approval and 
ratification of the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001 (see Chapter 2; see also 
Cooper and Lagler 2001; Hertz 2011; Heine and Weiffen 2014).
 3.2.1 Activation 
Cross-sectional analysis of the cases of intervention by the OAS reveals two noteworthy 
elements. The first, of a procedural nature, is a marked adherence to the formal activation 
procedures for MDPs stipulated in Resolution 1080 and later in the Democratic Charter. 
The second element of relevance is that the organisation has shown difficulties to activate 
its MDPs when facing incidents which do not correspond to a flagrant breakdown of the 
constitution, such as coups d’état or the threat of a coup d’état.
Let us start with the first element. In accordance with what its instruments stipulated, the 
Secretary General convenes the Permanent Council to analyse the situation in question 
and determine the implementation of specific measures that in most cases consist in 
designating a special mission headed by the Secretary General himself. In addition to this 
procedure, the Inter-American Charter envisions other two activation mechanisms. The 
first – contained in Article 17 - authorises the government of the affected state to have 
recourse to the Secretary General or the Permanent Council. The case of the attempt 
to destabilise President Enrique Bolaños of Nicaragua in October 2004 illustrates the 
application of this procedure. On that occasion, the Nicaraguan executive itself - together 
with the Pro Tempore President of SICA - requested that the Permanent Council of the OAS 
should grant an audience to the representative of this country and invoke the Democratic 
Charter, within the concept of “preventive diplomacy”.10 In April 2005, the Ecuadorian 
President Lucio Gutiérrez repeated the same procedure. He entered into contact with the 
 
10 http://www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=C-185/04	(accessed	1	July	2015).
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Secretary General of the OAS to report on the events that eventually led to his removal by 
the national Congress11, giving rise to an extraordinary session of the Permanent Council 
and the invocation of the Democratic Charter.12
Article 20 of the Democratic Charter also allows for the activation by “any member state”, 
which may request the immediate convocation of the Permanent Council.13 Despite this 
option provided by the Charter, we have not identified a case where a “third state” would 
have activated the MDPs. The only case, albeit unsuccessful, was in fact prior to the 
adoption of the Charter, and therefore still under the framework of Resolution 1080. The 
incident occurred when an electoral mission of the OAS issued a report challenging the 
electoral results in the elections in 2000 in Peru under the government of Alberto Fujimori. 
On this occasion, the permanent representative of the USA insisted on the need to invoke 
Resolution 1080 and convene a meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to decide on 
the actions to adopt. However, the representatives of the Latin American governments 
rejected (with subtle differences in the tone of the rejection) this US government proposal. 
The opposite and stronger position, supported by countries such as Mexico and Ecuador, 
argued that the OAS could neither interfere in nor replace the national institutions of a 
member state. It also argued that OAS had designed and approved Resolution 1080 in 
order to deal with situations that were different from those that Peru had experienced. 
This debate led the government of the USA to suggest that there was a need to revise 
and possibly strengthen Resolution 1080 whose area of implementation was proving too 
restricted (see Levitt 2006; Hertz 2012).
The incident of the Peruvian election of 2000 introduces the second element we mentioned: 
the OAS faces difficulties when it has to activate its MPDs to intervene in cases where 
there has not been a flagrant breakdown in the democratic order. In the case of the 
Peruvian election, the Mexican representative maintained that questioning the electoral 
results did not fall within the type of situations for which the Resolution had been created, 
referring to the fact that the strict area of implementation of the Resolution was solely and 
exclusively coups d’état, and particularly coups by the military (see Duxbury 2011). In 
fact, in those cases which were “obvious coups d’état” or “threats of a coup d’état”, the 
action by the OAS was clear: Haiti (1991), Paraguay (1996) and Honduras (2009). In the 
cases of Haiti and Honduras, for example, the Secretary General activated the protection 
mechanisms despite the government of the United States’ – for these purposes, the 
hemispheric power – adoption of a position of doubt in the Permanent Council.
11	 http://www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=C-075/05	(accessed	1	July	2015).
12	 CP/RES.	880	(1478/05)	Support	by	the	OAS	for	the	Republic	of	Ecuador.
13	 Inter-American	Democratic	Charter,	Article	20.
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Under this interpretation, electoral fraud - as reported by its own OAS electoral mission 
to Peru - did not correspond to a “sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic 
political institutional process or the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically 
elected government”14 and did not merit the activation of Resolution 1080. Indeed, there 
are a number of cases which do not correspond to “obvious” interruptions of the elected 
government, but to political crises with various shades of ambiguity and where the action 
of the OAS has been considerably less assertive than in cases of coups d’état. In the cases 
of the self-coups by Presidents Fujimori in Peru and Jorge Serrano in Guatemala which 
were perpetuated in 1993, the OAS first took an investigative position, invoking Resolution 
1080 to gather information on what had happened; only later, it classified the events as 
a “coup d’état” and adopted measures which eventually included sanctions. Even less 
assertive was the action of the OAS when the Vice President of Paraguay, Luís María 
Argaña, was assassinated; it invoked Resolution 1080, but did not adopt any measures. The 
representative of the United States criticised this by maintaining that the Resolution was 
only effective when states “faced the worst possible scenario”, in clear reference to coups 
d’état and, as in the case of Peru, he advocated for the amendment of Resolution 1080. 
The case of Haiti in 2004 clearly illustrates the complexities involved when justifying 
whether or not to implement MDPs. The incident began with the questioning of the results 
of the parliamentary elections that had favoured the party of President Aristide, by an 
electoral mission of the OAS on 21 May 2000. Up to this point the case was identical 
to that of the Peruvian elections one month earlier, with the important difference that 
economic sanctions were in fact imposed on Haiti. OAS did not directly implemented 
these sanctions, rather, multilateral financial institutions (the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank) did. Paradoxically, facing accusations of electoral fraud, 
the government of Aristide itself through its Minister of Foreign Affairs requested the 
sending of an OAS mission. The Permanent Council issued Resolution 796 that 
authorised the Secretary General to carry out “consultations” with the government of 
Haiti and with sectors of the political community.15 The escalation of violence together 
with the increasing difficulty of the Haitian government in maintaining governability and 
the pressures from CARICOM to reinstate financial assistance to Haiti and to engage the 
international community in a more active way in the resolution of the crisis led the General 
Assembly of the OAS to issue Resolution 1831 in Support of Democracy in Haiti, in June 
2001. Although the resolution continued to justify the actions of the OAS in terms of the 
negative conclusions of the electoral mission, the Secretary General was authorised to 
participate in the efforts of CARICOM and other interested countries to “strengthening 
democracy in Haiti”.16 
14	 	See	para.	1	Resolution	1080.
15	 	CP/RES.	786	(1267/01).
16 	AG/RES.	1831	(XXXI-O/01).	With	this	resolution	the	Group	of	Friends	of	Haiti	was	formed.
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The OAS did not activate the Democratic Charter either during the controversial deposing 
of President Fernando Lugo of Paraguay in June 2012, event that will be further discussed 
later when we analyse the interventions of the South American organisations which 
played a leading role in this crisis. In the case of the OAS, the Secretary General did not 
hesitate to condemn the removal of President Lugo:
“There are several situations in which, in some countries, democratic principles 
that should have universal validity are violated, based on written law.”
However, the OAS did not deem the removal from office as an “unconstitutional act” and, 
therefore, the Democratic Charter was not invoked. As a consequence, the hemispheric 
organisation played a secondary role in the management of the crisis.17
 3.2.2 Verification and evaluation
The OAS sent missions in all the cases in which the Democratic Charter had been 
invoked, normally under the leadership of the Secretary General. Nonetheless, Resolution 
1080 did not entail any explicit provision about these missions, leaving their composition 
and objectives to the discretion of the Permanent Council. The Democratic Charter does 
not add much either to the definition of the missions. In Article 18, the Charter lays down 
that the Secretary General or the Permanent Council, with the consent of the affected 
government, may arrange visits and other actions in order to analyse the situation, namely 
fact-finding missions. Article 20 stipulates that the Permanent Council, depending on the 
situation, may undertake the necessary diplomatic initiatives, including good offices, to 
foster the restoration of democracy. This may be considered the legal basis for missions 
of mediation.
In some cases, the Secretary General of the OAS has sent missions even without having 
invoked the Democratic Charter. This was the case of the acts of violence aimed at 
destabilising the government of President Evo Morales in 2008, which culminated with 
the massacre of Pando. Despite the fact that the Charter was not activated, the Secretary 
General and the Secretary for Political Affairs of the OAS travelled as special envoys to 
La Paz at the request of the Morales’ government and in collaboration with an UNASUR 
mission (see OEA 2011: 97). Something similar occurred in 2012 when Paraguay’s 
 
Parliament impeached President Fernando Lugo. The Secretary General travelled to 
17	 Secretary	General	José	Miguel	 Insulza	also	talks	about	 illegal,	although	not	unconstitutional,	acts,	and	maintains	that	 
	 there	 is	a	dangerous	 tendency	 for	 these	 type	of	acts,	camouflaged	as	constitutional,	 to	be	 repeated	 throughout	 the	 
	 region,	 see	 http://www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=C-229/12	 	 (accessed	 1	 July,	 
	 2015).
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Asunción on a mission of an informal nature without the support of the Charter or any 
resolution, but at the suggestion of the President of the Permanent Council and under the 
general mandate of the OAS Charter.18
Cross-case analysis shows that organisations design the missions according to a lax 
criterion of representation including various diplomatic representatives of countries 
in the hemisphere under the leadership of the Secretary General or a special envoy 
of the Secretary. The abovementioned case of Paraguay is interesting in this respect 
because for the first time the Secretary General of the OAS tried to form a mission 
following a strict criterion of representation from each of the sub-regions that make up 
the hemisphere.19 We may infer that the decision stems from the fact that Paraguay 
is also a member of MERCOSUR and UNASUR, as well as of the OAS, and that both 
sub-regional organisations showed interest in intervening in what they considered – as 
we will see below - the unconstitutional removal of an elected President. However, the 
attempt failed, and the OAS mission took on a purely information-gathering objective 
and was made up of representatives from the United States, Canada, Honduras, 
Mexico y Haiti.20
The majority of the cases analysed demonstrate that the interaction between the OAS 
missions and the parties involved is normally positive. In accordance with what the 
Charter stipulates, these are missions which seek to employ good offices and which 
usually exhaust diplomatic mechanisms and national dialogue before taking any 
measures of a coercive nature. A recurrent activity of the missions is that of warning 
those groups or actors who offended the democratic order of the possible consequences 
of their actions at a diplomatic and economic level. That being said, there are cases 
where one of the parties rejected the missions. After the coup d’état against Aristide on 
29 February 2004 and four years of “consultative diplomacy”, the OAS faced serious 
problems in guaranteeing the work of its missions in Haiti, de facto delegating the 
initiative to the UN Security Council. Similarly, the de facto government of Honduras 
took a hostile position towards the mediating role of the OAS, especially when the 
organisation suspended the country (see Vicente 2009). On 22 September 2009, an 
express order of the de facto government prevented an OAS mission headed by the 
Secretary General from landing at Tegucigalpa, which unleashed general condemnation 
from the international community.21
18	 	http://www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=C-234/12	(accessed	1	August	2015).
19	 	http://www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=C-234/12	(accessed	1	August	2015).
20	 	http://www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=C-243/12	(accessed	1	August	2015).
21	 	http://www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=C-312/09	(accessed	1	July	2015).
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 3.2.3 Sanctions 
When diplomatic actions prove unfruitful and do not succeed in restoring democratic 
order, Article 21 of the Democratic Charter stipulates that suspension of the right of 
participation in the OAS requires an affirmative vote by two thirds of member states. As 
was said in Chapter 2, the Democratic Charter of the OAS does not provide for any other 
sanctions apart from suspension, which has only been applied once in the period being 
studied, in the case of the coup d’état in Honduras in 2009. In addition, Resolution AG/
RES.2 (XXXVII-E/09) which applied Article 21 of the Democratic Charter, encouraged 
member states and international organisations to revise their relations with the Republic of 
Honduras during the period of diplomatic actions to restore democracy and the rule of law 
in the Republic of Honduras, in order to reinstate President José Manuel Zelaya in office. 
The effectiveness of the actions deserves some comments. In the first place, the OAS did 
not achieve its objective of reinstating President Zelaya despite actions and sanctions. 
Bilateral actions by a mission from the U.S. headed by the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Western Hemisphere Affairs, Thomas Shannon facilitated the termination of the conflict 
and the formation of a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation. A letter of safe-
passage allowed Zelaya to leave the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa where he had 
been in asylum for almost eight months. The effects of the sanctions were also far from 
immediate. The suspension of Honduras interrupted the communication channel between 
the OAS and the de facto government, and diplomatic actions had to be taken from outside, 
firstly through the initiative of the Ex-President of Costa Rica, Ricardo Arias, and then in 
the context of the Guaymuras dialogue.22 In accordance with Article 22 of the Democratic 
Charter, any member state or the Secretary General may propose to the General Assembly 
to lift a suspension once the situation that led to the suspension has been resolved. In the 
case of Honduras, this occurred on 12 May 2010 when the Vice President and the Foreign 
Minister of Panama called for opening a debate on the re-incorporation of Honduras, which 
eventually took place in May 2011 with 32 votes in favour and one against from Ecuador. 
It is interesting to note that in some cases the OAS has recommended economic and 
diplomatic sanctions despite that its formal MDPs did not envisage them. In the case of 
the first coup d’état against President Aristide in 1991, the Permanent Council issued 
an ad hoc Resolution which recommended member states to consider diplomatic 
and economic sanctions against Haiti. OAS members accepted the recommendation, 
although the United States was doubtful about its application. In the opinion of certain 
analysts, this was due to the negative image the North American government had of 
Aristide (see Schnably 2000: 169-196).
22	 http://www.abc.es/20110601/internacional/rc-honduras-regresa-201106011917.html	 and	 http://www.oas.org/es/ 
	 centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=C-020/10	(accessed	1	August	2015).
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3.3. CAN, MERCOSUR and UNASUR
Three South American regional organisations – CAN, MERCOSUR and UNASUR - 
have formalised MDPs (see also Chapter 2). Both, the Additional Protocol of CAN 
Commitment to Democracy, and the Ushuaia Protocol on the Democratic Commitment 
of MERCOSUR, were agreed upon in 1998. In the case of MERCOSUR, the Montevideo 
Protocol (also known as Ushuaia II) amended the Ushuaia Protocol in 2011. The former 
remains unratified. As for UNASUR, it adopted the Additional Protocol on Democratic 
Commitment in 2010, which entered into force in 2014 after obtaining nine of the twelve 
national parliaments’ ratifications.
The cross-case analysis shows an emergent tendency of increasing leadership of the 
sub-regional South American organisations to the detriment, to some extent, of the 
role exercised by the OAS. Thus during the attempts to destabilise the government of 
Evo Morales in Bolivia (2008), the OAS had to act in coordination with UNASUR in a 
special mission, at the express request of President Morales. Later in Paraguay in 2012, 
MERCOSUR and UNASUR invoked their respective democratic clauses while the OAS 
Secretary General exercised his good offices without implementing the Democratic 
Charter. Finally, the OAS was side-lined from managing the crisis in Venezuela during the 
contested electoral process which brought Nicolás Maduro to power (April 2013), and it 
was UNASUR which took the leading role in mediation between the parties. It remains 
to be seen whether the OAS will cede the management of democratic crises in South 
America to the sub-regional organisations or whether, on the contrary, it will resume a 
role of greater leadership. 
The increasing leadership by the South American organisations has not, however, 
been of a similar nature across the three organisations. Although the MDPs of CAN 
and MERCOSUR were formalised in a contemporary manner in 1998, CAN has never 
implemented its democratic clause and in general has limited itself to issuing declarations, 
and in some cases to ex post support measures once the severe phase of the crisis has 
been overcome. MERCOSUR, on the other hand, took proactive action in the three crises 
affecting Paraguay, including suspending its rights of participation when President Lugo 
was impeached in June 2012. UNASUR, a much more recent regional organisation whose 
democratic clause was adopted in 2010 and ratified in 2014, participated actively in the 
crisis in Bolivia (2008), and during the attempted coup in Ecuador (2010), suspended 
Paraguay (2012) and had been the main international actor in the mediation of the crisis 
in Venezuela (2013-2015). 
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 3.3.1 Activation
Cross-sectional analysis of the cases of intervention in South America also show two 
general tendencies which are worth highlighting. The first is the high level of discretion 
enjoyed by executive powers of the member states. As was seen in the case of the 
OAS, the hemispheric organisation is also subject to inter-governmental dynamics that 
may inhibit its actions. However, in the case of MERCOSUR and UNASUR the discretion 
enjoyed by the Heads of State and Government translates into greater innovation 
outside of the procedures stipulated in the respective legal texts. The second tendency 
that stands out is that MERCOSUR and UNASUR are more proactive in intervening in 
controversial cases where the OAS has adopted a much more reluctant position as has 
already been described earlier. 
Let us start by the discretion in following the activation procedures. It is worth remembering 
that the activation procedures of the MDPs of CAN, MERCOSUR and UNASUR grant the 
ability to activate established actions exclusively to the Heads of State and Government 
(CAN, MERCOSUR and UNASUR) or, otherwise, to the Council of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs (UNASUR, MERCOSUR).23 This is in contrast to the OAS, where the Secretary 
General is also competent to activate the mechanisms. The democratic Protocol of 
UNASUR, as well as the Montevideo Protocol (Ushuaia II) of MERCOSUR – whose texts 
share an extraordinary level of similarity – also grant to the affected state the capacity to 
activate the mechanisms requesting cooperation to defend and preserve the democratic 
institutionality.24 In this sense the Montevideo Protocol (Ushuaia II) is somewhat more 
specific on the activation procedure than the original Ushuaia Protocol of 1998.25
Neither MERCOSUR nor UNASUR confer to a “third State” the capacity to activate the 
mechanisms – for example, by convening a meeting of ministers. CAN leaves room for a 
certain ambiguity concerning this procedure in Article 3 of the democratic Protocol. This 
stipulates that “In the event of development that could be considered as a disruption of 
the democratic order in any Member Country, the other Andean Community Member 
Countries shall consult with each other and, if possible, with the country involved in order 
to examine the nature of those events” (see also Chapter 2).
23	 Additional	Protocol	 “Andean	Community	Commitment	 to	Democracy”,	Art.	3;	Additional	Protocol	 to	 the	Constitutive	 
	 Treaty	 of	 UNASUR	 on	 Commitment	 to	 Democracy,	 Art.	 2;	 Montevideo	 Protocol	 on	 Commitment	 to	 Democracy	 in	 
	 MERCOSUR	(Ushuaia	II),	Art.	2.	
24	 Additional	Protocol	to	the	Constitutive	Treaty	of	UNASUR	on	Commitment	to	Democracy,	Art.	6;	Montevideo	Protocol		
	 on	Commitment	to	Democracy	in	MERCOSUR	(Ushuaia	II),	Art.	4.
25	 The	original	Ushuaia	Protocol	 in	 its	Article	4	established	that	 in	 the	case	of	a	disruption	of	 the	democratic	order	 in	a	 
	 state	 that	 was	 part	 of	 that	 Protocol,	 the	 other	 states	 parties	 would	 initiate	 the	 relevant	 consultations	 between	 
	 themselves	and	with	the	affected	state.
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Discretion in the interpretation of the procedures is apparent in several cases. For 
example, in the case of the attempted coup d’état in 1996 and the assassination 
in 1999 in Paraguay, the Brazilian executive acted as spokesperson for MERCOSUR 
and announced measures which the block took in respect of this country. In 1996, the 
Brazilian ambassador in Asunción announced to General Oviedo the measures that Brazil, 
MERCOSUR and the international community would adopt if the mandate of the elected 
president, Juan Carlos Wasmosy, was not respected. The fact that the organisation 
had not yet adopted a democratic clause may explain the evident bilateral nature of 
the interventions by MERCOSUR in that incident. However, Brazil repeated again this 
bilateral approach three years later in the wake of the assassination of Vice President Luís 
María Argaña even though MERCOSUR had already adopted and ratified the Ushuaia 
Protocol by then. In this case, the Presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso acted again 
as spokesperson for MERCOSUR and warned the government of Raúl Cubas of the 
consequences of departing from the constitutional order. 
In the case of the removal of President Fernando Lugo on 22 June 2012, the activation 
of the Ushuaia Protocol did not explicitly follow the procedure stipulated in the Protocol 
either. The Heads of State and Government of MERCOSUR condemned on the same day 
the removal from office of President Lugo that was executed through an impeachment 
(juicio politico). Two days later, the Heads of State and Government of MERCOSUR 
(including the associated countries Bolivia and Chile) declared the suspension of 
Paraguay in a declaration that did not specify the place of the meeting where this decision 
had been taken (Paz 2012). 
Despite the fact that CAN has never implemented its democratic Protocol, it has taken 
actions regarding political events that have affected its member states. These actions did 
not follow the procedure laid down in Article 3 of the Protocol. For instance, CAN issued 
a statement only two weeks after the removal from office of the President of Ecuador, 
Lucio Gutiérrez. In this case, the Secretary General of CAN visited Ecuador invited by the 
interim President, Alfredo Palacios, to participate in the setting up of the round-tables for 
political dialogue and consensus (mesas de diálogo politico y concertación). The interim 
President also invited the Secretary General to participate as an observer in the process 
of appointing a new Supreme Court in Ecuador. In the case of the removal from office of 
the Bolivian President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, the Secretary General of CAN took 
again the initiative and he sent a message of support to the President. In this message, 
the Secretary General cited the Democratic Protocol of CAN, although the instrument 
was not officially invoked. In other situations, CAN played a secondary role, delegating 
the role of mediator to other organisations. This occurred, for example, in the case of the 
coup d’état against President Hugo Chávez in 2002 when CAN delegated the diplomatic 
initiative to the OAS. At that moment, CAN had already adopted the Democratic Protocol 
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although it was not yet ratified. CAN was also rather absent from the mediation between 
the government of Evo Morales and the opposition during the Pando massacre in 
2008. While UNASUR took on a leading role, CAN limited itself to issuing an ex post 
communiqué congratulating President Morales on the national agreement reached. The 
actions of CAN were also limited to a declaration in the case of the attempted coup d’état 
against President Correa in 2010.26
UNASUR, the most recent of the South American regional organisations, has participated 
actively in all the political crises that have taken place since its creation in 2008. However, 
it is important to reiterate that the organisation adopted the Democratic Protocol only in 
2010 and national parliaments ratified it in 2014. In other words, UNASUR implemented 
interventions without the framework of its democratic clause. In the case of the Pando 
massacre in Bolivia in September 2008, the Pro Tempore President, Michelle Bachelet, 
convened the other Heads of State and Government to a meeting in Santiago to examine 
what had occurred in Pando. At that extraordinary meeting the “La Moneda Declaration” 
introduced UNASUR as an instrument for democracy protection and political coordination. 
During the attempted coup in Ecuador in September 2010, President Rafael Correa 
himself acted as the Pro Tempore President of UNASUR. Because of this, the Secretary 
General of UNASUR – the ex-President Néstor Kirchner – and the President of Argentina 
– Cristina Fernández de Kirchner –jointly called an extraordinary meeting in Buenos Aires 
to deal with the situation. 
The case of the removal from office of Fernando Lugo is also an example of inter-
governmental discretion. Notwithstanding the Democratic Protocol pending ratification, 
the Heads of State and Government of UNASUR suspended Paraguay from its rights 
of membership. On the same day as the Chamber of Representatives in Paraguay was 
voting to remove the President from office, the Heads of State and Government of 
UNASUR were meeting extraordinarily in Rio de Janeiro, where they happened to be 
attending the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, and they agreed 
to send an investigative mission to Asunción.
UNASUR was the only international player acting as a mediator between the government 
of President Nicolás Maduro and sectors of the opposition which they not only challenged 
the election results of April 2013 but also accused the government of violating the political 
and civil rights of its militants and leaders. UNASUR implemented actions, including the 
sending of various missions made up of foreign ministers and the Secretary General, 
without officially invoking the democratic Protocol. The Council of the Heads of State 
and Government recognised and supported the government of Nicolás Maduro the day 
26	 http://www.comunidadandina.org/webcan/Prensa.aspx?id=3314&accion=detalle&cat=NP&title=comunicado-de- 
	 prensa-de-la-secretaria-general-de-la-can-sobre-la-situacion-del-ecuado	(accessed	1	August	2015).
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after the election results, and appointed the first mission to support investigations of the 
violent acts after the elections (Closa and Palestini 2015). 
The South American organisations (basically MERCOSUR and UNASUR) have proved to 
be more proactive than the OAS (and for these purposes, CAN) in intervening in cases 
which contain a certain degree of ambiguity. In so doing, MERCOSUR and UNASUR 
have widened the scope of interventions aimed at protecting democracy. In the case of 
Bolivia 2008, the justification for acting given by the Heads of State and Government of 
UNASUR included a new element absent in previous interventions: the risk of secession. 
The La Moneda Declaration explicitly states that the South American countries will not 
accept any rupture of the institutional order in Bolivia, or any process compromising its 
territorial integrity. This set an interesting precedent, as for the first time in the last two 
decades the region was facing a possible case of territorial secession. 
The case of the removal from office of President Lugo is also instructive. The Constitution 
of Paraguay permits the removal from office of the President of the Republic by a process 
of impeachment. Therefore, strictly speaking, this event could not fall into the category 
of a constitutional rupture. The Heads of State and Government of MERCOSUR and 
UNASUR justify the intervention on the basis of the non-respect of the due process, as 
apparent in the short time granted to President Lugo to prepare his defence. Without 
entering into the interpretation as to whether this procedural infringement converts the 
impeachment into “a breakdown in the institutional order” or not, political actors added a 
new element to justify the intervention of a regional organisation in the affairs of a member 
state. The violation of a political right justified their intervention and this would ostensibly 
broaden the scope of intervention by regional organisations.
 3.3.2 Verification and evaluation
It should be noted that neither the Ushuaia Protocol of 1998, nor the CAN Protocol of 
Commitment to Democracy stipulate the creation of special missions. In the case of 
MERCOSUR, the Montevideo Protocol (Ushuaia II), approved in December 2011 but 
still not in force, stipulates in its Article 5 the constitution of committees for support, 
cooperation and technical assistance in the affected party, and open committees to 
support the work of round-tables between the political, social and economic actors in the 
affected member state. 
There is only one record of a mission sent by CAN during the removal from office of 
President Lucio Gutiérrez in April 2005. The mission, however, acted ex post when the 
interim President, Alfredo Palacio invited the Secretary General of CAN to participate in 
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setting up round-table talks and to act as observer in the process of appointing a new 
Supreme Court of Justice. This mission was authorised by the CAN Council of Ministers 
on the following day during a meeting held in Luxemburg.27
MERCOSUR has not made use of missions. In the case of the threat of a coup d’état 
in Paraguay in 1996, it was the Brazilian Embassy which acted, informing the Brazilian 
president and warning the de facto government of the possible sanctions MERCOSUR 
might consider. The ministers of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay travelled to Asunción on 
a mission organised by the Secretary General of the OAS, so it is not quite accurate to 
attribute this action to MERCOSUR.
UNASUR, on the other hand, has carried out several special missions in its brief history. 
The Democratic Protocol envisages the forming of missions in a rather loose manner. Its 
Article 5 stipulates that as well as adopting sanctions (defined in Article 4), the Council 
of Heads of State and Government or, in its absence, the Council of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs shall use its good offices and take diplomatic steps to promote the restoration of 
democracy in the affected country. It is striking that the missions are formally identified 
as “simultaneous” to the adoption of sanctions; there does not therefore exist such a 
thing as an investigative or fact finding mission, whose purpose would be to inform the 
executive bodies before the adoption of any later measure such as sanctions. 
In the case of Bolivia and the Pando massacre, UNASUR created two missions. Through 
the La Moneda Declaration, the Council of Heads of State and Government ordered the 
creation of a mission with the objective of opening up a process of dialogue between 
the government and the opposition. The Pro Tempore President of UNASUR, Michelle 
Bachelet, appointed a special envoy – the former Chilean Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdés 
– to lead this mission, which worked in coordination with the good offices of the Secretary 
General of the OAS, former Chilean Minister of the Interior, José Miguel Insulza. Nine 
days later, during a meeting of the UN General Assembly, the Bolivian President Evo 
Morales asked the South American Presidents to form a second mission to investigate 
the events which had occurred on 15 September, led by the Argentinian human rights 
lawyer Rodolfo Mattarollo, and which thus took on the work of the previous mission. 
In the case of the removal from office of President Lugo, UNASUR sent a mission to 
Asunción the day it knew the result of the Senate vote to remove the president. The 
mission was made up of ministers and representatives from the member states, together 
with the Secretary General who had recently taken office, Alí Rodríguez, and had the aim 
of examining the events in situ.28 
27	 http://www.comunidadandina.org/webcan/Prensa.aspx?id=1680&accion=detalle&cat=NP&title=acordaran- 
	 condiciones-para-veeduria-andina-eneleccion-de-nueva-corte-suprema-de-ecuador	(accessed	1	July	2015).
28	 Communiqué	from	UNASUR	on	the	political	situation	in	Paraguay.	COMMUNIQUE	Asunción.	22	June	2012.
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After the violence intensified and the government arrested the opposition leader Leopoldo 
López in February 2014, the Council of Ministers of External Relations of UNASUR 
approved Resolution 02/2014 that created a “committee of ministers” made up of the 
ministers of external relations of Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador with the objective of 
supporting, advising and enabling dialogue in Venezuela. The Committee visited Caracas 
three times, and the Secretary General of UNASUR accompanied the Committee on the 
last visit. He, in fact, played a leading role in the mediation effected by UNASUR.
Some comments on the interaction between the UNASUR missions and the parties 
involved are in order. In the case of Bolivia, both parties received well the mission to 
facilitate dialogue. During an extraordinary meeting within the framework of the UN 
General Assembly, President Evo Morales publicly thanked the UNASUR mission for their 
actions that made it possible to re-establish dialogue with the opposition and change the 
tone of the debate: 
“Now that we sit down to talk with the opposition they tell me that they do not 
want to destabilise democracy or attack my presidential office, something which it 
was unthinkable they would say before the UNASUR meeting”.29 
The Final Report of the investigative mission led by Mattarollo was delivered to the Pro 
Tempore President, Michelle Bachelet, on 25 November 2008; it was, however, criticised 
by large sectors of the opposition and other countries for being incomplete and not 
sufficiently substantial30 (see also Comini 2014). 
The missions sent by UNASUR to Paraguay and Venezuela were received less positively 
by the oppositions to the governments. In the case of Paraguay, the UNASUR mission 
managed to have conversations with opposition leaders and with the Vice President 
Federico Franco, who eventually assumed as the interim President. However, the mission 
did not succeed in establishing a dialogue between the parties. Following the decision to 
suspend Paraguay from its rights of participation, the opposition became hostile to the 
organisation. The presidential adviser to President Lula, Marco Aurélio García referred to 
the UNASUR mission in these terms:
“After many consultations and attempts at mediation, it was not difficult to see that 
the Paraguayan Senate had in effect become a truly emergency court, insensitive 
to any deliberations. By means of a summary judgment and on the basis of a 
 
29	 http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-112209-2008-09-25.html		(accessed	1	July	2015).
30	 http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2008/11/25/332402/bachelet-recibe-informe-sobre-matanza-en-bolivia.html	 
	 y	 http://www.emol.com/noticias/internacional/2009/03/13/348757/senado-boliviano-pide-a-michelle-bachelet-revisar- 
	 el-informe-de-unasur-sobre-pando.html	(accessed	1	July	2015).
80
document of extraordinary factual and legal inconsistency, it was decided to 
remove a president elected by popular vote, without giving him the time necessary 
to make a coherent defense of his mandate” (García 2012; authors’ translation). 
Something similar occurred in the case of Venezuela. On their first two visits to Caracas, 
the committee of ministers managed to maintain a channel of dialogue with the opposition. 
However, as a result of the lack of receptivity to the demands of the opposition, 
regarding the supposedly arbitrary detentions of political leaders, the mission, and for 
these purposes UNASUR as such, lost its legitimacy among sectors of the opposition. 
The actions of the Secretary General in direct support of the elected government thus 
contributed to the breakup in communications between UNASUR and the opposition to 
President Maduro. 
 3.3.3 Sanctions
As was analysed in Chapter 2 the democratic clauses of CAN (Article 4) and UNASUR 
(Article 4) contain sanctions. In the case of MERCOSUR, the Ushuaia Protocol did not 
define sanctions, but the Montevideo Protocol (Ushuaia II) does so in its Article 6. 
In the cases of democratic crises analysed, only the removal from office of President 
Lugo led MERCOSUR and UNASUR to apply sanctions, specifically suspension of the 
rights of participation. The Heads of State and Government of MERCOSUR (including 
the associated countries, Bolivia and Chile) decided to suspend Paraguay on 24 June 
2012, three days after the removal from office of President Lugo became official. This 
decision was formalised at the MERCOSUR Summit in Mendoza on 29 June 2012, on 
the basis of the Ushuaia Protocol and the Montevideo Protocol. According to Marco 
Aurélio Garcia, the Brazilian government argued that economic sanctions should not 
be applied to Paraguay as it was understood that economic sanctions hurt the civilian 
population more than they hurt governments (Garcia 2012). In fact, along with the 
“Decision of Suspension”, the states parties of MERCOSUR guaranteed the continuity of 
projects concerning Paraguay in the Structural Convergence Fund (FOCEM) (Mendoza 
Decision). 
It is curious that this document was entitled “Decision”, as the only body competent to 
make decisions under the Ouro Preto Protocol is the Council of the Common Market, 
which includes the ministers of external relations and the finance ministers. The 
Montevideo Protocol itself explicitly states in its Article 6 that the decision to suspend 
a state party must be made in an extended session of the Council of the Common 
Market. The Extraordinary Summit in Mendoza, which involved the three presidents of 
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Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, was not the appropriate body to decide on a suspension. 
The decision to suspend must, on the contrary, be taken after consultations (Ushuaia 
Protocol, Art. 4 and Montevideo Protocol, Art. 3), which did not happen in this case, 
since as was said in the previous section MERCOSUR did not appoint any mission, 
nor did authorise the Paraguayan delegation to attend the Mendoza meeting to inform 
the parties.
At the same meeting in Mendoza, the newly appointed Secretary General of UNASUR, 
Alí Rodríguez, stated that Paraguay was likewise suspended from UNASUR “until the 
exercise of democracy is re-established”, without necessarily envisaging the return of 
this country to the South American block once the presidential elections of 2013 had 
been settled. It was proposed that the monitoring of the future electoral process would 
be responsibility of the Electoral Council of UNASUR, a body approved by the Council 
of Ministers of External Relations for the external observation of the electoral processes 
of member countries in order to guarantee democratic transparency (Kersfield 2013). 
One month after the suspension was imposed, UNASUR established a high-level group 
which concluded that the suspension measure would remain in force until “fair” elections 
took place and “until respect for political freedoms and human rights existed”. Salomón 
Lerner (former Prime Minister of Peru in the government of Ollanta Humala), argued 
that “it was not the intention of the South American block to return the government 
of Fernando Lugo that was considered as an internal matter of Paraguay, but to carry 
forward “political monitoring of all the events given that just eight months before the 
electoral process there was a breakdown of democracy” (Kersfield 2013: 204, translated 
by the authors). OAS was, therefore, the only regional organisation that did not suspend 
Paraguay.
3.4. SICA and CARICOM
We will now examine the actions of the organisations of Central America (SICA) and the 
Caribbean (CARICOM). It makes sense to group these two organisations together not 
only because they share a geographical and security area, but also because they both 
maintain a dialogue of institutional cooperation (Ugell 2000; Berry 2005). In the case of 
SICA, the Framework Treaty on Democratic Security (FTDS) established a commitment 
to democracy. The six Central American governments designed this Treaty as a 
supplementary instrument to the Tegucigalpa Protocol. They signed it on 15 December 
1995 in Honduras. The FTDS may be understood as a formalised result of the agreements 
and process of Esquipulas, which facilitated peace agreements in El Salvador (1992) and 
Guatemala (1996), as well as in Nicaragua (1989). In the latter case, elections allowed 
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political alternation in Nicaragua (1990). These cases together led to the integration and 
pacification of the region. In this way, the FTDS seeks to replace the old doctrine of 
national security represented by the Central American Defense Council (CONDECA). The 
objectives of the FTDS are to strengthen Central America as a region of peace, freedom, 
democracy and development, as well as to design a new model of regional security (see 
Chapter 2; see also Urgell 2000). 
In the case of CARICOM the commitment to democracy is enshrined in the Charter of 
Civil Society adopted at the Eighth Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government 
in February 1997. As was said in Chapter 2, the Charter of Civil Society is not binding 
in nature, being an example of soft law. Its reach goes far beyond the protection of 
democracy as it includes the protection of civil and political, economic, social and cultural 
rights (see Charter of Civil Society, Art. 6 and Art. 17).
 3.4.1 Activation
As was described in Chapter 2, the legal instruments on which the MDPs of SICA and 
CARICOM are based suffer from ambiguity and a low level of precision in their procedures. 
Both the FTDS, in the case of SICA, and the Charter of Civil Society, in the case of 
CARICOM are rather general normative frameworks whose specific instruments for the 
protection of democracy are not very operational. This characteristic is evident when we 
analyse the cases where the two organisations have intervened. In general terms one 
could say that the interventions of SICA and CARICOM are characterised by a low level 
of legal bases, thus being defined ad hoc depending on each case. 
CARICOM’s Charter of Civil Society does not provide for a specific activation procedure 
in the case of a disruption of democracy. However, Article 25 lays down a permanent 
scrutiny procedure according to which the states must submit periodic reports to the 
General Secretary with respect to the fulfilment and implementation of the clauses of the 
Charter. A National Committee receives accusations of violation or non-fulfilment of the 
clauses of the Charter. 
Despite the ambiguity in the procedures to which we have referred, CARICOM played a 
primary role during the crisis in Haiti which began with the questioning of the parliamentary 
elections of May 2000 and which continued until the removal of President Jean Bertrand 
Aristide on 29 February 2004. It should be noted that Haiti was accepted as a member 
of CARICOM on 2 July 2000, a month after the questioned elections had taken place. As 
early as August CARICOM issued a declaration urging the OAS to send a mission to look 
for ways out of the political crisis. From this moment onwards, CARICOM took a clear 
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position in defence of the elected government of Haiti that contrasted with the reluctant 
position taken by the OAS and the negative stance taken by both the United States 
government and the multilateral financial institutions towards the government of Aristide. 
Indeed, in its declarations, CARICOM urged support for the government of Aristide in 
running the forthcoming elections and bringing calm to the population, at the same time 
as it urged the World Bank and the IDB to reactivate financial cooperation with Haiti.31
Three days after the forced removal of President Aristide, the Conference of Heads of 
Government met in an extraordinary session and invoked the Charter of Civil Society. 
The declaration issued did not recognise the legitimacy of rebelling Haitian forces and 
expressed a clear concern about the move away from democracy32, offering asylum to 
President Aristide in Jamaica and triggering the reaction of the de facto Haitian government 
that froze relations with CARICOM. Similarly, CARICOM increased its pressure on the UN 
and the OAS to invoke Article 20 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. 
The justification of the position taken by CARICOM may be reconstructed from the 
official declarations and speeches. In a speech given to the UN Security Council, the 
President of the Council of External and Community Relations (Hon. Billie Miller, from 
Barbados), stated that CARICOM had been involved in Haiti prior to the removal from 
office of Aristide. Involvement had three objectives: to stabilise the political situation 
through power sharing, to prevent the traditional practise in Haiti of removing elected 
presidents with the aim of resolving political conflicts, and to help the Haitians to find a 
peaceful political solution which would preserve the rule of law and ensure constitutional 
continuity. In the same declaration, the Honourable Lady stressed that for small countries 
such as those in the Caribbean, respect for democratic principles was essential for their 
own security.33 The identity of small states may explain the very proactive and cohesive 
action undertaken by CARICOM in order to support Aristide and this readiness stands in 
sharp contrast with the reluctant position of the OAS. 
SICA played a relevant role in the case of the “institutional” coup in Nicaragua despite the 
fact that, as we saw in Chapter 2, the FTDS is rather brief in its reference to MDPs. It is 
worth remembering that the protection of democracy – as a legal principle – it is scattered 
across the broad normative framework of “democratic security” which informs the spirit 
and content of the treaty, whose wide scope is a response to the large number of security 
challenges facing the Central American region. Thus, for example, Article 8, dealing with 
the strengthening of democracy, does not establish any “active” mechanism to use in the 
case of a disruption of a democratic order. It rather enshrines the “passive” obligation 
 
31	 http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres151_02.jsp			(accessed	1	August	2015).
32	 http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres22_04.jsp	(accessed	1	August	2015).
33	 http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres19_05.jsp	(accessed	1	August	2015).
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to refrain from lending any support of a political, military, financial or any other nature 
to individuals, groups, irregular forces or armed gangs which attack the unity and order 
of the state or advocate the overthrow or destabilisation of the democratically elected 
government of another party (FTDS, Article 8). 
In the case of Nicaragua, President Enrique Bolaños himself contacted the Heads of 
State and Government of SICA nine days after the General Accountability Office laid 
charges against him. In an extraordinary meeting, Bolaños explained to the Heads of 
State and Government his view of the events, blaming the leaders of the opposition – 
Arnoldo Alemán and Daniel Ortega – for attempting destabilisation. Subsequently, SICA 
asked the OAS to invoke the Democratic Charter using the argument, expressed by the 
Pro Tempore President of SICA: “[SICA] has a responsibility to maintain democratic order 
in the region. […] We believe that Bolaños is an honest and a very responsible person”. 
The President of Guatemala, Oscar Berger added: “because we know that in the political 
arena there are institutions which find a breeding ground to weaken institutionality”. 34 
As was seen earlier in the section on the OAS, the hemispheric organisation responded 
positively to the request from SICA. We should note the allegation by the Sandinista leader 
and former President Daniel Ortega against SICA: “every president in Central America 
has to look to their own affairs, because corruption is an issue in Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Honduras, El Salvador, everywhere, so with what authority do these presidents give their 
support to Bolaños?”.35
The support of SICA for President Bolaños continued after the Central American Court of 
Justice issued a ruling that stated that the constitutional reforms and other laws approved 
by the National Assembly of Nicaragua violated public law and the rule of law.36 The Heads 
of State and Government of SICA agreed to renew their support for President Bolaños. 
They accepted the principal legal argument of the Central American Court of Justice 
and reiterated that it was not possible to alter, even by legislative reform, the principle 
of the separation, balance and independence of state powers, an essential element in 
representative democracies and the values underpinning SICA and the Inter-American 
System. We should note that, unlike the contemporary case of Haiti where the support of 
CARICOM for President Aristide contrasted with the reluctance of the OAS, in the case of 
Nicaragua, the OAS and SICA took an identical stance of support for President Bolaños 
that ended positively with a “national agreement” in October 2005 between the executive 
and the National Assembly.37
34	 http://www.laprensa.com.ni/2004/10/17/nacionales/948599-respaldo-regional-a-bolaos,	authors’	translation;	 
	 (accessed	1	August	2015).
35 http://www.eluniverso.com/2004/10/19/0001/14/74904F7A7BF446B38CAD8E5D0249AD83.html
	 authors’	translation	(accessed	1	August	2015).
36	 http://www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=C-004/05	(accessed	1	August	2015).
37	 http://www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=C-249/05		(accessed	1	August	2015).
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SICA also acted in coordination with the OAS in the case of the coup d’état in Honduras. 
On 25 June, the same day that Honduras’ judiciary initiated a prosecution that included a 
search warrant and arrest against Manuel Zelaya, official representatives of SICA, the OAS 
and the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) consulted with the authorities in Honduras to prevent 
an insurrection by the Armed Forces38 (Vicente 2009). Three days after the removal of 
Zelaya from office and forced to move to Costa Rica, SICA suspended Honduras from its 
right of participation. 
It is not possible to analyse the justifications given by the actors in SICA for their actions 
in both Nicaragua and Honduras, against the background of the legal instruments of the 
organisation because, as we have said, the FTDS does not provide explicit procedures 
in cases of democratic breakdown. Nevertheless, the absence of these procedures did 
not prevent SICA from employing sanctions against Honduras, including suspension and 
economic sanctions. The reasoning of the political actors in SICA was, however, devoid 
of legal foundation. During the meeting deciding on the  imposition of economic sanctions 
on Honduras, the President of Guatemala, Álvaro Colom, stated that “there should be a 
reordering of the powers of the state in Honduras”, while the President of El Salvador, 
Mauricio Funes, maintained that “countries shall use diplomatic measures such as 
withdrawing their Ambassadors from Honduras” and expelling this country from all national 
and international bodies as well as isolating it from the integration organisations.39 Even if 
these opinions may seem appropriate in the face of what was proving to be a flagrant breach 
of a constitutional mandate, in the absence of a democratic clause and formal procedures, it 
is difficult to see that they constituted a sufficient legal basis for the imposition of sanctions.
 3.4.2 Verification and evaluation
After the forced removal of President Aristide, CARICOM took an active position by 
forming the Core Group of Prime Ministers, appointing a special envoy and establishing 
the Task Force to coordinate assistance to the country. By the same token, CARICOM 
decided not to participate in the Temporary Multinational Force authorised by the UN 
Security Council.40
It is interesting to note that in the Haiti crisis, the OAS paid great attention to CARICOM’s 
claims. All the many declarations and resolutions issued by the OAS mentioned CARICOM; 
similarly, all the actions of the OAS were taken after consultation with CARICOM. One 
could argue that CARICOM provided legitimacy to the OAS actions, besides being a more 
38 http://elpais.com/diario/2009/06/28/internacional/1246140003_850215.html	(accessed	1	August	2015).
39	 http://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/51203-sica-congela-cooperacion-bcie-honduras/,	authors’	translation,	 
	 (accessed	1	August	2015).
40	 http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres22_04.jsp	(accessed	1	August	2015).
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flexible organisation to take decision compared with the hemispheric organisation. The 
later had to harmonise the interests and interpretations of the various American states, 
including a sceptical United States (see among other documents: Resolution AG/RES. 
1831 (XXXI-O/01); Resolution CP/RES. 806 (1303/02); Resolution 861).
As was mentioned before, SICA intervened actively in the cases of Nicaragua and Hondu-
ras. However, it is striking that SICA made no use of special missions in neither of these 
cases. In both cases, SICA implicitly delegated the conformation of missions to the OAS, 
which might be due to the lack of formal procedure regarding missions in the FTDS. The 
President of Costa Rica, Óscar Arias, offered to mediate in the conflict in Honduras in 
what could be called a diplomatic mission with the objective of bridging the gap between 
the position of President Zelaya and that of the de facto government. This mission, which 
gave rise to the so-called the San José Agreement41, was a unique initiative by a president, 
and thus cannot be considered an official SICA mission. The same could be said of the 
participation of Costa Rica’s Minister Bruno Stagno in a special mission of the OAS that 
gave rise to the Guaymuras Agreement that put an end to the political crisis in Honduras.42
 3.4.3 Sanctions
Ambiguity in the formal instruments and improvisation are also features of the 
implementation of sanctions by CARICOM and SICA. While CARICOM did not formally 
suspend Haiti when Aristide was unconstitutionally removed, the Caribbean organisation 
did impose a de facto suspension by not inviting the interim government to any of the 
official meetings of the organisation. In the speech to the Security Council mentioned 
earlier, the Honorable Dame Billie Miller (Barbados) justified the de facto suspension by 
arguing that the sustained violation of the principles contained in the Charter of Civil 
Society made it impossible for the Community to allow representatives from Haiti to 
attend meetings of its Council: 
“The interim administration must be held to internationally recognized standards 
with regard to respect for fundamental civil and political rights, due process, and 
the rule of law”.43
David Berry (2005) has criticised the actions by CARICOM arguing that all the formal 
decisions concerning the participation of Haiti were taken during meetings when the 
Haitian representatives were absent, which would be against voting procedures laid 
41	 http://www.nacion.com/nacional/Arias-iniciara-mediacion-Honduras-propia_0_1060094076.html	 (accessed	 1	 August	 
	 2015).
42	 http://www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=C-326/09	(accessed	1	August	2015).
43	 http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres19_05.jsp	(accessed	1	August	2015).
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down in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. This treaty does not indeed stipulate that 
a member state must be excluded for democratic regression (see Chapter 2). According 
to the CARICOM authorities, with the removal of Aristide, Haiti violated the principles 
of the Charter of Civil Society, an additional instrument to the Chaguaramas Treaty; 
however Berry argues that the Charter was not binding and, therefore, did not constitute 
a legitimate basis for the exclusion. 
CARICOM readmitted Haiti on 13 June 2006, and the organisation immediately drew up an 
Action Plan to cooperate with the country including, among other areas, the strengthening 
democracy and institutional construction, special access to markets, promotion of 
investment, and cooperation in energy and educational exchange programmes.44
As far as SICA is concerned, it suspended Honduras from its rights of participation on 29 
June, five days after President Manuel Zelaya’s removal from office. One month later in 
a joint meeting of SICA, the Rio Group, and ALBA, the leaders of SICA agreed to impose 
economic sanctions on Honduras by means of the suspension of loans and payments 
from the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). SICA also declared that 
it would only accept the presence of Honduran representatives accredited by President 
Zelaya and asked the Security Council to issue an order of condemnation and apply the 
“appropriate enforcement measures”.45 It is possible to argue that the SICA sanctions 
echo the sanctions that the OAS, the EU and the multilateral financial institutions were 
imposing at the same time. However, the political and economic sanctions imposed by 
SICA lacked any legal basis, as neither the Treaty of Tegucigalpa, nor the FTDS envisaged 
the suspension of a state party or the application of economic sanctions. 
SICA readmitted Honduras as a member of on 20 July 2010, when all the Central American 
Presidents, with the exception of Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, recognised President 
Porfirio Lobo as the legitimate president of Honduras.46
3.5 The European Union, the Council of Europe and the OSCE  
In this section, we will turn to the analysis of the cases of implementation of MDPs by 
the European organisations. As described in Chapter 1, the end of the Cold War and the 
subsequent process of transition to democracy by the post-Socialist countries led to the 
formalisation of the democratic principles and norms, the respect for human rights and 
 
44	 Haiti	Support	Group.	http://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haitis-membership-caricom	(accessed	1	August	2015).
45 http://www.sica.int/busqueda/Reuniones.aspx?IDItem=37551&IDCat=21&IdEnt=1&Idm=1&IdmStyle=1	 and	 http:// 
	 www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/51203-sica-congela-cooperacion-bcie-honduras/	(accessed	1	August	2015).
46	 http://www.infolatam.com/2010/06/29/sica-lobo-afirma-que-la-reinsercion-de-honduras-es-un-anhelo-del-pueblo/	 
	 (accessed	1	August	2015).
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fundamental liberties within the framework of the “The New Europe”. In the case of the 
EU, the democratic principle became one of the criteria that the Commission applied 
when evaluating candidates for the accession process. The only post-Cold War case, 
and therefore a landmark case, of a candidate country being rejected on the basis of 
non-respect for human rights, democracy and freedom of the press, was Slovakia under 
the government of Vladimir Meciar. This was despite the fact that the country fulfilled, 
according to the European Commission, the economic criteria of a “functioning market 
economy”.47 That being said, the EU has not implemented Article 7 of the TEU to suspend 
an already member state from its rights of participation.
The Council of Europe, founded in 1949 and made up of 47 member states, including 
the 28 current members of the EU, has the fundamental purpose to promote common 
European principles and facilitate the economic and social progress of its member 
states. As we saw in Chapter 2, among the common principles that the CoE seeks to 
promote are democratic pluralism, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights, 
all of which are, moreover, considered conditions of membership. In its institutional 
evolution, the CoE may be conceptualised as an international system to protect human 
rights, including institutions such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
European Court of Human Rights. In this sense, its role in the protection of democracy 
must be understood within the broader framework of the protection of fundamental 
rights and freedoms. Today, the CoE includes a wide range of programmes related to 
the promotion of democracy in a broad sense going beyond what this study defines as 
MDPs.48
The third organisation we analyse in this section is the Organisation for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) that brings together 57 member states, including - in 
addition to the members of the CoE - countries of Central Asia and Eurasia. In contrast 
to the CoE, the United States and Canada are also member states of this organisation. 
The process of transforming the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(CSCE) into the OSCE since 1993 happened in the context of the end of the Cold War. 
This transformation implied an institutional change from a political forum into a regional 
organisation in its own right, as established by the Helsinki Declaration of July 1992 
and the Prague Document of January 1992. This change entailed also a qualification 
of the principle of non-intervention and of the procedure for decision-making based on 
consensus. At the meeting in Copenhagen in June 1990, the member states had already 
declared that “pluralist democracies and the rule of law are essential to ensure respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms […] the development of societies based on 
47	 Commission	of	the	European	Communities	(1997)	Agenda	2000	–	Summary	and	conclusions	of	the	opinions	of	 
	 Commission	concerning	the	Applications	for	Membership	to	the	European	Union	presented	by	the	candidate	 
	 Countries,	Brussels,	DOC/97/8.
48	 See	Council	of	Europe	site:	http://www.coe.int/en/	(accessed	1	August	2015).
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pluralist democracies and the rule of law are prerequisites for progress in creating lasting 
levels of peace, security, justice and cooperation which they are seeking to establish in 
Europe” (Kritz 1993: 19; Sneek 1994). 
During the meetings of the Council of Ministers in Berlin and then in Moscow in June 
and October 1991, the CSCE adopted exceptions to the rule of consensus in the case 
of emergency situations relating to human rights, democracy and the rule of law.49 
The growing number of member states (51 at that date) and the attempted coup 
against Prime Minister Mikhail Gorbachov, as well as the increasing deterioration in the 
situation in Yugoslavia triggered the debates on the revision of the rule of consensus 
and the incorporation of measures when states did not meet these basic principles. 
Yugoslavia, in fact, constituted the principal case of intervention by the CSCE-OSCE 
(see below). 
 3.5.1 Activation
Until 2015, the EU has intervened in three events.50 The first occurred in Austria when the 
Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) became part of a coalition 
government based on an extreme right political platform in 1999. The two other events 
occurred later as reactions against the violation of constitutional norms in Romania on 
the part of the government of Prime Minister Victor Ponta and against the constitutional 
reforms carried out by the President of Hungary, Viktor Orban, that were considered as 
unconstitutional. An analysis of these three incidents reveals some common tendencies. 
In the first place, in none of the three cases the EU activated its formal MDPs, which 
nevertheless did not prevent the political actors from adopting measures of conditionality, 
in the case of Romania, and even punitive measures in the case of Austria. In all three 
events, the EU faced difficulties in implementing coordinated and consensual action in 
respect of the cases in question. In the case of Austria, governments favoured sanctions 
whilst the Commission stood up against them. In the case of Hungary and to a lesser 
extent in that of Romania, tension was generated within the European Parliament as 
well as in the domestic political arena, where EU’s criticism was used by the Hungarian 
government to boost its own internal legitimacy vis-á-vis its electorate. 
Regarding the sanctions imposed on Austria, it is important to observe their nature sui 
generis since, strictly speaking, the EU – as a Union did not impose the sanctions - its 
14 member states implemented them through bilateral measures. The adoption of these 
49	 Document	of	the	Moscow	Meeting	of	the	Conference	on	the	Human	Dimension	of	the	CSCE.
50	 On	3	January	2016,	the	EU	Commission	expressed	its	doubts	with	respect	to	the	compliance	with	the	principle	of	rule 
	 of	law	in	the	constitutional	reforms	adopted	by	the	Polish	government.	This	case	was	included	into	the	analysis	given	its 
	 recent	occurrence,	but	even	so,	this	case	follows	the	tendencies	observed	in	the	cases	of	Hungary	and	Romania.
90
measures was, however, announced by the President of the EU Council and coordinated 
by the fourteen governments, a coalition which came to be known as EU-14, on 31 
January 2000. As a consequence, the EU appeared to be the agent of the sanctions in 
the eyes of public opinion.51
The sanctions were not, however, implemented under the umbrella of a European 
supranational norm (such as Article 7 of the TEU), as they did not follow a decision 
of the Council, and the Commission was not consulted but only “informed” after the 
governments, under the coordination of France and Belgium, had already agreed on the 
measures. The principal argument provided by European governments for the sanctions 
appealed to the shared values of the Union. Thus, for example, the Portuguese Prime 
Minister, António Guterres, in his role as President of the Council, justified the measures 
using the argument that the EU was “a Union based on a set of values and rules and 
on a common civilisation”, describing the FPÖ as “a party which does not abide by the 
essential values of the European family”.52 Other political actors, such as the British 
Foreign Secretary, the German Chancellor and the Italian Prime Minister backed this 
appeal to values. They argued that the political platform of Jörg Haider and the FPÖ 
violated the values of the European Union (Merlingen et al. 2001: 65).
“[O]ur joint interpretation is that we must continue to defend the essential values 
that underpin European construction and which are also the reference framework 
for the way the European Union behaves in its external relations […]. Respect of 
human rights and the main democratic principles, the fight against racism and 
xenophobia do not only concern one country, if this country belongs to a community 
whose members share a project of civilisation and hope to create a common area 
of freedom, justice and security.” (Francisco Seixas de Costa, President of the 
Council). 
The political sanctions adopted against Austria were therefore based on a normative 
consensus around the violation of the principles and norms on which the union is based. 
However, in procedural terms these were adopted five days before the coalition formed 
by Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP) and FPÖ took over the 
government, which occurred on 4 February 2000. In other words, the sanctions were 
announced before the supposed violation came into effect. This may be the reason why 
the 14 governments adopted the sanctions without a formal invocation of the MDPs of the 
EU. By acting in this way, the sanctions were imposed without any legal basis and without 
the Council having previously determined “the existence of a serious and persistent 
breach”, as stipulated in Article 7 of TEU (Calingaert 2000; Merlingen et al. 2002: 66). 
51	 	Statement	by	the	Portuguese	President	of	the	EU	on	behalf	of	XIV	member	States.
52	 	Merlingen	et	al.	2002:	36.
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The absence of any legal basis explains the position adopted by the President of the 
Commission, Romano Prodi, who maintained that, while sharing the concerns underlying 
the decision of the EU-14 and carefully monitoring the situation, the Commission would 
maintain normal relations with Austria.53 Prodi went on to say in his declaration that the 
duty of a strong supranational institution is not to isolate one of its members, but to 
keep it firmly integrated. The Commission was later to reiterate the criticism of what it 
perceived as a new tendency in the member states to act outside of the framework of the 
institutions of the Union in an obvious allusion to the intergovernmental and discretionary 
nature of the measures adopted by the EU-14. 
In an attempt to explain the behaviour of the EU-14 countries, Merlingen, Mudde and 
Sedelmeier (2001) argued that the coalition was coordinated by governments such as 
France and Belgium, who were facing the threat of the rise of extreme right parties similar 
to the FPÖ of Haider in their own domestic arena. Indeed, Jacques Chirac and Guy 
Verhofstadt acted as the agenda setters of the EU-14 appealing, as we have seen, to 
normative arguments concerning the common values of the Union.54 As we will see later, 
when expressing an opinion on the sanctions, governments who were not facing the 
same pressure in their domestic political arenas, such as Denmark and even Germany, 
soon began to act to deactivate the measures against Austria.
The community institutions of the EU and the CoE also acted in the case of Hungary and the 
supposed illiberal turn taken by the Fidesz government in successive constitutional reforms 
facilitated by a parliamentary majority. During the first year of its second mandate - 2010 - 
Viktor Orbán carried out twelve constitutional reforms and then adopted a new constitution 
in 2011 which reformed the civil and criminal codes, the constitutional court, the institutions 
of national security, the media, the electoral code, and the laws protecting personal data, 
among other principal regulations (Scheppele 2013). European political actors perceived 
these reforms as at odds with the principle of respect of the rule of law as they broke with 
the balance and independence of the powers of the state and internal controls; however, 
neither in this case EU actors invoked the activation of Article 7 of the TEU. 
In 2011, after Hungary – at that time holding the presidency of the Council – had approved 
a new media law, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for the Hungarian 
government to revise the law. Months later, the European Parliament issued a second 
resolution, passed by a low margin of votes, this time criticising the new Constitution 
of Hungary and calling upon the Commission to monitor the situation. This resolution 
evoked a strong reaction of the Hungarian government, which alleged that the democratic 
shortcomings of the institutions of the Union should prevent them from interfering in the 
domestic affairs of a nation state whose authorities has been democratically elected. 
53	 	http://www.repubblica.it/online/mondo/haider/governo/governo.html	(accessed	1	July	2015).
54	 	http://elpais.com/diario/2000/03/24/internacional/953852403_850215.html	and	https://www.wsws.org/en/ 
	 articles/2000/02/haid-f22.html	(accessed	1	August	2015).
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The EU adopted a similar position on a series of extraordinary regulations adopted by the 
Romanian parliament with the support of Prime Minister Victor Ponta aimed at challenging 
and removing from office President Traian Băsescu in July 2012. As in the Hungarian 
case, both the Commission and the Parliament reacted immediately. The President of the 
European Parliament, Martin Schulz, warned the Romanian government of the dangers of 
using emergency measures to sidestep constitutional norms. As in the cases of Hungary 
and Austria, the EU did not invoke Article 7 as a legal basis for the actions taken against 
the government of Ponta (Sedelmeier 2014). 
Despite a shared assessment of the illiberal nature of the measures adopted by the 
governments of Hungary and Romania, the EU institutions faced difficulties when it came 
to implementing coordinated action. In the case of Hungary in particular, the centre-right 
block of the European Parliament (European People’s Party) backed the government of 
Fidesz by hindering subsequent actions. The European Commission sent letters on behalf 
of its President that the Hungarian government used in its domestic politics, and “framed” 
by Orbán as a conflict between his legitimate government and the illegitimate bureaucracies 
of Brussels. In 2012, the European Commission initiated three infringement proceedings 
against Hungary in the areas of the independence of the judiciary, the independence 
of the Central Bank and the independence of the Data Protection Authority that did 
not however prevent the Hungarian government from adopting further constitutional 
modifications later.55 The inability of the European institutions to act in a coherent manner 
can be attributed not only to coordination problems both at intergovernmental level and 
at the level of the institutions of the union. The character of the actions themselves raised 
difficulties for action. Strictly speaking, the reforms adopted by the government of Viktor 
Orbán, considered individually, were not anti-constitutional: it was as a whole and in their 
mutual interaction that these reforms gave the government of Orban the appearance of a 
regime that called into question the democratic principles and values of the EU (for this 
argument see Scheppele 2013). 
The Polish government of Peace and Justice (PiS) elected in October 2015 has passed 
several laws that have been perceived as a violation of the rule of law. On the one 
hand, parliament annulled the appointment of judges of the Constitutional Court by the 
previous parliament and proceeded to name five alternative judges. The Constitutional 
Court found unconstitutional part of the measure but the government refused to publish 
the judgment, thus depriving the ruling of validity. The new parliament also approved an 
express reform of the Constitutional Court that forces it to resolve the issues in order of 
arrival and not following the classification assigned to them by the TC itself. The same 
law granted the President of the Republic the ability to appoint the President and Vice 
President of the Constitutional Court. The Venice Commission has opined that this reform 
55 European	Commission	‘Court	of	Justice	rules	Hungarian	forced	early	retirement	of	 judges	 incompatible	with	EU	law’,	 
	 MEMO/12/832,	Brussels,	6	November	2012.
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is unconstitutional. In addition, the government has also passed legislation on the media 
of public ownership, on the reform of the National Judicial Council (KRS) and the Civil 
Service that could affect the rule of law.
Facing those events, the European Commission launched a dialogue with the Polish 
authorities on two issues: reform of the constitutional court and the public broadcasting 
service, indicating in one case the need to adapt to the guidelines of the Venice Commission 
and in the other case to Community law. However, the dialogue did not yield the expected 
results and found a defiant stance from the Polish authorities who questioned the legal 
basis of the Commission to act. On June 1 the Commission announced the development 
of an Opinion within the framework of the rule of law (which has not been made public).
The intervention of the CSCE-OSCE in Yugoslavia is also of relevance, because in this 
case the regional organisation did formally activate its MDPs. The Prague Document56 
specified the activation of the measures in the case of democratic disruption. This 
Document establishes that the Council of Ministers of External Relations or the Committee 
of Senior Officials ( both executive bodies at the highest level of the organisation) may take 
action to protect the ability of the CSCE-OSCE to safeguard human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law in cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of the relevant 
principles of the CSCE (paragraph 16).
The CSCE invoked this paragraph to proceed with the suspension of Yugoslavia. During 
the Second Emergency Meeting of the Council in Helsinki in May 1992, the CSCE 
declared: 
“The pattern of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of CSCE commitments 
by the authorities in Belgrade and by the JNA [National Yugoslav Army] is now 
unmistakably established. Those leaders have driven themselves into isolation. 
They bear the prime responsibility for the escalation of bloodshed and destruction” 
(Declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Bloed 1993: 938). 
The Council stated in the same declaration that it would examine the report issued by 
the Peace Conference of the European Community to decide whether or not to extend 
the exclusion decision. We should stress that for the purposes of this study, the actions 
of the CSCE-OSCE fall less within the framework of protection of the democratic order 
and more within that of protecting human rights. Indeed, an appendix to the declaration 
expressed the justification of the decision taken. In it, the organisation stressed the 
continuing destruction and human suffering resulting from the conflict and aggravated 
by the continuous obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the violation 
56	 Prague	Document	on	Further	Development	of	CSCE	Institutions	and	Structures.	See	Duxbury	(2011:	212).
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of the fundamental human rights of the ethnic minorities, including Albanians in Kosovo 
(Declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Bloed 1993: 942). Moreover, the declaration 
was issued after the death of a member of the mission sent by the then European 
Community. 
 3.5.2 Verification and evaluation
In the Declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina, the CSCE did not establish a special 
mission, but urged all parties to cooperate with the mission organised by the UN Secretary 
General, as well as with the Peace Conference organised by the European Community 
(EC) (Bloed 1993). Subsequently, the CSCE organized an “exploratory” mission to prepare 
recommendations on the role that the future CSCE could play in promoting peace, 
avoiding violence, and restoring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Sandzak. This exploratory mission concluded with the delivery 
of a report with proposals to implement a war crimes tribunal that the UN accepted. In 
February 1993, the Committee of Senior Officials named a coordinator, based in Brussels, 
to monitor the joint missions of the EC and the CSCE.
In 1995, the OSCE was mandated to lead a mission to Bosnia headed by the U.S. 
Ambassador Robert Frowick with the purpose of implementing a peace agreement. 
The  number of participants (one hundred members) and the budget of 25 million dollars 
gives an idea importance of the mission. This budget is only slightly inferior than the 
total budget of the organisation. The mission objectives included the development of 
an electoral mission charged with implementing electoral rules, regulations concerning 
voters, candidates and political parties, monitoring the vote counting, and publishing 
and certifying the results. At the same time, the OSCE created the High Commissioner 
on National Minorities as an instrument to prevent conflicts between minorities after the 
dissolution of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (Sica 1996; Packer 1999).
In the case of the political sanctions imposed on Austria, the EU-14 group, through the 
European Court of Human Rights, appointed a committee of three political and academic 
experts in June 2000. The objective of this committee of three “wise persons” was to 
prepare a report on the evolution of the commitments by the Austrian government to the 
“common values” of Europe, including the rights of minorities, refugees and immigrants. 
Over two months the three experts entered into dialogue with political groups and civil 
society and issued a report that constituted the basis for the withdrawal of sanctions. 
Amongst its conclusions, the report pointed out that, ironically, Austria was the only 
European country that granted constitutional status to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Likewise, the report stated that Austria was one of the countries that did 
95
most to protect the rights of minorities, rights that are constitutional obligations in the 
Austrian national legal system. Finally, despite recognising that the FPÖ was described 
as a “right wing party with extremist expressions” 57, the committee of experts suggested 
that sanctions should be lifted (see also Duxbury 2000). 
The case of Romania deserves special mention in this section on verification and 
evaluation. In fact, the EU – through the Commission – implemented in Romania as well 
as in Bulgaria a “cooperation and verification mechanism” (CVM) to monitor progress in 
the areas of judicial reform, corruption and organized crime. The EU adopted the CVMs 
in 2007 as part of the accession process of both countries. As part of the CVM, the 
Romanian government committed to submitting annual reports on the state of progress 
in meeting a series of goals, as well as to authorising and supporting the work on the 
ground of missions of experts from the Commission itself (Commission 2006). The CVM 
report served as a support for the eleven measures the Commission requested from the 
government of Victor Ponta after the adoption of the emergency measures considered 
by the EU institutions to be at odds with the constitutional order. As we will see in the 
following section, the action of the CVM, along with the pressure from the EU, largely 
explain the cancelling of the exceptional measures and, ultimately, the failure of the recall 
referendum against President Băsescu. 
 3.5.3 Sanctions
The European organisations imposed sanctions in the cases of Yugoslavia and Austria. 
Although these crises are completely different, a common feature to both cases is the 
doubt casted over the effectiveness of the sanctions which ultimately brings the debate 
back to the question of the real benefits of suspending or excluding a member state 
(see Magliveras 1999; Duxbury 2011). In the case of Yugoslavia, the suspension seemed 
inevitable in the light of the accusations against the government; at the same time, it 
posed difficulties in maintaining a communication channel between the CSCE-OSCE and 
that country. In the case of Austria, the isolation of the government resulting from the 
diplomatic measures caused resentment in Austrian public opinion that unexpectedly 
favoured the position of the FPÖ.
As was said earlier, the CSCE decided in the Declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina (12 
May 1992) to exclude the Yugoslav delegation from meetings of the organisation on the 
basis of Paragraph 16 of the Prague Document. The Declaration included a statement 
of Yugoslavia according to which “the Yugoslav delegation cannot give its consent to 
57	 Report	 by	 Martti	 Ahtisaari,	 Jochen	 Frowein,	 and	 Marcelino	 Oreja	 (2000):	 para	 106.	 The	 Report	 was	 prepared	 by	 
	 Martti	Ahtisaari,	former	President	of	Finland;	Jochen	Frowein,	Director	of	the	Max	Planck	Institute	for	Comparative	and 
	 International	Private	Law;	and	Marcelino	Oreja,	former	Foreign	Minister	of	Spain.
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the text of the Declaration on Bosnia-Herzegovina, but cannot prevent its adoption due 
to the application of paragraph 16 of the Prague Document on Further Development of 
CSCE Institutions and Structures” (see Declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Bloed 
1993: 940). It is interesting to observe that the CSCE Council declared that the decision 
to exclude Yugoslavia was not directed at the peoples of Serbia and Montenegro, but 
at their government (see Bloed 1993: 951). The suspension of Yugoslavia was lifted 
in November 2000, when the OSCE admitted the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a 
new member. The admission – or readmission – was carried out after the signing of 
the Kumanovo Peace Treaty that officially ended the conflict in Kosovo, and after the 
presidential elections that ended in the resignation of Slobodan Milosevic and the coming 
to power of Vojislav Kostunica, the last president of the now extinct Yugoslavia. The 
bases for the suspension and then readmission of Yugoslavia by the CSCE-OSCE are, in 
fact, different: while the suspension was carried out on the basis of the existence of an 
armed conflict and violations of human rights, the readmission was done on the basis of 
a demonstration of the commitment to democracy in the country (Duxbury 2011). 
The sanctions established by the EU-14 group and communicated by the President of 
the European Council in January 2000 against Austria included various political and 
diplomatic measures. In the first place, the 14 countries suspended bilateral relations with 
any Austrian body that was a member of the FPÖ. Secondly, the countries did not support 
the candidacy of Austrians applying for posts in international organisations. Thirdly, EU 
capitals received Austrian ambassadors only at a technical level. As was said earlier, 
it is inaccurate to say that the political sanctions imposed on the Austrian government 
were sanctions implemented by the EU. They were imposed by a coalition of European 
countries that, however, used the values of the union as a normative justification of the 
sanctions, and used the Council as a platform to announce and suspend sanctions. 
Once the sanctions had been communicated, the Austrian government officially declared 
that the EU actions violated fundamental legal principles and the spirit of the European 
treaties, including recognition of a democratic government governed by the rule of law. 
The sanctions were announced four days before the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition came to power, 
which, as has been pointed out, means that the sanctions were imposed a priori. However, 
the TEU framework did not envisage a “preventive suspension” and the sanctions were 
lifted unconditionally on 12 September 2000 after the issuing of a report of the “committee 
of wise persons” verifying that Austria did not have any record of human rights violations. 
It is worth briefly reviewing the role of the committee. The European Court of Human 
Rights appointed the committee at the request of the EU-14. This happened within the 
context of the growing perception, on the part of some European governments, that 
the punitive measures were turning out to be counter-productive, as they fuelled anti-
European feeling in the affected country. The Nordic countries in particular argued that, 
with the use of sanctions, the regional powers were interfering in the domestic affairs of 
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small countries. In this sense, the consensual decision of the EU-14 group to support the 
formation of a committee of experts may be directly linked to the political actions led by 
the Danish Prime Minister Nyrup Rasmussen (Merlinger et al. 2001).
The Communiqué on the lifting of sanctions reiterated the concerns of the EU regarding 
the ideological nature of the FPÖ, and expressed the desire of the EU to continue reflecting 
on how to monitor, evaluate and act in similar situations. The sanctions were thus framed 
as “constructive measures” rather than as “punitive measures”. We should point out 
that the report of the “committee of wise persons” offered suggestions for improving the 
EU mechanisms when faced with democratic ruptures or violations of human rights by 
incorporating prevention and monitoring procedures mentioned in Article 7 of the TEU. 
At the Nice Summit in December 2000, three months after the sanctions were lifted, the 
Council decided that in future the EU could intervene if there was a danger of a serious 
violation of the principles of the Treaty (Falkner 2001).
Although it is not possible to talk about the imposition of sanctions in Rumania, there 
was strong pressure from the EU on the Ponta government to annul the exceptional 
measures designed to revoke the mandate of President Băsescu. The pressure from 
the EU institutions was not the only form of pressure, as the United States government 
also made public its criticism of the Ponta government’s actions. However, explicit 
conditionality accompanied EU pressure: if Romania did not backtrack on the exceptional 
measures and, in particular, on the modification of the quorum required to hold a recall 
referendum, the country would see its membership of the Schengen area subject to an 
indefinite delay. It is interesting to note that in an official Communiqué, the Commission 
criticised the use by member states of the reports of the CVM as a criterion to decide 
on the admission of Romania to the Schengen Area, arguing that such membership was 
subject to its own mechanisms and criteria.58 Nevertheless, according to analysts it was 
precisely this link between the CVM and conditionality together with the domestic support 
for the government of Victor Ponta, which explained the decision of this government to 
annul the exceptional measures and reinstate the mandate of the Constitutional Court. 
The lack of such “conditionality” on the one hand, and the popularity of Viktor Orbán, on 
the other, explains why the measures adopted by the Commission were strikingly less 
effective in the case of Hungary (Iusmen 2014).
58	 Communiqué	of	the	Commission	on	the	Cooperation	and	Verification	Mechanism.	Plenary	session	of	the	European	 
	 Parliament,	13	March	2013.
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3.6. Conclusions
This chapter concludes by highlighting the patterns and general tendencies identified 
in the previous sections. The cases analysed constitute political events of highly varied 
nature (political violence, coups d’état, removals from office, etc.), each one of which has 
its own specific qualities, which limits any attempt to generalise. Even considering this, 
it is possible to identify a series of common elements of interest in order to consider the 
challenges faced by the regional organisations when they implement mechanisms for 
democratic protection. We will group these general elements according to the dimensions 
used in the analysis. 
Activation
The analysis of the activation of MDPs shows that organisations tend either to neglect the 
decision-making procedures enshrined in their normative instruments or to act without 
invoking such instruments where they exist. In fact, in only 8 of the 21 cases analysed in 
Latin America, and 1 of the 4 cases analysed in Europe, did the regional organisations 
invoke the clauses. 
In both regions, discretion seems to take precedence over any obligation to observe the 
formal procedures, with the justification that the severity of a given crisis calls for swift 
and assertive action on the part of the regional organisations. The invocation of “common 
values” is often used as a justification for establishing missions and even drawing up 
sanctions while sidestepping or disregarding the procedures formalised in clauses and 
protocols. 
The affected state usually activates the actions by the regional organisation and goes 
on to play an important role during the decision-making process in most Latin American 
cases. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, this is not necessarily contrary to what is stipulated 
in the various democratic clauses of the organisations of the region and may be justified 
on the basis of the principle of non-interference that requires that the affected state 
“authorises” the measures taken by the organisation. Nevertheless, the analysis carried 
out provides reasons to think that the governments of the affected states may make use 
of the regional organisations to reinforce their own position in the internal conflict. This of 
course does not apply to cases of a flagrant disruption of a constitutional order (coups 
d’état), but it does so in those cases where conflicts between the different branches of 
the state or between the government and the opposition exist. 
In the four cases analysed in Europe the tendency is precisely the opposite: the other 
member states have activated measures against the affected state. The risk is also the 
opposite of that in Latin America, namely the possibility of an imbalance against the affected 
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state, as was alleged in the case of Austria. Nevertheless, the balances and controls within 
the EU and the CoE seem to have worked effectively, since the pressure of small states, 
as well as the positions adopted by the European Commission and the European Court of 
Human Rights, facilitated the constructive search of solutions to the impasse.
To sum up, both the Latin American and the European organisations show a common 
tendency towards discretion over adherence to the legal bases and procedures; however, 
whereas in Latin America discretion tends to lean towards favouring the affected government, 
in Europe discretion goes in the opposite direction. This divergence may be explained by 
an underlying difference in the types of political crisis that informed MDP design in either 
regional context. In Latin America, MDPs were drawn up mainly with possible military coups 
d’état in mind - a very real threat to the region, particularly during the Cold War period. In 
Europe, on the other hand, the main point of reference for the architects of MDPs seems to 
have been “breaches to the rule of law” committed by incumbents. 
In no Latin American case, a member state has activated MDPs to take action against 
another member state, even if the OAS Democratic Charter does provide for such a 
procedure. Once again, the principle of non-interference appears to inhibit this procedure 
that, on the contrary, seems to be the norm in the European context, where it is in fact 
the Commission which adopts a more moderate stance towards member states, as the 
cases of Austria and Romania indicate. 
The activation of MDPs by civil society organisations is even more unusual in the Latin 
American context. No legal instrument – with the partial exception of CARICOM’s Charter 
of Civil Society – allows for this procedure, and in none of the cases analysed have regional 
organisations responded to a request stemming from the citizens. And while CARICOM 
Charter allows for requests from civil society, its soft-law nature limits its implementation 
(see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, it is a current subject of debate in the regional organisations 
with particular relevance in the discussion about the scope of MDPs. Insofar as regional 
organisations are expanding beyond their traditional core concerns with coups (as the 
evidence seems to suggest), considerations regarding citizens and their political rights are 
coming to the fore. Neglecting the role of citizens and civil society in MDPs and their activation 
would imply that only governments could be the “victims” of democratic disruptions, - which 
in turn is suggestive of a very shallow definition of formal democracy, and one which several 
Latin American governments have strongly criticised (see Chapter 1). 
The General Assembly of the OAS debated the option of including citizens in the activation 
of MDPs following an US government initiative. The US government proposed to create 
a permanent monitoring body that could hear accusations from trades unions, business 
organisations and other civil society groups, possibly leading to the invocation of the 
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Democratic Charter. The proposal was widely rejected (Schnably 2005). It is a sensitive 
subject but one which it is necessary to raise. Civil society groups and organisations may 
be behind a threatened democratic breach against an elected government, as happened in 
the failed coup against President Chávez in 2002. On the other hand, civil society can also 
be the victim of unconstitutional actions on the part of elected governments. To neglect 
either of these two extremes is implicitly to circumscribe the purpose and scope of MDPs.
Verification	and	evaluation
Discretion also predominates in the conformation of the missions and their purposes. Both 
in Latin America and in Europe missions tend to be determined – in their composition, 
purpose and scope – ad hoc, depending on the situation at hand. The OAS is, to a certain 
extent, an exception, abiding more strictly by its formal rules and delegating in all cases 
a salient role to the General Secretariat. The South American regional organisations – 
particularly MERCOSUR and UNASUR – tend to favour an intergovernmental design for 
their missions, prioritising the role of ambassadors and foreign ministers. Nevertheless, in 
the most recent case of political crisis in Venezuela, a more prominent role was awarded 
to the Secretary General of UNASUR, while the Council of Foreign Ministers was ascribed 
a secondary role. 
The cases analysed show that cooperation through inter-organisational missions is a 
common practice. CARICOM and SICA have a record of cooperation with OAS missions. 
Cooperation between MERCOSUR, UNASUR and the OAS seems interrupted ever since the 
suspension of Paraguay in 2012. The attempt by the Secretary General of the hemispheric 
organisation to form an inter-organisational mission was eventually dismissed and the South 
American organisations took the lead in this case. In Europe, in turn, the then European 
Community worked very closely with the OSCE during the intervention in Yugoslavia. 
The only mission that incorporated actors from civil society was the so-called “committee 
of wise persons” which acted in the conflict with Austria. This was once again an ad hoc 
mission constituted at the request of the Danish government and accepted by the EU-14 
group and by the Commission. Its purpose was to supply impartial arguments to justify 
the decision to suspend sanctions against this Central European country.
This brings us to a final point of interest: in both regional contexts, missions are 
highly ambiguous when it comes to drawing the line between objectives of scrutiny 
and diplomatic mediation. In practise, it is difficult to distinguish between fact-finding 
missions and mediation missions. In most cases, missions are hybrid in nature, 
considerably muddying the waters between the two objectives: they provide ground-
level information to the respective regional organisation and, at the same time, they 
mediate in the internal conflicts of the affected state. In some cases, the fact-finding 
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missions act a posteriori to the adoption of measures and sanctions, and therefore do 
not fully accomplish their primary objective of scrutinizing the facts. This is, rather than 
uncovering information ex ante - as established in the clauses and protocols - the fact-
finding missions often investigate the facts ex post. Examples of this can be found in 
the case of the UNASUR intervention in Bolivia in 2008, and the “committee of wise 
persons” in the case of Austria in 2000. 
More careful scrutiny would contribute to more thoughtful and informed actions 
and measures on the part of the organisations. However, the opposing argument 
is, of course, that thorough scrutiny delays such actions, and contributes to the 
organisations’ irrelevance - a criticism often levelled at organisations such as the 
OAS. The solution to this dilemma might lie in converting this scrutiny function into a 
preventive and permanent action; regional organisations would thereby have at their 
disposal the necessary information before the outbreak of a political crisis. The CVM 
implemented by the European Commission in Romania could be a model for such a 
permanent scrutiny instrument. However, the ad hoc character of the CVM, as well as 
its restrictive and selective implementation (limited to Bulgaria and Romania), raises 
the issue of equality among states. Why has the EU applied an evaluation mechanism 
in the case of Bulgaria, but not so in the case of Hungary, or in the case of Romania, 
but not so in the case of Italy? Answers are far from evident and may stir up political 
controversy (see Chapter 4).
Sanctions
Sanctions are the most extreme measures organisations can take in the case of persistent 
breaches to the democratic order. This explains why not all the cases analysed in this chapter 
applied sanctions. However, we again find a low level of adherence to the formal procedures 
in the cases in which organisations adopted them. The OAS activated political and economic 
sanctions against Haiti in 1991, although its judicial instruments did not allow for sanctions. 
SICA suspended Honduras and adopted economic sanctions against that country without 
any legal basis; CARICOM suspended Haiti in 2004, also without any legal basis; UNASUR 
suspended Paraguay, although its democratic clause was awaiting ratification; and the 
EU Council announced the diplomatic isolation of Austria without invoking Article 7 of the 
TEU. Sanctions, similarly to missions, are determined ad hoc, hinging on the contingent 
interpretation of the political actors. The ending of sanctions is therefore determined on a 
case by case basis, according to what the political actors interpret as a “return to normality”.
The end of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a case in point. While 
the OSCE decided about the suspension of its membership on the basis of violations of 
the human rights of minorities, it terminated the sanctions in light of what was judged 
to be an improvement in the conditions of democracy, following the exit of Slobodan 
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Milosevic. Thus, the application and the suspension of the sanctions followed two 
different logics. Certainly, it could be argued, as in the case of the missions, that actors 
decide about the adoption and suspension of sanctions based on the severity of the 
case and, therefore, a margin of discretion is to some degree necessary. However, when 
political actors (governments and civil society) perceive that organisations adopt extreme 
actions such as sanctions on a case-by-case basis and without adherence to formal rules 
and procedures, an erosion in the regional organisation’s legitimacy is to be expected.
 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of sanctions, and their termination in particular, is in itself 
a matter of some disagreement. For instance, it is debatable whether the suspension 
of Honduras by the OAS contributed to the resolution of the country’s political crisis, 
or whether this procedure rather distorted the communication between the de facto 
government and the OAS. In any case, the OAS did not fulfil its objective of restoring 
Manuel Zelaya in office. Even harder to assess is the effectiveness of the suspension 
of Paraguay by MERCOSUR and UNASUR. Two other factors affected sanctions 
and questioned their legitimacy. First, the international community had different 
interpretations regarding the (un)constitutionality of Lugo’s impeachment. MERCOSUR 
and UNASUR interpreted the event as a coup d’état, while the OAS deemed it a serious, 
yet constitutional action. Second, the accession of Venezuela to MERCOSUR during the 
suspension of Paraguay – the only member state that had opposed that accession – 
deeply damaged the legitimacy of the sanctions in the eyes of the Paraguayan public and 
the international community. Similarly, the diplomatic isolation of Austria adopted by the 
EU-14 group yielded the opposite and undesired effect by generating anti-EU sentiments 
on the part of the Austrian people, thereby pressing the European institutions to find an 
ad-hoc solution to the impasse and finishing the sanctions. 
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4  CONCLUSIONS AND  
RECOMMENDATIONS
The study began with acknowledging the progress and consolidation of democracy 
achieved in both Latin America and Europe. This progress was linked, among other 
things, to the states’ membership in regional organisations in both continents as well as 
to the adoption of mechanisms of democracy protection (MDPs) by these organisations.
But the study also showed that the rule of law and the democratic order have been 
threatened in various circumstances. In this context, the MDPs proved pivotal to 
guaranteeing the reestablishment of the respect of the rule of law and democracy in the 
states facing those threats. The numerous cases of intervention both in Latin America 
and the Caribbean and in Europe show a mixed and not always satisfactory record. 
In Latin America, organisations such as UNASUR and the OAS have successfully 
intervened to contain possible crises, but it is also true that in some instances the 
mechanisms did not yield the desired effects, generated unintended consequences, 
or called into question the very legitimacy of the intervention and, ultimately, of the 
regional organisation. 
We finish the study with three general observations. First, the challenges and deficiencies 
observed in the cases of intervention by regional organisations may be understood, in 
part, as consequence of the success of the processes of democratisation. The more 
democratic regimes consolidate and, in the case of Latin America, the military threat 
becomes less likely, the more the challenges faced by regional organisations become 
subtler, more complex and difficult to address. Troubles that in the past would have 
been considered as belonging exclusively to the domestic realm, are now regarded as 
political crises requiring action by a regional organisation. According to Schnably (2005), 
the regional organisations have two options: to act in accordance with shared normative 
principles (constitutional transnationalism or “regionalism”), or to act in accordance with 
a faithful respect for the normative principles adopted by each member state (in the 
traditions of international law). Instead, Chapter 3 has shown that regional organisations 
tend to use their discretion and to adopt actions appropriate for the case, thereby shifting 
the formal instruments towards the background of weak legitimacy. 
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Second, the interventions analysed show that to the degree that organisations take 
action in new types of political conflicts that go beyond “classic” cases of “coups 
d’état”, they have to pay more attention to the domestic impact of the measures 
adopted. Indeed, the actions of the regional organisations are a two-level game. On 
the one hand, there is a regional and inter-governmental dynamic, and, on the other, 
there is an internal dynamic within the countries, and especially within the affected 
country. As we have seen, the domestic actors – in this case, the actors of civil 
society – can be the drivers of a democratic disruption, they can be the victims of 
non-democratic actions by their governments, and they can also be affected by the 
sanctions adopted by the organisations. Ultimately, the citizens of the member states 
constitute the very source of legitimacy for the operations of regional organisations and 
these organisations should therefore consider them adequately and systematically. 
Third and finally, the study has provided evidence for the importance of interpretation 
in the process of implementing the MDPs. Chapter 3 commenced with the assumption 
that there is no immediate relationship between the design of the formal mechanisms 
and their implementation, but that an intermediate space articulated by interests and 
interpretation exists in-between them. The regional organisations and the political agents 
who act on their behalf do not only have to interpret the situation that they face. In as 
much as the organisations widen their scope of intervention, they also have to interpret 
the political context and the legal order (the national constitution) of the affected state. 
This, in turn, implies a cognitive asymmetry between the regional organisation and the 
domestic political bodies of the affected state. This asymmetry must be acknowledged 
and managed if the organisation aims to remain within the realm of legitimate action. 
When the interpretation rests primarily or exclusively on the executives of the member 
states, as usually happens in intergovernmental organisations, the cognitive asymmetry is 
greater. The organisations therefore need to be able to count on specialised bodies which 
are independent from the government and which have the necessary ability to analyse 
and to judge in order to interpret the political circumstances and the constitutional texts 
when acting in a concrete democratic crisis.
Based on this evidence, we formulate a series of suggestions for action with the objective 
of maximising the effectiveness of the MDPs.
1. Formalisation, that is, the codification into explicit legislative measures of 
the MDPs would enhance the legal certainty that member states need when 
resorting to a regional organisation. These mechanisms should therefore be 
subject to explicit regulations laid down in formal clauses, rather than being 
deduced, for example, from the preambles of the treaties or from other more 
generic provisions.
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2. The regional organisations in Latin America and the Caribbean and Europe all 
share the common characteristic of relative vagueness in the definition of the 
concept of democracy. Often, it is subsumed in alternative concepts such as 
“constitutional order”. Consequently, a relatively high level of detail in respect 
of which violations are conceived a threat to democracy, including a list of 
minimum elements, should reduce the margin of interpretative discretion in any 
specific type of situation. However, regulation should avoid the tendency of 
over-regulation too, given that sometimes a violation of the democratic order 
and the rule of law can occur in a subtle manner, through procedures apparently 
in accordance with these values.
3. The evolution towards mechanisms of preventive control has been common and 
various organisations allow for action in the face of a “threat of a disruption” 
(that is, before a disruption occurs). This development must be welcomed, but 
the margin of discretion it implies must be managed with caution to prevent 
abuses.
4. In practically all MDPs, activation is the responsibility of authorities and/or 
bodies, whether of the organisation itself or of the member states. In no case, 
civil society or the people are legitimised as petitioner. Without arriving at 
radical solutions (for example, enabling groups from civil society to participate), 
formalising activation mechanisms that would allow these actors to access the 
bodies of the respective organisation would improve its own effectiveness as 
well as its legitimacy.
5. One outstanding feature of the MDPs is their incidental nature; that is, they are 
activated when there is an instance of disruption or threat of disruption of the 
democratic order. This, together with the discretion in interpretation, creates 
a problem of possible inequality in the way different states are treated, that is, 
the selective use of clauses which are not applied in a systematically equal way 
in all cases. One mechanism that would ease this potential problem is to take 
recourse, simultaneously, to permanent systems of monitoring of the fulfilment 
of and respect for the values defended by the MDPs. 
6. With respect to procedures, there is a tendency to combine mechanisms 
for verification on the ground with mechanisms for diplomatic mediation. 
Although political mediation may be beneficial, the organisations should rely on 
established fact-finding procedures, without having to depend on secondary 
sources. Verification and evaluation can be more objective and legitimate if they 
are entrusted to independent subjects or autonomous bodies of the organisation 
with a recognised degree of expertise. 
7. Mechanisms for hearings: The procedural aspects have not developed 
mechanisms for hearings for affected parties. In some cases (e.g. Austria 1999) 
this has provoked allegations of defencelessness and unilateralism. Regional 
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organisations should therefore provide for mechanisms to hear the affected 
parties. For example, the High Level Review Group of the Commonwealth of 
Nations recommended in the year 2001 that sanction measures could only be 
activated after the state party concerned had had the opportunity to respond to 
the allegations made.
8. The application of MDPs via sanctions and/or suspension from membership is, 
in all the cases considered, a political process and not a legal one. The existing 
mechanisms for recourse to the law are relatively weak. Therefore, reinforcing 
the role of the regional courts (where these exist) as a means of verifying the 
compliance of the norms and of the procedure would provide MDPs with greater 
legitimacy.
9. Sanctions: The panoply of possible sanctions is considerable; without 
assessing their effectiveness, their application should follow a strict criterion of 
proportionality and should in no way threaten the wellbeing of citizens or human 
rights. As sanctions are measures of last resort, their type, the legal instruments 
of the organisation should define and formalise their application and duration.
10. Termination of sanctions: In general, organisations do not refer explicitly to 
procedures for terminating the sanctions. The model of periodical evaluations 
of the situation allows for the termination of sanctions in the moment in which 
the circumstances that had caused the adoption of sanctions have completely 
disappeared, and the organisations should abide by this model.
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